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While wireless communication has dramatically changed the way people work
and interact, the wireless era continues to be plagued by insufficient security. With-
out necessary countermeasures, even a few attackers can break down the whole
network. On the other hand, attacker detection can be extremely challenging in
realistic scenarios because misbehavior may also be caused by various other fac-
tors, such as noise and uncertainty, and perfect monitoring is either impossible
to achieve or too expensive to afford. In this dissertation we have investigated
how to secure wireless ad hoc networks against insider attacks in noisy and hostile
environments, based only on local and imperfect monitoring.
In traditional ad hoc network applications, nodes usually belong to the same
authority and pursue some common goals. The inherent cooperative nature of
such networks makes them extremely vulnerable to insider attacks. For example,
by dropping other nodes’ packets and/or injecting an overwhelming amount of traf-
fic, insider attackers can easily break down the whole network. In this dissertation
we have first studied how to secure such ad hoc networks against insider attacks
under noise and imperfect monitoring. Besides devising a set of efficient monitor-
ing and attacker detection mechanisms to defend against routing disruption and
injecting traffic attacks, we have also formally analyzed the dynamic interactions
between good nodes and attackers under a game theoretic framework, where both
the optimal defending strategies and the maximum damage that can be caused by
insider attackers have been derived.
In many civilian applications, nodes in ad hoc networks tend to act selfishly.
Stimulating selfish nodes to act cooperatively poses one key research challenge,
especially in realistic contexts. In this dissertation we have also investigated how
to design attack-resistant cooperation mechanisms for such networks. We have
first designed an attack-resistant cooperation stimulation strategy for mobile ad
hoc networks, then formally analyzed the issue of secure cooperation in ad hoc
networks under a game theoretic framework. Finally, we have derived a set of
reputation-based attack-resistant and cheat-proof cooperation strategies for such
ad hoc networks that can work well in noisy and hostile environments under im-
perfect monitoring.
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A wireless ad hoc network is a group of nodes without requiring centralized admin-
istration or fixed network infrastructure, in which nodes can communicate with
other nodes out of their direct transmission ranges by cooperatively forwarding
packets for each other through wireless connections [69, 79]. Since ad hoc net-
works can be easily and inexpensively set up as needed, they have a wide range of
applications, such as military exercises, disaster rescue, mine site operations, etc.
In traditional military and emergency applications, nodes in an ad hoc network
usually belong to the same authority and pursue some common goals. To maximize
the overall system performance, nodes usually work in a fully cooperative way,
and will unconditionally forward packets for each other. We refer to such ad hoc
networks as cooperative ad hoc networks. Recently, emerging applications of ad
hoc networks are also envisioned in civilian usage [16, 18, 19, 45, 58, 60, 78, 99]. In
civilian applications, nodes typically do not belong to a single authority and may
not pursue a common goal. Consequently, fully cooperative behaviors, such as
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unconditionally forwarding packets for each other, cannot be taken for granted.
On the contrary, in order to save limited resources, such as battery power, nodes
may tend to be “selfish”. We refer to such ad hoc networks as autonomous ad hoc
networks.
Since ad hoc networks are usually deployed in hostile environments and nodes
may tend to be selfish, before they can be successfully deployed in practice, the
following two critical issues must be resolved first: security and node cooperation.
When ad hoc networks are designed without taking into consideration necessary
security concerns, adversaries can easily exploit the possible vulnerabilities of the
network to cause damage. In many critical applications, such as in battle fields,
the potential damage caused by attacks can be fatal. Meanwhile, since nodes may
be selfish, without necessary cooperation mechanisms, nodes may not be willing to
help the others, and consequently the network may reach a non-cooperative state.
This contradicts the original purpose of designing ad hoc networks: nodes should
help each other to extend the coverage and/or to best utilize the limited resources.
Security in wireless ad hoc network has drawn extensive attentions over the
past several years [3, 34, 36, 42, 58, 96, 101]. It has been realized that securing ad
hoc networks can be extremely challenging. In wireless networks, due to unre-
stricted channel access, a variety of attacks can be easily launched, ranging from
passive eavesdropping to active interfering. Since ad hoc networks usually do not
have centralized monitoring or management points, the situation can be further
deteriorated. Meanwhile, nodes in ad hoc networks may not have enough physical
protection, and can be easily captured and compromised by adversarial parties
and become insider attackers. Without necessary countermeasures, even a few
attackers can break down the whole network.
2
Past research on securing ad hoc network have mainly focused on preventing
attackers from entering the network through mechanisms such as secure key dis-
tribution and secure neighbor discovery [34–37, 42, 65, 76, 95, 101]. However, the
research on defending ad hoc networks against insider attacks is still in its prelim-
inary stage. For example, in the literature, only very few works have implicitly
considered insider attackers, such as in [16,58]. On the other hand, insider attacks
can be very common in ad hoc networks due to the self-organized nature of ad hoc
networks and due to that nodes can be easily captured and compromised.
Besides insider attacks, another important aspect that has been widely ignored
is the effects of noise and imperfect monitoring. In general, the wireless environ-
ments are usually full of noise and uncertainties. Meanwhile, due to the limited
resource constraint and distributed nature, imperfect monitoring in ad hoc net-
works is either impossible to achieve or too expensive to afford. How to secure
ad hoc networks under noise and imperfect monitoring and how to design effective
and robust monitoring mechanisms pose another research challenges. For example,
how to design robust attacker detection mechanisms that are able to distinguish
those malicious behavior caused by attackers from those caused by noise or incor-
rect monitoring? What is the maximum possible damage that can be caused by
attackers under noise and imperfect monitoring? What are the optimal defending
strategies? None of them have been fully addressed in the literature.
Besides security, node cooperation is also a critical issue that needs to be ad-
dressed. Recently, many schemes have been proposed to stimulate node cooper-
ation in ad hoc networks, such as in [6, 7, 16, 18, 19, 26, 31, 58–60, 78, 80, 99, 100].
These schemes can be roughly categorized into two types: payment-based and
reputation-based. In payment-based methods, such as in [7, 18, 19, 99, 100], nodes
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request help from others by paying them. In reputation-based schemes, such as
in [6, 16, 26, 31, 58–60, 78, 80], whether a node can get help from the others based
on its reputation, which is usually determined by its past actions observed by
its peers. Comparing to the payment-based schemes, the advantage of reputation-
based schemes lies in that they do not require tamper-proof hardware or centralized
banking service to process billing information, while the drawback is that in some
situations cooperation cannot be effectively stimulated.
Although many schemes have been proposed to stimulate cooperation among
selfish nodes in ad hoc networks, most of them have assumed that nodes have
accurate monitoring, and will act rationally whose only goal is to maximize their
own payoff. In other words, they have not considered possible malicious behaviors.
However, since ad hoc networks are usually deployed in noisy and hostile envi-
ronments, without taking into consideration possible malicious behaviors, those
proposed schemes can easily collapse. The situation is further deteriorated in real-
istic contexts when the environment is noisy and the monitoring cannot be perfect,
since both selfish and malicious nodes can take advantage of noise and imperfect
monitoring to improve their performance or cause more damage. How to design
attack-resistant and cheat-proof cooperation strategies that can work well in noisy
hostile environments will be one major challenge in autonomous ad hoc networks,
and none of the existing works have fully addressed it.
1.2 Contributions
In summary, this dissertation has investigated how to establish secure and reli-
able ad hoc network services in hostile environments under noise and imperfect
monitoring. Specifically, two important issues have been addressed: 1) how to
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secure cooperative ad hoc networks against insider attacks under noise and imper-
fect monitoring, and 2) how to design attack-resistant and cheat-proof cooperation
strategies for autonomous ad hoc networks that can work well in noisy and hostile
environments. The contributions lie in three aspects: secure ad hoc network pro-
tocol design, formal analysis of security and cooperation in ad hoc networks, and
effective and robust monitoring mechanism design.
Secure ad hoc network protocol design: In this dissertation we have de-
signed a series of effective secure protocols to handle various attacks. Specifically,
we have presented a set of secure routing protocols to handle various routing dis-
ruption attacks, such as dropping packets attack, black hole attack, etc. By using
a novel self-evaluation mechanism, malicious node detection can be significantly
speeded up. Meanwhile, since they can distinguish routing disruptions caused by
nodes’ temporary misbehavior and those caused by malicious attacks, the pro-
posed protocols can work well in noisy environments. Following that, we have also
presented a set of effective protocols to handle various types of injecting traffic at-
tacks. Under which the optimal strategies from the attackers’ point of view is not
to launch injecting traffic attacks. When stimulating cooperation among selfish
nodes, we have also designed a set of secure receipt submission and credit update
protocols to support attack-resistant cooperation stimulation.
Formal analysis of security and cooperation in ad hoc networks: One
major contribution of this dissertation would be the formal analysis of security
and cooperation in ad hoc networks under noise and imperfect monitoring, as well
as under insider attacks. Specifically, for cooperative ad hoc networks, we have
modeled the dynamic interactions between good nodes and attackers as securing
routing and packet forwarding game. Under a game theoretic framework, we have
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derived the optimal defending strategies and the maximum possible damage that
the attackers can cause. For autonomous ad hoc networks, we have jointly studied
the security and cooperation issues under a game theoretic framework. We have
first derived the cheat-proof cooperation strategies for two nodes scenarios, then
demonstrated when cooperation among selfish nodes can be effectively stimulated
and how to obtain optimal cheat-proof and attack-resistant cooperation strategies
for autonomous ad hoc networks under realistic scenarios.
Effective and robust monitoring mechanism design: To defend against
insider attacks, one has to base on what being observed about the others’ behav-
iors. However, due to the fully distributed nature of ad hoc networks and the
limited resource constraints, perfect monitoring is either impossible to achieve or
too expensive to afford. In this dissertation, we have presented several robust mon-
itoring mechanisms to detect various malicious behaviors. Specifically, to handle
routing disruption attacks, we have proposed a light-weight monitoring mecha-
nism based on end-to-end acknowledge and intermediate node reporting. When
the proposed monitoring mechanism is used, a malicious node has to either admit
dropping packets, or provide reports that are most likely conflicting with others
which can make them easily be detected. We have also designed a robust and cost-
efficient monitoring mechanism to detect possible injecting traffic attacks, where
only packet headers need to be listened and decoded. Besides that, we have also
designed another robust monitoring mechanism for autonomous ad hoc networks to
help detecting whether some nodes have dropped other nodes’ packets or receipts,
which are used to claim credits from the requesters.
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1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the
related works, describes the system models, and presents some notations that will
be used throughout this dissertation.
The first major part of this dissertation consists of the following chapters:
Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5. This part is dedicated to study how to se-
cure cooperative ad hoc network against insider attacks under noise and imperfect
monitoring. Specifically, Chapter 3 studies how to defend against routing disrup-
tion attacks [93], Chapter 4 investigates how to defend against injecting traffic
attacks [90], and Chapter 5 provides formal analysis of securing cooperative ad
hoc networks under noise, imperfect monitoring, and insider attacks [89].
The second major part of this dissertation consists of Chapter 6 and Chap-
ter 7. This part studies how to design attack-resistant cooperation strategies for
autonomous ad hoc networks that can work well in noisy and hostile environments.
Specifically, Chapter 6 presents an attack-resistant cooperation stimulation system
for autonomous mobile ad hoc networks [91], and Chapter 7 focuses on the game
theoretic analysis of cooperation and security in autonomous ad hoc networks [92].





2.1.1 Security in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
In wireless ad hoc networks, since all nodes share the common communication
medium, attackers can easily launch a variety of attacks ranging from passive
eavesdropping from active interfering. For example, a simple and straight-forward
attack is jamming attack, where attackers can disrupt the other nodes’ normal
communications by introducing interferences. Various schemes have been proposed
to handle jamming attack in the literature. One way to handle jamming attack is
to design robust physical layer technologies, such as spread spectrum, which are
resistant to RF jamming [71, 72, 77]. By using some spreading codes only known
to the communicating peers, nodes have created a secret channel among them.
Recently, several new approaches have also been proposed to handle jamming
attacks in a more efficient way, such as those proposed in [20, 55, 81, 83, 84]. In
this dissertation we will not focus on jamming attack, and will assume that some
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existing schemes, such as those proposed in [71,83], have been employed to address
such attacks.
Besides physical layer attacks, attackers can also try to interrupt the normal
Medium Access Control (MAC) layer behaviors, such as described in [53, 74]. In
this dissertation, we will not focus on specific types of MAC layer attacks. Instead,
we will focus on some general attack models which have incorporated the effects
of MAC misbehavior. In [22], Cagalj et. al. have also studied the possible MAC
layer selfish and cheating behaviors in wireless CSMA/CA networks.
To secure wireless ad hoc network, we can first try to prevent attackers from
entering the networks. This can be achieved by applying necessary access con-
trol and authentication [42, 101], such as secure key distribution [8, 21, 43] and
secure neighbor discovery [34, 36], etc. For example, Zhou and Haas investigated
distributed certificate authorities in ad hoc networks using threshold cryptogra-
phy [101]. Hubaux et al. developed the idea of self-organized public-key infras-
tructure similar to PGP in the sense that public-key certificates are issued by
the users [42,43]. The difference with PGP is that in their system, certificates are
stored and distributed by the users. Capkun et al. have also discussed how to build
security associations with the help of mobility in mobile ad hoc networks [24].
Since in ad hoc network nodes relies on each other to forward packets, routing
has become one of the most active research topics during the last decade, and
various routing protocols have been proposed, such as DSR [47, 48], AODV [70],
OLSR [25], and TBRPF [63]. Some performance comparison among various rout-
ing protocols have been demonstrated in [2]. However, in order to work properly,
these protocols need trusted working environments, while in reality the environ-
ments is usually adversarial. Some examples of routing attacks are: black hole,
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gray hole, wormhole, rushing attack, and frame-up [34–37]. For example, the at-
tackers can create a wormhole through collusion in the network to short circuit
the normal flow of routing packets [35], or can apply rushing attack to disseminate
route request quickly through the network [36]. By creating a wormhole or apply-
ing rushing attacks, the attackers can prevent good routes from being discovered,
and increase their chance of being on discovered routes. Once an attacker is on a
certain route, it can create a black hole by dropping all the packets passing through
it, or create a gray hole by selectively dropping some packets passing through it.
If the protocols have the mechanism to track malicious behavior, an attacker can
also try to frame up good nodes. In addition, an attacker can modify the packets
passing through it, which has similar effects as dropping packets, but a little bit
more severe because more network resources will be wasted when the following
nodes on this route continue forwarding this corrupted packet.
In the literature, various secure routing protocols have been proposed, such
as [3, 9, 12, 13, 17, 23, 27, 34–39, 58, 62, 65, 66, 68, 76, 86, 87, 94, 95, 98]. For example,
Papadimitratos and Haas [65] have proposed a secure routing protocol for mobile
ad hoc networks that guarantees the discovery of correct connectivity information
over an unknown network in the presence of malicious nodes. Sanzgiri et al [76]
have considered a scenario that nodes authenticate routing information coming
from their neighbors while not all the nodes on the route will be authenticated by
the sender and the receiver. Hu, Perrig and Johnson [34] have proposed Ariadne, a
secure on-demand ad hoc network routing protocol, which can prevent attackers or
compromised nodes from tampering with uncompromised routes that (only) consist
of uncompromised nodes. In [35, 36], they have described how to defend against
rushing attacks through secure neighbor discovery and how to apply packet leashes
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to defend against wormhole attacks. Later, Capkun and Hubaux have investigated
secure routing in ad hoc networks in which security associations exist only between
a subset of all pairs of nodes [23].
However, most of the existing secure routing schemes have focused on prevent-
ing illegitimate nodes from being on the routes. In other words, they have focused
on defending against outside attackers. In ad hoc networks, due to the loose ac-
cess control and weak physical protection, insider attackers can be very common.
In the literature, very few schemes have considered insider attacks. Among them
the most representative one is proposed by Marti et al [58]. They focused on
the case that nodes agree to forward packets but fail to do so, and proposed two
tools that can be applied upon source routing protocols: watchdog and pathrater.
Specifically, each node launches a “watchdog” to monitor its neighbors’ packet
forwarding activities and to make sure that these neighbors have forwarded the
packets according to its requests. Pathrater will be used to prevent misbehaving
nodes from being on the selected routes when performing route discovery. How-
ever, this system suffers some problems, and many attacks can cause a malicious
behavior not being detected, such as ambiguous collisions, receiver collisions, lim-
ited transmission power, collusion, and partial dropping. Meanwhile, due to noise
and possible attacks, good nodes can also be easily marked as malicious. In other
words, the proposed scheme may suffer both high false alarm ratio and high miss
detect ratio when performing attacker detection.
Following [58], CONFIDANT was proposed to detect and isolate misbehav-
ing node and thus make it unattractive to deny cooperation [16]. Comparing to
the schemes proposed in [58], CONFIDANT allows the reputation to propagate
throughout the network. However, since the scheme still rely on watchdog, they
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also suffer the same types of problems as [58]. Furthermore, once reputation is
allowed to propagate, attackers can also collude to frame up or blackmail other
nodes [15]. Besides [16,58], Ning and Sun have also provided a case study of insider
attacks against mobile ad hoc routing protocols by focusing on AODV.
Security in ad hoc networks has also been addressed from the intrusion detection
point of view, such as [40,41,96,97]. In these works, the authors have discussed how
to apply intrusion detection techniques to secure wireless ad hoc networks. They
examined the vulnerabilities of a wireless ad hoc network, then introduced multi-
layer integrated intrusion detection and response mechanisms. Such techniques can
also be used to deal with insider attacks. However, in their work they have not
described specific mechanisms to secure ad hoc networks. Furthermore, no formal
analysis of securing ad hoc networks against insider attacks has been provided.
Besides the above mentioned attacks, attackers can also launch various types
of other attacks to disrupt the normal communications. For example, one severe
attack is Sybil attack [29, 61], where an attacker can behave as if it were a larger
number of nodes, for example by impersonating other nodes or simply by claiming
false identities. In [3] the authors have also studied JellyFish attacks. Another
types of severe attacks, which will be thoroughly studied in this dissertation, is
injecting traffic attacks, that is, the attackers will try to inject an overwhelming
amount of traffic into the network to consume valuable network resources and de-
grade the network performance. Section 2.3 describes the attack model considered
in this dissertation.
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2.1.2 Cooperation Stimulation in Ad Hoc Networks
In the literature, many schemes have been proposed to address the issue of cooper-
ation stimulation in ad hoc networks [6,7,16,18,19,26,31,58–60,78,80,99,100]. One
way to stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes is to use payment-based meth-
ods, such as those proposed in [7,18,19,99,100]. In [18], a cooperation stimulation
approach was proposed by using a virtual currency, called nuglets, as payments for
packet forwarding, which was then improved in [19] using credit counters. However,
tamper-proof hardware is required in each node to count the credits. In [99], Sprite
was proposed to stimulate cooperation. It releases the requirement of tamper-proof
hardware, but requires a centralized credit clearance service trusted by all nodes.
Furthermore, these schemes consider only nodes’ selfish behavior, while in many
situations nodes can be malicious. Payment-based cooperation stimulation mech-
anisms have also been proposed in [7,100]. Although these schemes can effectively
stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes, the requirement of tamper-proof hard-
ware or central billing services greatly limits their potential applications.
Another way to stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes is to use reputation-
based methods with necessary monitoring [58, 60]. Actually, the watchdog mech-
anism proposed in [58] can also be regarded as a reputation-based cooperation
stimulation scheme. Following [58], Core has been proposed to enforce coopera-
tion among selfish nodes [60], which uses watchdog as a basic building module. As
mentioned before, these schemes suffer some problems. For example, many attacks
can cause a malicious behavior not being detected in these schemes, and malicious
nodes can easily propagate false information to frame up others. Meanwhile, these
schemes can only isolate misbehaving nodes, but cannot actually punish them,
and malicious nodes can still utilize the valuable network resources even after be-
13
ing suspected or detected.
Besides that, efforts have also been made toward mathematically analyzing
cooperation in autonomous ad hoc networks by applying game theory, such as
[6, 26, 30, 31, 59, 78, 80]. In [78], Srinivasan et. al. provided a mathematical frame-
work for cooperation in ad hoc networks by focusing on the energy-efficient aspects
of cooperation. In [30, 31], Felegyhazi et. al. defined a game model and identi-
fied the conditions under which cooperation strategies can form an equilibrium.
In [59], Michiardi et. al. studied the cooperation among selfish nodes in a co-
operative game theoretic framework. In [6], Altman et. al. studied the packet
forwarding problem in a non-cooperative game theoretic framework and provide a
simple punishing mechanism considering end-to-end performance objective of the
nodes. The study of selfish behavior in ad hoc networks has also been addressed
in [26,80]. All these schemes consider only selfish behavior and most of them study
cooperation enforcement under a repeated game framework. Since these works are
highly related to our work, in later chapters the difference between our work and
these works as well as the uniqueness of our work will be further demonstrated.
Recently, Cagalj et al have also studied the selfish and cheating behaviors in
wireless CSMA/CA networks under a game theoretic framework [20,22]. They have
used both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to model and analyze the
co-existence of multiple CSMA/CA selfish users, and proposed a simple channel
access protocol that discourages selfish behavior and results in the optimal and
fair allocation of the available bandwidth. In their work, besides Nash equilibrium,
Pareto optimality and fairness have also been considered when deriving the optimal
strategies. However, in their work, they have not considered the situations where
some nodes’ goals are to harm other specific nodes. Meanwhile, the game model
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in [20, 22] is also different from ours presented in Chapter 7 in the sense that the
strategy space, utility functions, and solution formats are totally different.
In this dissertation, we have used game theory to analyze the dynamic inter-
actions among different nodes. Roughly speaking, game theory deals with multi-
person decision making, in which each decision maker tries to maximize his own
utility [32,64]. Game theory has been used to solve various problems in networking
and telecommunication applications, such as resource allocation [5,46,57,73,82,85],
flow and congestion control [4], routing games [7,50,51,54,75], cooperation enforce-
ment in ad hoc networks [6,26,31,59,78,80]. In our work, we mainly focus on the
most important concept in game theory: Nash equilibrium1. Specifically, we adopt
Nash equilibrium as a basic optimality metric to measure the performance of those
derived strategies.
2.2 System Description
Now we introduce some basic assumptions of the wireless ad hoc networks networks
to be considered. We assume that each node is equipped with a battery with limited
power supply, communicates with other nodes through wireless connections, and
can move freely inside a certain area when mobile ad hoc networks are considered.
In cooperative ad hoc networks, nodes are classified into good or malicious, while
in autonomous ad hoc networks, nodes are classified into selfish or malicious.
We mainly focus on the scenarios that the wireless links are bidirectional, but
not necessarily be symmetric. That is, if node A is capable of transmitting data
to node B directly, then node B is also capable of transmitting data to A directly,
1A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile for a game with the property that no player can
benefit by changing his strategy while the other players keep their strategies unchanged [64].
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though the two directions may have different bandwidths. This assumption holds
in most wireless communication systems. In this paper, neighbor refers to that two
nodes are in each other’s transmission range, and can directly communicate with
each other. We assume that the MAC layer protocol supports acknowledgement
(ACK) mechanism. That is, if node A has sent a packet to node B, and B has
successfully received it, then node B needs to notify A of the reception immediately.
In this dissertation we will mainly focus on source routing, where source routing
means that when sending a packet, the source lists in the packet header the com-
plete sequence of nodes through which the packet is to traverse. In general, due to
the multihop nature, when a node wants to send a packet to a certain destination,
a sequence of nodes will usually be requested to help forwarding this packet. We
refer to the sequence of ordered nodes as a route, the set of intermediate nodes
on a route as relays, and the procedure to discover a route as route discovery. In
general, the route discovery can be partitioned into three stages. In the first stage,
the requester notifies other nodes in the network that it wants to find a route to
a certain destination. In the second stage, other nodes in the network will make
their decisions on whether they will agree to be on the discovered route. In the
third stage, the requester will determine which route should be used.
Without otherwise explicit specification, we will use DSR [47] as the underlying
routing protocol. There are two basic operations in DSR: route discovery and route
maintenance. In DSR, when a source S wishes to send packets to a destination D
but does not know any routes to D, S will initiate a route discovery by broadcasting
a ROUTE REQUEST packet, specifying the destination D and a unique ID. When
a node receives a ROUTE REQUEST not targeting on it, it first checks whether
this request has been seen before. If yes, it will discard this packet, otherwise,
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it will append its own address to this REQUEST and rebroadcasts it. When
the REQUEST arrives at D, D then sends a ROUTE REPLY packet back to S,
including the list of accumulated addresses (nodes). A source may receive multiple
ROUTE REPLYs from the destination, and can cache these routes in its Route
Cache. Route Maintenance handles link breakages. If a node detects the link to the
next hop is broken when it tries to send a packet, it will send a ROUTE ERROR
packet back to the source to notify this link breakage. The source then removes
the route having this broken link from its Route Cache. For subsequent packets
to the destination, the source will choose another route in its Route Cache, or will
initiate a new Route Discovery when no route exists.
As we have mentioned before, in this dissertation we will focus on defending
against insider attacks. We assume that each node has a unique and verifiable
identity, such as a public/private key pair, and there is a secure binding between
a node’s public key and its address. We also assume that a node can know or
authenticate other nodes’ public keys, but no node will disclose its private key to
others unless it has been compromised. We do not assume that nodes trust each
other, since some nodes may be malicious or be compromised.
In [14], Bobba et. al. have studied how to establish security associations be-
tween pairs of nodes in mobile ad hoc networks without relying on any trusted
security service. Specifically, they have shown how to bootstrap security for the
routing layer, and have used the notion of statistically unique and cryptographi-
cally verifiable (SUCV) identifiers to implement a secure binding between IP ad-
dresses and keys. They have also demonstrated that the solution is applicable to
various routing protocols, such as Ariadne [34] and SEAD [37]. In our work, we as-
sume the scheme proposed in [14] will be applied to bootstrap security association
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among nodes.
In ad hoc networks, in general not all packet forwarding decision can be per-
fectly executed. For example, when a node has decided to help another node to
forward a packet, the packet may still be dropped due to link breakage or the
transmission may fail due to channel errors. In this dissertation we refer to those
factors that may cause decision execution error as noise, which include environ-
mental unpredictability and system uncertainty, channel noise, mobility, etc. When
necessary, we will use pe to denote the average packet dropping probability due to
noise. It is worth mentioning that the packet dropping probability may vary over
time due to the varying channel conditions, mobility, etc.
We also assume that some underlying monitoring schemes have been employed
(such as those proposed in [58] and those described in Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and
Chapter 6) which can let the source know whether its packets have been successfully
delivered to their destinations. Meanwhile if a packet has been dropped by some
relay, the underlying monitoring mechanism can let the source know who has
dropped this packet. However, we do not assume any perfect monitoring, instead,
we assume that even a node has successfully forwarded a packet, with probability
no more than pf it can be observed as dropping packet (i.e., false alarm). On the
other hand, when a packet has been dropped by a certain relay, with probability no
more than pm this can be observed as a forwarding event (i.e., miss detect). Here
pf and pm characterize the capability of the underlying monitoring mechanism.
It is easy to understand that pf and pm may vary according to the underlying
monitoring mechanism and the monitoring environment.
When evaluating the performance of proposed strategies, besides theoretical
analysis, we have also conducted various simulations. In our simulations, we use
18
an event-driven simulator to simulate mobile ad hoc networks. The physical layer
assumes a fixed transmission range model, where two nodes can directly commu-
nicate with each other successfully only if they are in each other’s transmission
range. The MAC layer protocol simulates the IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordina-
tion Function (DCF) [44]. DSR will be used as the underlying routing protocol.
When considering mobile ad hoc networks, we assume that each mobile node moves
according to the random waypoint model [88], which can be characterized by the
following three parameters: a node starts at a random position, waits for a dura-
tion called the pause time that is modeled as a random variable with exponential
distribution, then randomly chooses a new location and moves towards the new lo-
cation with a velocity uniformly chosen between vmin and vmax. When it arrives at
the new location, it waits for another random pause time and repeats the process.
2.3 Attack Model
Next we exploit the possible attacks that can be launched in such networks. We
say a route R = “R0R1 . . . RM” is valid at time t if for any 0 ≤ i < M , Ri and Ri+1
are in each other’s transmission range. We say a link (Ri, Ri+1) is broken at time t
if Ri and Ri+1 are not in each other’s transmission range. It is easy to see that at
time t, a packet can be successfully delivered from its source S to its destination
D through the route R = “R0R1 . . . RM” with R0 = S and RM = D within the
delay constraint τ if and only if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
1. R is a valid route at time t, and no links on route R are broken during the
transmission.
2. No errors have been introduced to the packet.
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3. No intermediate nodes (including S) on route R will drop the packet.
4. The total transmission time is less than τ .
In order to degrade the network performance, the attackers can either directly
break the ongoing communications, or try to waste other nodes’ valuable resources.
Based on the above analysis we can see that from the attackers’ point of view, the
following attacks can be used:
A1. Emulate link breakage: When a node Ri wants to transmit a packet to the
next node Ri+1 on a certain route R, if Ri+1 is malicious, Ri+1 can simply
keep silent to let Ri believe that Ri+1 is out of Ri’s transmission range, which
can dissatisfy the condition 1.
A2. Drop/modify/delay packets: Dropping a packet can dissatisfy the condition
3, modifying a packet can dissatisfy the condition 2, and delaying a packet
can dissatisfy the condition 4.
A3. Prevent good routes from being discovered: Such attacks can either dissatisfy
the condition 1, or increase their chance of being on the discovered routes
and then launching various attacks such as A1 and A2. Two examples are
wormhole and rushing attacks [35,36].
A4. Inject traffic: Malicious nodes can inject an overwhelming amount of packets
to overload the network and consume other nodes’s valuable energy. When
other nodes forward these packets but cannot get payback from attackers,
the consumed energy is wasted.
A5. Collusion attack: Attackers can work together in order to improve their
attacking capability.
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A6. Slander attack: Attackers can also try to say something bad about the others.
A7. Impersonation: Attackers can also try to impersonate good nodes to achieve
their various malicious goals, such as causing other nodes to believe these
good nodes are malicious.
A8. Sybil attack: An attacker can behave as if it were a larger number of nodes,
for example by impersonating other nodes or simply by claiming false iden-
tities [29,61].
Among these inside attacks, A1, A2, and A3 can be regarded as the specific
types of routing disruption attacks, A4 can be regarded as resource consumption




Secure Ad Hoc Networks Against
Routing Disruption Attacks
In this chapter we investigate how to defend cooperative ad hoc networks against
routing disruption attacks, that is, attackers attempt to cause legitimate data
packets to be routed in dysfunctional ways, and consequently cause packets to be
dropped or extra network resources to be consumed. To defend against such at-
tacks, we have designed a set of light-weight mechanisms with low overhead. First,
each node launches a route traffic observer to monitor the behavior of each valid
route in its route cache, and to collect the packet forwarding statistics submitted
by the nodes on this route. Since malicious nodes may submit false reports, each
node also keeps cheating records for other nodes. If a node is detected as dishon-
est, this node will be excluded from future routes, and the other nodes will stop
forwarding packets for it. Third, each node will try to build friendship with other
nodes to speed up malicious node detection. Route diversity will also be explored
by each node to discover multiple routes to the destination, which can increase the
chance of defeating malicious nodes who aim to prevent good routes from being
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discovered. In addition, adaptive route rediscovery will be applied to determine
when new routes should be discovered.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 describes the proposed mech-
anisms in detail. Section 3.2 analyzes the security of the proposed mechanisms.
Section 3.3 presents the simulation results and performance evaluation. Finally,
Section 3.4 summarizes this chapter.
3.1 Defense Mechanism Description
Before describing the detail of proposed mechanisms, which is referred to as HADOF
(the acronym of Honesty, Adaptivity, Diversity, Observer, and Friendship), we first
introduce some notations, as listed in Table 3.1. We focus on insider attacker, and
assume that all nodes in the network are legitimate. Meanwhile, if two nodes set
up communication between them, they must have built a trust relationship, and
trust the information reported by each other. This trustiness can be built outside
of the context of the network (e.g. friends), or through certain authentication
mechanisms after the network has been set up. In this chapter we use S to denote
the source and D to denote the destination, and use traffic pair to refer to a pair
of nodes (S, D) communicating with each other directly or indirectly.
3.1.1 Route Traffic Observer
In HADOF, each node launches a route traffic observer (RTO) to periodically
collect the traffic statistics of each valid route in its route cache. Here a valid route
refers to a route without receiving any link breakage report. At the end of each
pre-determined interval, the RTO examines each traffic pair (S, D) and each route
23
Table 3.1: Notations for each traffic pair
Ri The ith available route from S to D in S’s Route Cache.
Li Number of intermediate nodes on the route Ri.
FNcur(A,S, Ri) The number of packets originated from S and forwarded by A via
route Ri in this interval.
RNcur(A,S,Ri) The number of packets originated from S and received by A via route
Ri in this interval.
FNtot(A,S) The total number of packets originated from S and forwarded by A.









, the overall packet delivery ratio of A for S.
H(A, S) A’s honesty score in S’s point of view.
Ri to D in S’s route cache that has been used in this interval. In particular, the
RTO collects RNcur(A, S,Ri) and FNcur(A, S, Ri) reported by each node A on this
route. This can be done by letting D periodically send back an agent packet to
collect such information, or letting each node periodically report its own statistics
to S. For each node A known by S, S’s RTO also keeps a record of RNtot(A, S)
and FNtot(A, S). To reduce overhead, the RTO of S will request reports from the
intermediate nodes of a route only when S realizes that some packets have been
dropped on this route in this interval based on the reports submitted by D.
After the RTO has finished collecting packet forwarding statistics, it recalcu-
lates the expected quality of those routes that have been used in this interval. In
general, the expected route quality is affected by many factors, such as the for-
warding history of each node on this route, the hop number, the current traffic load
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and traffic distributions, etc. Before defining the expected route quality metric,
we first define the expected packet delivery ratio of A for S, P (A, S), as follows:
P (A, S) = (1− β)Pavg(A, S) + βPcur(A, S, Ri). (3.1)
That is, P (A, S) is a weighted average of Pcur(A, S,Ri) and Pavg(A, S), and β is
used to adjust the weight between them. The intuition behind this is that when
predicting a node’s future performance, we consider not only this node’s current
performance, but also its past history. It is easy to see that the range of P (A, S)





P (A, S) ∗H(A, S)− λ ∗ Li, (3.2)
where H(A, S) is A’s honesty score in S’s view indicating the suspicious degree of
A. H(A, S) ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating being honest and 0 indicating
being malicious. The criteria of calculating H(A, S) is presented in Section 3.1.2.
In (3.2), a small positive value λ is introduced to account for the effects of hop
number. As a result, if two routes have the same value for the product in the right
hand of (3.2), the route with less hops is favored. The intuition behind this is that
we expect a route with less hops having less influence on the network. In HADOF,
the values of P (S, S), P (D, S), H(S, S) will always be 1, since a source trusts itself
and the corresponding destination.
3.1.2 Cheating Record and Honesty Score
When S’s RTO collects packet forwarding statistics, malicious nodes may submit
false reports. For example, it may report a smaller RN value and a larger FN
value to cheat the source and frame up its neighbors. To address this, each source
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S A B C D
Figure 3.1: Detection of cheating behavior
keeps a Cheating Record (CR) database to track whether some nodes have ever
submitted or been suspected to submit false reports to it. S will mark a node as
malicious if S has enough evidence that the node has submitted false reports.
Initially, S assumes that all nodes are honest, and sets the honesty score H(A, S)
for each node A to be 1. After each report collection which is performed period-
ically, S will try to detect whether some nodes on a route are cheating through
checking the consistence of the received reports. For example, in Fig. 3.1, both
A and B are on the route R with A being ahead of B. A cheating behavior is
detected if S finds that FNcur(A, S, R) 6= RNcur(B,S, R). If one of them (A or B)
is trusted by S (e.g., that node is S itself or D), then the other node can be marked
as cheating by S, and the honesty score of the cheating node will be set to be 0.
Otherwise, S can only suspect that at least one of them is cheating. In this case,
the honesty scores of both nodes are updated as
H(A, S) = αH(A, S) (3.3)
H(B,S) = αH(B, S) (3.4)
where 0 < α < 1 is used to indicate the punishment degree. In addition, if
FNcur(A, S, R) > RNcur(B,S, R), S will reset the value of FNcur(A, S,R) using
RNcur(B,S, R), reset the value of RNcur(B,S, R) using FNcur(B, S, R), and recal-
culate FNtot(A, S) and RNtot(B,S) using the updated values. Since it makes no
sense that FNcur(A, S, R) < RNcur(B,S, R), we will not consider this situation.
Once a node has been detected as cheating, punishment should be applied on it.
In HADOF, when S detects a node B being malicious, S will put B in its blacklist
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(equivalent to set H(B, S) to be 0), stop forwarding any packets originated from
B, and refuse to be on the same route as B in the future.
Next we introduce a mechanism to recover the honesty scores of nodes that
have been framed up by malicious nodes. We still use the example in Fig. 3.1
to illustrate this mechanism. When S finds the reports submitted by A and B
conflicting with each other, that is, FNcur(A, S, R) > RNcur(B,S, R), besides
decreasing A’s honesty score, S will also increase the number of possible frame-up
attacks launched by B to A, and records the difference between FNcur(A, S, R)
and RNcur(B, S, R). Similarly, S does the same thing to B. If later S detects that
B is a cheating node, S will check how many nodes have ever been framed up by B
and for each node how many times. Assume A has been framed up by B m times,





which is always bounded by 1. Meanwhile, S also needs to increase FNtot(A, S)
or decrease RNtot(A, S) to recover the inaccuracy caused by frame-up attacks
launched by B.
3.1.3 Friendship
Since a malicious node knows the source and destination of each route that it is
on, to avoid being detected, it will only frame up its neighbors who are neither
the source nor the destination. Therefore, even when the CR database has been
activated, the malicious nodes can only be suspected, but cannot be proved as
cheating by the source. This can be mitigated by taking advantage of the existing
trustiness relationship. Each node maintains a private list of trust nodes that it
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considers to be honest. Now if B submits false reports to S to frames up A, while
S trusts A, B can be detected by S immediately, and H(B, S) will be set to be 0.
3.1.4 Route Diversity
Since there may exist more than one route from a source to a destination, it is usu-
ally beneficial to discover multiple routes. In [2, 67], the authors have shown that
using multiple routes can reduce the route discovery frequency. In this chapter, we
investigate how route diversity can be used to defend against routing disruption
attacks. In DSR, discovering multiple routes from a source to a destination is
straight-forward. Let MaxRouteNum be the maximum number of ROUTE RE-
PLYs that the destination can send back for the route requests with the same re-
quest ID. By varying MaxRouteNum, we can discover different number of routes.
By exploring route diversity, we have better chance to defeat attackers who aim to
prevent good routes from being found. Meanwhile, since there may exist multiple
routes, the source can always use the route with the best quality according to
certain criteria.
When a new route R is discovered, for each node A on this route, FNcur(A, S, R)
and RNcur(A, S, R) should be initialized to be 0. Since this route has never been




Pavg(A, S) ∗H(A, S)− λ ∗ L. (3.6)
The difference between (3.6) and (3.2) lies in that only nodes’ past history on the
route are used in (3.6).
Since there may exist multiple routes to D in S’s Route Cache, S needs to
decide which route should be used. One possible way is to always use the one
with the best expected quality. However, this may not be the best choice. For
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example, the quality of a route may degrade dramatically after being injected into
a lot of traffics. In this chapter, the following procedure is used to distribute
traffics among multiple routes, and adaptively determine which route should be
used. Let Qthreshold be a pre-determined quality threshold, and let R1, . . . , RK be
the K routes with the expected quality higher than Qthreshold. Once S wants to
send a packet to D, S randomly picks a route among them. The probability that
route Ri (1 ≤ i ≤ K) will be picked is determined as
Prob(Ri) =
Q(Ri)
Q(R1) + · · ·+ Q(RK) (3.7)
If no route has expected quality higher than Qthreshold, the route with the highest
expected quality will be selected.
3.1.5 Adaptive Route Rediscovery
Due to mobility and the dynamically changing traffic patterns, some routes may
become invalid after a while, or their quality may change. Usually, a new route
discovery should be initiated by S when there exist no available routes from S to
D. In this chapter, we use an adaptive route rediscovery mechanism to determine
when a new route discovery should be initiated: if S wants to send packets to D,
and there exist no routes to D with quality higher than Qthreshold in S’s route cache,
S then initiates a new route discovery.
3.1.6 Implementation
We have implemented HADOF upon DSR, which includes two major procedures:
packet sending procedure and traffic statistics and cheating records updating pro-
cedure. The packet sending procedure is described in Fig. 3.2(a). When S wants to
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Section IV.A and IV.B 
Does any route have 
quality higher than 
Qthreshold?
S initiates a new 





(a) Packet sending procedure (b) Statistics update procedure
Figure 3.2: HADOF implementation
send a packet to D, S first checks its route cache to find whether there exist valid
routes to D. If there exist no valid routes, S initiates a new route discovery with
the destination being D. If there exist some valid routes, but none has expected
quality higher than Qthreshold, S picks the route with the best expected quality, and
initiates a new route discovery. Otherwise, S randomly picks one route according
to the procedure described in Section 3.1.4.
The procedure for updating/maintaining traffic statistics and cheating records
is described in Fig. 3.2(b). The source S periodically calls this procedure to collect
traffic statistics for each route that has been used in this interval. Based on the
mechanisms described in Section 3.1.1 and Section 3.1.2, S updates the expected
route quality and cheating records. If necessary, a new route discovery should be






Figure 3.3: A simple example
3.2 Security Studies
This section analyzes the security aspects of HADOF in terms of defending against
various routing disruption attacks. Throughout this section, we will use Fig. 3.3
as a simple example to illustrate different situations.
Black Hole and Gray Hole Attacks: In HADOF, the source can quickly
detect a gray hole or black hole based on the reports it has collected and past
records of each node. Without loss of generality, assume B has created a gray hole
on route “SABCD” in Fig. 3.3. Based on the reports submitted by A, B, C, and D,
S can know that some of them have dropped packets. Node B can be detected as
creating a black/gray hole by S if Pavg(B,S) and Pcur(B, S, “SABCD”) are low,
and RN(B, S) value is larger than a pre-defined threshold, where a relatively large
RN(A, S) is used to make sure that this is not transient phenomenon.
Frame-up Attacks without Collusion: Besides dropping packets, a ma-
licious node can also submit false reports to cheat the source and frame up its
neighbors. For example, on the route “SABCD”, if B is malicious, B can submit a
smaller RN value to frame up A and a larger FN number to frame up C. In HADOF,
a source can detect frame-up attacks through checking the consistence of the re-
ports it has collected. We still use the route “SABCD” as an example, and assume
that the malicious nodes work alone. If B has reported a larger FNcur(B,S, R) to
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frame up C, S can detect this by finding FNcur(B, S,R) > RNcur(C, S,R) where
R denotes the route “SABCD”. Now we analyze the possible consequence of this
frame-up. First, B cannot increase its Pcur(B,S, R) and P (B, S) since S will use
RNcur(C, S, R) to replace FNcur(B,S, R). Second, B can only make S suspect C,
but cannot make S believe that C is malicious. Third, if C is trusted by S, then B
can be detected immediately, and will be excluded from any route originated from
S in the future. Fourth, B’s own honesty score will be decreased. Therefore, B can
cause only limited damage by framing up others, but has to take the risk of being
detected as malicious, especially when friendship has been introduced.
Frame-up Attacks with Collusion: Next we show that collusion in frame-up
attacks cannot further deteriorate the situation. We still use the route “SABCD”
as an example. In the first case, the malicious nodes are neighbors of each other.
For example, B and C. Without loss of generality, we can view them as one node
B′, with RNcur(B′, S, R) = RNcur(B, S,R) and FNcur(B′, S, R) = FNcur(C, S,R).
That is, B and C together have the same effects as B′ working alone, and the
only difference is that they can release one node by sacrificing of the other one,
that is, by letting it take all the responsibilities. In the second case, the malicious
nodes are not neighbors of each other. For example, A and C are malicious and
work together to frame up B. It can be seen that the effect of A and C jointly
framing up B is the same as that of A and C framing up B independently. Thus
we conclude that in HADOF collusion cannot further improve the capability of
frame-up attacks.
Rushing Attacks: In rushing attacks, an attacker can increase its chance of
being on the route by disseminating ROUTE REQUESTs quickly and suppressing
any later legitimate ROUTE REQUESTs [36]. For example, in Fig. 3.3, if V can
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broadcast the ROUTE REQUESTs originated from S more quickly than A and E,
then all the ROUTE REQUESTs broadcasted by A and E will be ignored. The
direct consequence is that V appears on all the routes returned by D. Later V
can drop packets and frame up its neighbors. Now we show how rushing attacks
can be handled using HADOF. If S detects that no routes to D in its route cache
work well, it will check whether these routes share a critical node where all packets
from S to D pass through it. In this example, the critical node is V. If V has low
Pavg(V, S) value and low H(V, S), S has reasons to suspect that V has launched
rushing attacks. S then initiates a new route discovery and explicitly exclude V
from being on discovered routes.
Wormhole Attacks: A pair of attackers can create a wormhole in the network
via a private network connection to disrupt routing by short circuiting the normal
flow of routing packets [35]. For example, in Fig. 3.3, if W and V are attackers
and have created a wormhole between them, V can quickly forward any ROUTE
REQUESTs it receives to W, and let W broadcast them. There are two variations
based on whether V and W append their addresses to the REQUESTS. If they
append their addresses, they are similar as rushing attackers, and the method
discussed above can be used to handle them. The situation becomes more severe
if they do not append their addresses. For example, W and V can make S believe
that D is its neighbor, and later V can create a black hole to drop all the packets
originated from S and targeting D. In HADOF, if S finds no routes returned by
D are valid, or S has not received any acknowledgement from D, S has reason
to suspect that there exists a wormhole between S and D. S then activates an
neighbor discovery techniques such as in [35,36] to prevent attackers from creating
wormholes.
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In summary, HADOF can handle various routing disruption attacks very well,
such as gray hole, black hole, frame-up, and rushing attacks, and wormhole attacks,
and is collusion-resistant.
3.3 Simulation Studies
In this set of simulations, 100 nodes are randomly deployed inside a rectangular
area of 1000m × 1000m. The maximum transmission range is 250m. There are
20 traffic pairs randomly generated for each simulation. For each traffic pair, the
packet arrival is modelled as a Poisson process, and the average packet inter-arrival
time is uniformly chosen between 0.04 and 0.2 second, such that each traffic pair
injects different traffic load to the network. The size of each data packet after
encryption is 512 bytes, and the link bandwidth is 1 Mbps. Among the 100 nodes,
we vary the total number of malicious nodes from 5 to 20. In our implementation,
the malicious nodes will submit false reports only when it has dropped packets and
this false reports cannot be detected easily. For example, a malicious node will not
submit false reports to frame up the sources or the destinations.
In the simulations, we focus on mobile ad hoc networks, and each node moves
randomly according to a random waypoint model, and two sets of average pause
time are used: 0 second and 50 seconds. The average pause time of 0 second
represents a high mobility case where nodes keep moving, while the average pause
time of 50 seconds represents a moderate mobility case. We set α = 0.9, β = 0.6,
λ = 0.02, and Qthreshold = 0.8. The maximum number of returned routes is set 5
and the maximum number of hops per route is set 10.
In our simulations, the baseline system is implemented as follows: the baseline
































































































































Figure 3.4: Packet drop ratio comparisons under gray hole attacks
route rediscovery is used, and no malicious node detection mechanisms are applied.
It is expected that the baseline system will perform badly in most situations.
For comparison, the mechanism proposed in [58] has also been implemented,
which includes two major components: watchdog and pathrater. To make watch-
dog work properly, we have modified the MAC layer protocol to ensure the follow-
ing property: after node B receives a packet from node A and needs to forward
this packet to node C, B can start the forwarding only if both A and C are idle
and ready to receive packets. When using watchdog, a node will report to the
source when another node refuses to forward more than certain number of packets
for it. In our implementation, we set the threshold to be 5. In addition, each
route discovery initiated by source S will return at most 5 routes, and the route
with the best quality (calculated using pathrater) will be used. When the route
in use becomes invalid due to link breaks, instead of using the routes in S’s Route
Cache, S will initiate a new route discovery. The reason is that with a very high
probability those routes may also not work or may work badly due to mobility and
traffic dynamics. The SSR (Send extra Route Request) extension has also been
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implemented.
The following metrics will be used to evaluate the performance of HADOF.
• Packet drop ratio: The percentage of data packets that have been sent by
not been received by the destinations, which equals to 1 minus end-to-end
throughput.
• Overhead: In this chapter, we consider routing overhead, energy consump-
tion overhead, encryption overhead, and complexity overhead. Given a traffic
pattern, routing overhead indicates how many route discoveries have been
initiated by the sources. Energy consumption overhead denotes how much
extra energy need to be consumed. To keep the confidentiality and integrity
of the transmitted content, extra cryptographic operations are needed, and
the encryption overhead describes how many extra cryptographic operations
are needed by these mechanisms. Complexity overhead accounts for the extra
storage and computations needed by applying these mechanisms.
We use “baseline” to denote the baseline system, “watchdog” to denote the
system based on watchdog and pathrater, and “HADOF” to denote the system
based on HADOF. We use different node movement patterns for each simulation
by changing the average pause time and the seed of random number generator. By
varying the number of malicious nodes and the average pause time, we get different
configurations. For each configuration, the results are averaged over 25 rounds
of simulations, where at each round we change the random seed to get different
movement and traffic patterns. To make fair comparison, for each configuration
and each round of simulation, the same movement and traffic patterns were used



















average pause time: 50 seconds, 20 malicious nodes
HADOF, gray hole
HADOF, gray hole + frame-up
watchdog, gray hole
watchdog, gray hole + frame-up
Figure 3.5: Effects of frame-up attacks
3.3.1 Packet Drop Ratio Comparisons
We compare the packet drop ratios of the three systems under different scenarios.
First, we compare the packet drop ratios under only gray hole attacks. That is,
no nodes will submit false reports. Second, we compare the packet drop ratios
under both gray hole and frame-up attacks, where some malicious nodes will drop
packets and frame up their neighbors when possible. Third, we show how friendship
mechanism can mitigate the effects of frame-up attacks.
Gray hole: In our simulations, we vary the number of malicious nodes from
5 to 20. The gray hole is implemented in such a way that each malicious node
drops half of the packet passing through it. The simulation results under different
configurations are plotted in Fig. 3.4. From these results we can see that HADOF
outperforms watchdog in all situations. For example, under the configuration of
pause time 50 seconds, 20 malicious nodes, the packet drop ratio of baseline is more
than 40%, watchdog can reduce the packet drop ratio to 22%, while for HADOF,
the packet drop ratio is only 16%, that is, more than 33% improvement is obtained
over watchdog under this configuration. Under the configuration of pause time 50
seconds, 5 malicious nodes, more than 55% improvement is obtained over watchdog
by HADOF.
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Gray hole plus frame-up attacks: We investigate the packet drop ratio un-
der both gray hole and frame-up attacks. In HADOF, the only way for a malicious
node to frame up a good node is to let the source suspect that the good node is
cheating. To achieve this, a malicious node can report a smaller RN number than
the actual value to frame up the node ahead of it on the route, and/or report a
larger FN number than the actual value to frame up the node just following it on
the route. However, the malicious node can never make the source believe that a
good node is cheating, since malicious node cannot create solid evidence.
In watchdog, there exist a variety of ways for a malicious node to frame up
good ones. For example, if node A has sent a packet to B and asks B to forward
it to C, B has many ways to make A believe that it has sent the packet to C while
B did not send packets or intentionally caused transmission failure. As reckoned
in [58], many reasons can cause a misbehaving node not being detected, such as
ambiguous collisions, receiver collisions, limited transmission power, false misbe-
havior, collusion, and partial dropping. In our simulations, we only implement
the frame-up attacks through receiver collisions. That is, B will forward packet to
C only when it knows that C cannot correctly receive it (e.g., C is transmitting
data to another node, or receiving data from another node). Since A can only
tell whether B has sent the packet to C, but cannot tell whether C has received it
successfully, B can easily frame up its neighbors.
Fig. 3.5 shows the simulation results with the configurations of 20 malicious
nodes, half of them applying frame-up attacks. First we can see that the degrada-
tion of HADOF caused by frame-up attacks is limited. Second, we see that frame-
up degrades the performance of both, and affects watchdog more than HADOF.



















average pause time: 50 seconds, 20 malicious nodes
gray hole + frame-up, no friends
gray hole + frame-up, 20 friends
only gray hole, no friends
Figure 3.6: Effects of friendship mechanism
watchdog because we have made many assumptions which favor watchdog, such as
no collusion attacks, only receiver collisions, perfect MAC protocol. For HADOF,
no extra assumptions are needed.
Effectiveness of Friendship: In the previous simulations, friendship has not
been introduced and the source only trusts the destination. Next we show the
results after introducing friendship mechanism to combat frame-up attacks. We
conduct simulations under the situations that each source has 20 friends which
are randomly chosen among all good nodes in the network. Fig. 3.6 shows the
simulation results using HADOF with the configuration of average pause time 50
seconds, 20 malicious nodes, half of them launching both gray hole and frame-up
attacks, and half of them only launching gray hole attacks. From these results we
can see that the effects of frame-up attacks can be overcome when trustiness has
been established among certain number of users. For example, with 20 friends, the
packet drop ratio, which is 15%, is even lower than the situation that no frame-up
attacks are launched, which is 16%.
3.3.2 Overhead Comparisons



























Figure 3.7: Route discovery overhead comparison
number of route discoveries that have been initiated by all the sources. Fig. 3.7
shows the results under the configuration of average pause time 50 seconds, 20
malicious nodes, and only gray hole attacks. From these results we can see that
though HADOF needs to initiate route discoveries preventively, it still has the
lowest routing discovery overhead. In the baseline system, only one route is re-
turned for each route discovery, which explains why baseline needs to initiate more
route discoveries. This also verifies the effectiveness of path diversity. Surprisingly,
watchdog has the highest route discovery overhead, which comes from its high false
alarm ratio, since a new route discovery will be initiated once no route has average
reputation larger than 0.
Energy Consumption Overhead: One major drawback of watchdog is that
it consumes much more energy than HADOF, because each node has to keep
monitoring its neighbors’ transmission activities. We use Fig. 3.1 to illustrate why
watchdog needs to consume extra energy. For example, after B sends a packet to
C and asks C to forward the packet to D, B has to keep listening C’s transmission.
If C is a malicious node, C can launch resource consumption attacks to consume
B’s energy by putting off forwarding packets for B. Even if C is a good node, B
still needs to consume extra energy to receive, decode, and compare the packets
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transmitted by C with the packets stored in B’s buffer. This consumes a lot of
extra energy. By requiring nodes to keep monitoring their neighbors, watchdog
not only reduces network capacity, but also consumes extra energy. On the other
hand, HADOF has no such drawbacks.
Encryption Overhead: As we discussed before, all packets should be en-
crypted and signed to ensure data confidentiality and integrity. Otherwise, outside
attackers can easily intercept those messages through eavesdropping. Compared
with the baseline system, HADOF introduces some encryption overhead which
comes from encrypting the reports. In most situations only the destination needs
to submit reports, and the source and the destination already share a secrete key
for data encryption. Thus, the reports from the destination can just be encrypted
by this secrete key, which introduces little overhead. In addition, if the amount
of data for reporting packet forwarding statistics is much less than the amount of
data, which is generally true, the overhead of encrypting reports of intermediate
nodes on the route will become negligible compared with data encryption overhead.
Complexity Overhead: In HADOF, each source needs to launch a route
traffic observer to maintain and update traffic statistics, and maintain records to
track cheating behavior. However, both can be implemented using simple data
structures, and consume little memory. The computation overhead comes from
updating traffic statistics, route quality, and cheating records. These operations
will not introduce a lot computation burden. In watchdog, each node also needs
to keep a reputation database and need to calculate route quality. Moreover, each
node in watchdog needs to keep an extra buffer to store the packets that it has
requested its neighbors to forward but not yet confirmed, which consumes a lot
extra memory, and introduces extra computation overhead to compare the packets.
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3.4 Summary
In this chapter we proposed HADOF to defend against routing disruption attacks
launched by inside attackers, which can be implemented upon the existing source
routing protocols. HADOF is capable of adaptively adjusting routing strategies ac-
cording to the network dynamics and nodes’ past records and current performance.
It can handle various attacks launched by malicious nodes, such as black hole, gray
hole, frame-up, rushing attacks, and wormhole attacks. Moveover, HADOF intro-
duces little overhead to the existing routing protocols, and is fully distributed.
Extensive simulation studies have also confirmed the effectiveness of HADOF.
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Chapter 4
Secure Ad Hoc Networks Against
Injecting Traffic Attacks
Chapter 3 has demonstrated how to defend against routing disruption attacks.
In this chapter, we will study another class of powerful attacks: injecting traf-
fic attacks. Specifically, attackers inject an overwhelming amount of traffic into
the network in attempt to consume valuable network resources, and consequently
degrade the network performance. Since in ad hoc networks, nodes need to coop-
eratively forward packets for other nodes, such networks are extremely vulnerable
to injecting traffic attacks, especially those launched by insider attackers.
In this chapter, we first proposed a set of fully distributed defense mechanisms
which can effectively detect injecting data packets attacks, even when attackers can
use advanced transmission techniques, such as directional antennas, in attempt to
avoid being detected. We have also derived the theoretical upper-bounds for the
probability that attackers can successfully launch injecting data packets attacks
without being detected. The results show that from attackers’ point of view, the
best injecting data packets strategy is to conform to their original data packets
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injection rate. That is, the best strategy is not to launch injecting data pack-
ets attacks. To further decrease the incurred overhead, we have then proposed
a centralized defense mechanisms with de-centralized implementation. By letting
some nodes under strong protection to perform attack detection, the detection
performance can be further improved and the average overhead can be dramati-
cally decreased. Besides injecting data packet attacks, the query-flooding attacks
have also been studied and the tradeoff between limiting query rate and system
performance is exploited.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 describes the system model
and investigates the possible types of injecting traffic attacks. Section 4.2 describes
the proposed fully distributed defense mechanisms. The theoretical analysis of
the proposed distributed defense mechanisms are presented in Section 4.3. In
Section 4.4, a centralized detection mechanism with de-centralized implementation
is described. Simulation results are presented in Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6
summarizes this chapter.
4.1 Injecting Traffic Attacks
Similar as in Chapter 3, in this chapter we also focus on cooperative ad hoc net-
works, where nodes are classified into two types: good and malicious. We focus
on the scenario that nodes use omnidirectional transmission techniques, such as
omnidirectional antennas. However, attackers are allowed to use directional trans-
mission techniques, such as directional antennas [52] or adaptive beamforming [33],
to improve their attacking capabilities.
According to the system goal, each node may schedule to generate and send a






Figure 4.1: An example of long route attack
be legitimate if this pair is needed to achieve the system goal. For each legitimate
source-destination pair (s, d) in the network, we assume that the number of packets
that is scheduled to inject by this pair until time t is Ts,d(t). In general, the exact
value of Ts,d(t) may not be known a priori by other nodes in the network. In
this chapter we assume that a loose upper-bound of Ts,d(t), denoted by fs,d(t),
can be estimated by some nodes in the network, which is referred to as the traffic
injection upper-bounds associated to pair (s, d). Without loss of generality, we
simply assume that all data packets have the same size.
As mentioned before, in this chapter our focus is on defending against injecting
traffic attacks. Roughly speaking, injecting traffic attacks can be classified into
two types: query-flooding attack and injecting data packets attack (IDPA). Due to
the changing topology or traffic pattern, nodes in ad hoc networks may need to
frequently perform route updates, which may require broadcasting query messages.
Then attackers can broadcast query message with a very high frequency to consume
valuable network resources. We call such attack as query-flooding attack. Besides
query-flooding attacks, attackers can also inject an overwhelming amount of data
packets into the network to request other nodes to forward. When other nodes
process and forward these packets, their resources (e.g., energy) are wasted. We
call such attack as injecting data packets attack (IDPA). Since in general the size
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of data packet is much larger than the size of query messages, and the injection
rate of data packets is much higher than the injection rate of query message, the
damage that can be caused by injecting data packets attack is usually more severe
than by query-flooding attacks.
We first consider the possible ways that IDPA can be launched by attackers s
and d with s being the source and d being the destination. The simplest way, which
is called simple IDPA, is that s picks a route R to d and injects an overwhelming
amount of packets into the network, which is much higher than the legitimate
bound fs,d(t).
In the second way, which is called long route IDPA, s picks a very long route
to inject data packets into the network. For example, as in Fig. 4.1, s can pick
the route “swcbahefgd” to send packets from s to d with the number of injected
packets conforming to the legitimate bound fs,d(t). By doing this way, s and d can























Figure 4.2: An example of multiple route attack
In the third and advanced way, which is called multiple routes IDPA, s
picks multiple routes to d and simultaneously injects traffic into the network via
these routes. For example, as shown in Fig. 4.2, s uses four routes “sa1 . . . b1d”,
“sa2 . . . b2d”, “sa3 . . . b3d” and “sa4 . . . b4d” to inject packets into the network. By
doing in this way, the traffic can be distributed among multiple routes such that
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for each route the packet injection rate conforms to the legitimate bound fs,d(t),
though the total number of injected packets can be much higher than fs,d(t). More-
over, the attackers can also take advantage of advanced transmission techniques,
such as directional antenna and beamforming, to avoid being detected.
Besides injecting data packets, attackers can also inject an overwhelming amount
of query messages into the network to request other nodes to forward, which is
called query-flooding attacks. The advantage of query-flooding attacks lies in that
for each query, more nodes in the network may be involved to process and forward
packets than IDPA. Although query messages are usually much smaller than data
packets, when the query frequency is high, the damage can still be severe.
4.2 Defense Mechanisms
In order to detect whether a node has launched injecting traffic attacks, we have to
base on the observed behavior of that node. In other words, a node can be marked
as launching injecting traffic attacks only if it has been observed by some other
nodes that it has injected too much traffic (higher than the legitimate bound), or
it has sent traffic to illegitimate destinations. Therefore, the following mechanisms
will be required by the defense system:
• A robust packet delivery mechanism where for any packet injected by node
x, x cannot deny that this packet is form it and no other nodes can generate
the same packet without colluding with x. This is addressed in Section 4.2.1.
• A robust traffic monitoring mechanism to count the number of packets in-
jected by each node in the network. This is addressed in Section 4.2.2.
• A robust detection mechanism to detect injecting traffic attacks based on
observed information. This is addressed in Section 4.2.3.
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4.2.1 Route Discovery and Packet Delivery
In this chapter we adopt DSR [47] as the underlying routing protocol to perform
route discovery. Meanwhile, to defend against possible attacks, the following se-
curity enhancements will also be incorporated into the DSR protocol:
• When node s initiates a route discovery to destination d, besides the source
destination pair, the query packet should also includes a unique ID associated
to this query and the sequence number corresponding to the last data packet
that s has sent to d. In this chapter, the following format is used for each
query packet:
{s, d, ids(s, d), seqs(s, d), signs(s, d, ids,d, seqs(s, d))}
Here ids(s, d) is the sequence number of this query packet, which has an initial
value of 1 and is required to be increased by 1 after each query has been issued
by the pair (s, d). seqs(s, d) is the sequence number of the last packet that has
been injected into the network by the pair (s, d). signs(s, d, ids,d, seqs(s, d))
is the signature generated by s based on the message {s, d, ids,d, seqs(s, d)}.
• When a good node x receives a route request packet with s being the source
and d being the destination, x first checks whether the following conditions
can be satisfied:
1. the source-destination pair (s, d) is legitimate;
2. all signatures are valid;
3. idx(s, d) < ids(s, d), where idx(s, d) is the maximum query sequence
number corresponding to the pair (s, d) that x has seen before;
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4. seqx(s, d) ≤ seqs(s, d), where seqx(s, d) is the maximum data packet
sequence number corresponding to the pair (s, d) that x has seen before;
5. no nodes appended to the request packet have been detected as mali-
cious by x;
6. less than Tmaxhop relay nodes have been appended to the query packet,
where Tmaxhop is a system-level parameter indicating the maximum num-
ber of relays that a route can have.
7. x has not forwarded any request for the pair (s, d) in the last Tx(s, d)
interval, where Tx(s, d) is the minimum query forwarding interval spec-
ified by x to indicate that x will forward at most 1 route request for
(s, d) in any Tx(s, d) interval.
If all of the above conditions can be satisfied, we call such a request as a valid
request. In this situation, x will assign the value of ids(s, d) to idx(s, d),
assign the value of seqs(s, d) to seqx(s, d), append its own address to the
route request packet and sign the whole packet, and rebroadcast the new
query. If only the conditions from 1 to 4 are satisfied, x will only assign the
value of ids(s, d) to idx(s, d), assign the value of seqs(s, d) to seqx(s, d). In
all other situations, x will discard this route request, and perform necessary
attacker detection. Assume request is the received valid query message that
x has decided to forward, then the following format will be used for x to
append its own address:
{request, x, signx(request, x)}
Once a source has decided to send a packet to a certain destination using a
certain route, a data packet delivery transaction should be started. The proposed
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data packet delivery mechanism works as follows. Suppose that node s is to send a
packet with payload msg and sequence number seqs(s, d) to destination d through
the route R. s first generates two signatures sigh and sigb, with sigh being gen-
erated based on the message {R, seqs(s, d)} and sigb being generated based on
the message {R, seqs(s, d), MD(msg)} where MD() is a digest function such as
SHA-1 [1]. The format of the packet to be sent is as follows:
{R, seqs(s, d), sigh,msg, sigb}. (4.1)
We refer to {R, seqs(s, d), sigh} as the header of the packet, and refer to {msg, sigb}
as the body of the packet. Next, s transmits this packet to the next node on route
R, and is required to increase the value of seqs(s, d) by 1. The advantage of
generating two signatures will be demonstrated later.
When a node (e.g., x) detects that a certain packet is to be transmitted by a
certain node (e.g., y), a first decodes and checks the header of the packet. Assume
{R, seqs(s, d), sigh} is the header of the transmitted packet, a needs to continue
receiving and decoding the body of the packet only if all of the following conditions
are satisfied:
1. the signature sigh is valid;
2. x is on the route R and is the target of this transmission;
3. no nodes on route R has been detected as malicious by x;
4. seqs(s, d) > seqx(s, d);
5. route R has no more than Tmaxhop relays;
6. x has agreed to participate on this route before and the route has not expired,
where each route will be set an expiration time.
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If all of the above conditions are satisfied, x will continue receiving and decoding
the body of the packet, assuming it is {msg, sigb}. If the signature sigb is valid,
x will forward the packet to the next node on the route, and assign the value of
seqs(s, d) to seqx(s, d).
4.2.2 Traffic Monitoring
Traffic monitoring is an indispensable component to detect possible injecting traffic
attacks. In the chapter, each node will keep monitoring its neighbors’ transmission
activities using the proposed header watcher mechanism. Specifically, when a node
x detects that a neighbor y is transmitting a data packet, no matter whether x is
the receiver of this transmission or not, x will try to receive and decode the packet
header sent by y. Actually this is needed by most wireless networks: without
decoding the header, how can a node know whether this packet target at it or not?
The uniqueness of the proposed header watcher mechanism lies in that each node
will also check the validity of the signature for the packet header. If the signature
of the packet header is valid, x will put the packet header into the set List(s, d, x)
in x’s records, which will be used later to detect whether s has launched injecting
traffic attacks.
Unlike the “watchdog” mechanism introduced in [58], which requires a node
to buffer all the packets that it has sent or forwarded and to keep monitoring
its neighbors’ transmission activities in order to check whether those packets have
been forwarded by them, the “header watcher” mechanism proposed in this chapter
only requires a node to monitor the packet headers around its neighborhood. Since
only packet header needs to be received and decoded, and the header of a packet is
much shorter than the body of a packet, a lot of effort can be saved comparing to
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the watchdog mechanism which requires receiving, decoding, and comparing the
whole packets.
In general, if all packet headers received by node x are recorded, with the
increase of x’s staying time in the network, more and more storage will be required.
Actually, in our scheme, for each legitimate source-destination pair (s, d), only
those packet headers received after the last valid route request issued by (s, d)
need to recorded by x; in another words, only those packet headers whose sequence
numbers are larger than the sequence number broadcast by s in its last valid route
request packet. With this modification, the storage requirement become very small
and does not increase over x’s staying time in the network. In Section 4.4, we will
also show how to further decrease the storage requirement.
4.2.3 Injecting Traffic Attack Detection
In this chapter each good node in the network will perform injecting traffic attack
detection based on the observed behaviors. Specifically, for each source-destination
pair (s, d) with List(s, d, x) being non-empty in good node x’s records, the following
detection rules will be used by x to check whether s has launched injecting traffic
attacks:
• Rule 1: If List(s, d, x) is not empty and the source-destination pair (s, d) is
illegitimate, x will mark s as malicious.
• Rule 2: x received a request issued by an illegitimate source-destination
(s, d), x will mark s as malicious.
• Rule 3: For any packet header {R, seqs(s, d), sigh} which belongs to List(s, d, x),
if route R has more than Tmaxhop relays, x will mark s as malicious.
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• Rule 4: If x detects that there exist two valid packet headers {R, seqs(s, d), sigh}
and {R′, seq′s(s, d), sig′h} in the set List(s, d, x) with seqs(s, d) = seq′s(s, d)
but R 6= R′, x will mark s as malicious.
• Rule 5: Let seqmax(s, d) be the maximum possible sequence number corre-
sponding to the source-destination pair (s, d) at time t, that is, seqmax(s, d) =
fs,d(t) at time t. If x detects that there exists a sequence number seqs(s, d)
in List(s, d, x) with seqs(s, d) > seqmax(s, d), x will mark s as malicious.
The first two rules imply that only legitimate source-destination pairs can inject
packets into the network. Rule 3 implies that no routes should have more than
Tmaxhop relays. Rule 4 handles multiple route attack. Rule 5 handles attackers
which inject more packets than they should. In summary, rule 4 and 5 are used to
prevent attackers from injecting more packets than they are allowed by associating
each packet with a unique sequence number. That is, no any two packets for the
same traffic pair should have the same sequence number, and the sequence number
has to be increased monotonically.
Once x detects that s is launching injecting traffic attacks, x will also inform
the other nodes in the network by broadcasting an ALERT message which in-
cludes evidence such as the corresponding packet headers. When other good nodes
have received the ALERT message, after necessary verification (i.e., signatures are
valid), they will also mark s as malicious.
Next we analyze the effects of possible impersonation attacks that can be
launched by attackers. In the proposed mechanisms, the only way that an at-
tacker m can impersonate a good node s whose has not been compromised is to
first record the packets that s has transmitted, then later forwards/broadcasts
these packets. Specifically, there are two situations:
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• Situation 1: m recorded a query packet issued by s and rebroadcast it later.
However, since this query packet has been seen by all other nodes in the
network due to the flooding nature of query message, no nodes will further
process this query packet.
• Situation 2: m recorded a data packet issued by s and forwarded it later.
However, since nodes on the route associated to this data packet will only
process this packet at most one time, forwarding this packet at time t1 by m
cannot cause damage to other nodes.
In summary, impersonation attack cannot cause further damage to good nodes in
the network. Furthermore, it can be readily checked that as long as s is good and
has not been compromised, the probability that x will mark s as malicious is 0.
That is, the false alarm ratio of the above detection rules is 0.
4.2.4 Overhead Analysis
Now we analyze the overhead associated with the above defense mechanisms. Ac-
cording to the above description, there is no extra communication overhead. Mean-
while, the computation overhead comes from generate and verify the signatures.
More specifically, the extra computation overhead comes from generating and ver-
ifying the signatures for packet headers. Comparing to packet body, the length of
packet header is much smaller, so the extra computation overhead is also small.
Now we analyze the storage overhead. In the proposed defense mechanism, each
node needs to store the set of packet headers between two consecutive route query
requests. In mobile ad hoc networks, due to dynamic topology change, the time
interval between two consecutive route query requests is usually short. Therefore,
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the number of packet headers that need to be stored is also small. Section 4.4 will
discuss how to further reduce the storage overhead.
4.3 Theoretical Analysis
According to the secure route discovery procedure described in Section 4.2.1, a
good node x will only forward at most 1 route request in any time interval Tx(s, d)
for any legitimate source-destination (SD) pair (s,d), and will not forward route
requests for any illegitimate SD pairs, therefore the total damage that can be
caused by attackers launching query flooding attacks is bounded. Next we analyze
the effects of IDPA. Assume that node s is malicious and tries to launch IDPA
with d being the destination of the packets injected by s. To avoid being detected
immediately, the SD pair (s, d) must be legitimate and d must be malicious too,
otherwise, s can be easily detected by d as malicious. According to Section 4.1,
there are three possible ways to launch IDPA: simple IDPA, long-route IDPA and
multiple-route IDPA.
We first consider simple IDPA. According to Section 4.2.1, in order for good
nodes to forward packets for s, s has to increase the sequence number seqs(s, d) by
1 after each packet delivery. Unless all nodes on the selected route are malicious,
which makes no sense, the good nodes on route R can easily detect that s is
launching IDPA by comparing the received packets’ sequence number with fs,d(t)
defined in Section 4.2.3. That is, when launching simple IDPA, the attackers can
be immediately detected and can cause negligible damage.
If s launches long-route IDPA, since much more good nodes will be involved,
s can cause similar damage as launching simple IDPA. However, as described in
Section 4.2.1, the maximum allowable number of hops per route is bounded by
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Tmaxhop, and good nodes will drop all packets with the associated number of hops
more than Tmaxhop. Therefore the damage is upper-bounded by fs,d(t)Tmaxhop.
Finally we consider the multiple-route IDPA. To avoid being detected imme-
diately, the packet injection rate to each route must conform to fs,d(t), and the
selected routes must be node-disjoint, that is, no selected routes should share any
common good node except s and d, otherwise, if a good node x lies in more than
one route from s to d, it can easily detect whether s and d have launched multiple-
route IDPA. Meanwhile, the packets passing through the same route should have
different sequence numbers in order for good nodes on the route to forward them.
Based on whether s allows packets in different routes to share the same sequence
numbers and what transmission techniques s will use, there are three cases:
• Case 1: s dose not allow packets on different routes to share the same se-
quence numbers. Since seqs(s, d) ≤ fs,d(t) is required to let s avoid being
detected immediately, in this case s has no extra gain by comparing with
launching simple IDPA.
• Case 2: s allows packets on different routes to share the same sequence
numbers, and transmits packets omnidirectionally. Since s’s neighbors will
keep monitoring s’s packets transmission, they can easily detect that some
packets sent by s through different routes use the same sequence number,
which indicates that s is launching IDPA. Therefore if s can only transmit
packets omnidirectionally, s should not launch multiple-route IDPA.
• Case 3: s allows packets on different routes to use the same sequence num-
bers, and can transmit packets using directional transmission techniques.
Since now s’s neighbors cannot receive s’ transmission not targeting on them,
they have little chance to directly detect that s is launching IDPA. However,
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since good nodes in the network use omnidirectional transmission techniques,
the probability that s can successfully launch multiple-route IDPA without
being detected still approaches 0, as to be shown next.
Next we derive the upper-bounds for the probability that s is able to success-
fully pick n node-disjoint routes to inject data packets without being detected
immediately, as illustrated in Case 3. We consider the most general situation that
the destination d does not know the exact locations of those nodes within its trans-
mission range, and all d’s neighbors are good nodes. Given a node x and a certain
area S, we say that x is randomly deployed inside S according to the 2D uniform
distribution if for any subarea S1 ⊂ S we have P (x ∈ S1|x ∈ S, S1 ⊂ S) = S1/S.
Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.1 Suppose that N good nodes are independently deployed inside a
large area of S according to the 2D uniform distribution. Suppose that all of these
N nodes use omnidirectional transmission techniques and r is their common max-
imum transmission distance. Suppose that the SD pair (s, d) collude to launch
IDPA with s using directional transmission technique and s and d not knowing the
exact location of the nodes inside d’s receiving range (which is r). If the defending
mechanisms described in Section 4.2 are used by good nodes, then the probability
P (n, r,N) that the two attackers can successfully pick n node-disjoint routes to
launch multiple-route IDPA without being detected immediately is upper-bounded
by



































Before proving Theorem 4.3.1, we first prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.3.2 Assume N nodes are independently deployed inside an area of S
according to the 2D uniform distribution. For any node x inside subarea S1 ⊂ S
and for any subarea S2 ⊂ S1, we have




P (x ∈ S2|x ∈ S1, S2 ⊂ S1 ⊂ S) = P (x ∈ S2, x ∈ S1|S2 ⊂ S1 ⊂ S)
P (x ∈ S1|S2 ⊂ S1 ⊂ S) =
P (x ∈ S2|S2 ⊂ S)





That is, the conditional distribution of x in S1 is independent of S, which is also
the 2D uniform distribution.
Lemma 4.3.3 Assume nodes x and y are independently deployed inside a certain
area S according to the 2D uniform distribution. Given x ∈ S1 ⊂ S and y ∈ S1 ⊂
S, and given any subareas Sx ⊂ S1 and Sy ⊂ S1, we have
P (x ∈ Sx, y ∈ Sy|x ∈ S1, y ∈ S1, Sx ⊂ S1, Sy ⊂ S1)
= P (x ∈ Sx|x ∈ S1, Sx ⊂ S1)P (y ∈ Sy|y ∈ S1, Sy ⊂ S1) (4.6)
Proof Since the deployment of x and y are independent of each other, we have
P (x ∈ Sx, y ∈ Sy|x ∈ S1, y ∈ S1, Sx ⊂ S1, Sy ⊂ S1)
= P (x ∈ Sx|x ∈ S1, Sx ⊂ S1, y ∈ Sy ⊂ S1) ∗
P (y ∈ Sy|y ∈ S1, Sy ⊂ S1, x ∈ S1, Sx ⊂ S1)
= P (x ∈ Sx|x ∈ S1, Sx ⊂ S1)P (y ∈ Sy|y ∈ S1, Sy ⊂ S1)
That is, the distribution of x and y inside S1 are independent of each other.
58
Lemma 4.3.4 Let S be a circular area with o being the center and R being the
radius. Assume that node x lies in S and P (A ∈ S1|A ∈ S, S1 ⊂ S) = S1S . Let d(x)
denote the random variable of the distance from x to o, then




0 ≤ r ≤ R
0 r > R
(4.7)
Proof For any 0 < r ≤ R, we have
P (d(x) = r|x ∈ S) = lim
∆→0






For any r > R, we have x /∈ S, which implies P (d(x) = r|x ∈ S) = 0.
Lemma 4.3.5 Let S be a circular area with o being its center and R being its
radius. Given that two nodes a and b independently deployed in S according to the
2D uniform distribution, we have

















Proof We use Figure 4.3 to help illustrating the proof. Let r denote the distance
from a to o, let Co denote the circle with o being the center and R being the radius,
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and let Ca denote the circle with a being the center and R being the radius. Let
c and d be the intersecting points between the two circles Co and Ca, and let
α = 6 coa = 6 doa. Let SI(r) denote the intersecting area inside both circles Co
and Ca with |oa| = r, and let SII(r) denote the area of S subtracted by SI(r).
Then we have
P (|ab| > R






















where α = arccos( r
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By integrating (4.12) into (4.10), we have P (|ab| > R





Lemma 4.3.6 Assume that n nodes A = {a1, . . . , an} are independently deployed
inside a circular area S according to the 2D uniform distribution with R being the
radius, then we have




P (|aiaj| > R : ∀ai, aj ∈ A)
= P (|a1a2| > R, . . . |a1an| > R, . . . , |an−1an| > R)
= P (|a1a2| > R
∣∣|a1a3| > R, . . . |an−1an| > R)P (|a1a3| > R, . . . , |an−1an| > R)
= P (|a1a2| > R
∣∣|a1ai| > R, |a2ai| > R : ∀3 ≤ i ≤ n)P (|a1a3| > R, . . . , |an−1an| > R)
Given |a1ai| > R and |a2ai| > R for any 3 ≤ i ≤ n, we can draw a circle with
ai being the center and R being the radius. To conform to the statement that
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“∀ai, aj ∈ A, |aiaj| > R”, both a1 and a2 cannot lie inside the intersecting area
between this circle and the circle with o being the center. That is, a1 and a2 are
now restricted in an area of S ′ ⊂ S smaller than S. So the probability that |a1a2|
is larger than R under such restrictions will become smaller than without such
restrictions. That is,
P (|a1a2| > R
∣∣|a1ai| > R, |a2ai| > R) ≤ P (|a1a2| > R : ∀3 ≤ i ≤ n). (4.14)
Following the same arguments we can have
P (|aiaj| > R : ∀ai, aj ∈ A) ≤
∏
1≤i<j≤n
P (|aiaj| > R). (4.15)





items in the product, and nodes in A are symmetric, we
can conclude that (4.13) holds.
Lemma 4.3.7 Assume n+m nodes {a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm} are independently de-
ployed inside a circular area S according to 2D uniform distribution with R being
the radius. Let A = {a1, . . . , an} and B = {b1, . . . , bm}, then we have
P (|aibl| > R or |ajbl| > R : ∀ai, aj ∈ A, bl ∈ B, i 6= j) ≤
(
nP (|a1b1| > R)n−1
)m (4.16)
Proof Let Ai = A − {ai}. Given any b ∈ B, to say “|aib| > R or |ajb| > R :
∀ai, aj ∈ A, ai 6= aj” is equivalent to say “there exists at least one Ai with |xb| > R
for any x ∈ Ai”, that is,
P (|aib| > R or |ajb| > R : ∀ai, aj ∈ A, ai 6= aj)




P (|xb| > R : ∀x ∈ Ai)
= nP (|xb| > R : ∀x ∈ A1)
≤ nP (|a1b| > R)n−1
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Due to the symmetry and independence of the m nodes in B, we can concludes
that (4.16) holds.
Now Theorem 4.3.1 can be proved as follows:
Proof Let Cd denote the circle with d being the center and r being the radius. For
s and d to be able to successfully pick n node-disjoint routes to launch multiple-
route IDPA without being detected immediately, they need to pick at least n
distinct nodes inside Cd, one for each route, to act as the last intermediate nodes
on these routes. Since s and d do not know the exact locations of the nodes
inside Cd, these n nodes can only be randomly selected. It is easy to see that the
following three necessary conditions must be satisfied in order for the attackers
to succeed:
C1. There exist at least n nodes inside Cd, otherwise, s and d can never have n
node-disjoint routes between them.
C2. Given that there are k ≥ n nodes inside Cd, and that s and d are to randomly
select n nodes among them to act as the last intermediate node for these n
node-disjoint routes, then for any two nodes among the n nodes selected by s
and d, no node should lie in the other nodes’ transmission range. Otherwise,
if any two of the n nodes lie in each other’s transmission range, they can
easily detect that s is launching multiple-route IDPA.
C3. Given that the n nodes have been selected by s and d, there should exist
no other good nodes (nodes excluding the selected n good nodes) which can
simultaneously lie in any two of these n nodes’ transmission range. Other-
wise, if there exist one such node, then it can easily detect that s is launching
multiple-route IDPA.
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Let P1(k, N) denote the probability that there are k nodes inside Cd, P2(n, r, k)
denote the probability that the condition C2 can be satisfied given that the n nodes
are randomly selected among k ≥ n nodes inside Cd, and P3(n, r, k, N) denote the
probability that the condition C3 can be satisfied given there are k ≥ n nodes
inside Cd and the n nodes have been determined by s and d. It is easy to see that
P (n, r,N) ≤
N∑
k=n
P1(k, N)P2(n, r, k)P3(n, r, k, N). (4.17)
Since nodes are independently deployed inside S according to the 2D uniform














Given that k nodes lie in Cd, according to Lemma 4.3.2 and Lemma 4.3.3, it is
equivalent to say that these k nodes are independently deployed inside Cd according
to the 2D uniform distribution. According to Lemma 4.3.5 and Lemma 4.3.6, we
can have








To simplify the analysis, we consider a modified version of condition C3: given
any two nodes among the selected n nodes, there should exist no other good nodes
inside Cd but not belonging to these n nodes which can simultaneously lie in these
two nodes’ transmission range. That is, only a small subset of the applicable
nodes are considered. Let P ′3(n, r, k, N) denote the probability that the modified
condition C3 can be satisfied given there are k ≥ n nodes inside Cd and the n nodes
have been determined by s and d, then we must have P3(n, r, k, N) ≤ P ′3(n, r, k, N).
According to Lemma 4.3.5 and Lemma 4.3.7, the probability that the modified
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condition C3 can be satisfied is upper-bounded by












By combining the above results, we can conclude that (4.2) as well as Theorem 4.3.1
holds.
Theorem 4.3.8 The probability that two colluding attackers s and d can success-
fully pick 6 or more node-disjoint routes to launch multiple-route IDPA without
being detected immediately is 0.
Proof For the attackers s and d (assuming s is the source and d is the destination)
to simultaneously pick 6 routes to launch multiple-route IDPA, it needs to pick
6 nodes within d’s receiving range, that is, the circular area Cd with d being the
center and r the radius. Let A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6} denote the set of 6 selected
nodes by s and d that lies inside Cd. One necessary condition for the attackers to
succeed is that for any ai, aj ∈ A, we must have |aiaj| > r for any aj ∈ A and
aj 6= ai. Now we show that it is not achievable. If there exist ai, aj ∈ A with
6 aidaj = 0, then we must have |aiaj| ≤ r. Next we only need to consider the
situations that for any ai, aj ∈ A, 6 aidaj 6= 0. For each node ai ∈ A, we draw a
radial originated from d and passing ai, and let a
′
i be the intersecting point between
the radial dai and the circumference of the circle Cd. Any two radials will partition
the circular area Cd into two sectors. We say a sector is singleton if none of the
nodes in A lie inside this sector (including the arc but excluding the two radials).
It is easy to say that the 6 nodes will partition the circle into 6 singleton sectors.
To satisfy the above necessary condition, the angle of each singleton sector should
be more than π/3: if the angle of a singleton section is no more than π/3, let ai
be the node on one side of this sector, and aj be the node on the other side of this
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sector, then for any point x that lies in the segment da′i and any point y that lies
in the segment da′j, we must have |xy| ≤ r. Since we have 6 singleton sectors, and
each singleton sector has an angle of more than π/3, the summed angle is more
than 2π, which contradicts the fact that a circle is 2π. Given this conclusion, it is
trivial to show that more than 6 routes is also not achievable.
We have also evaluated through experiments the upper-bounds of the success
ratio for two colluding attackers s and d to launch multiple-route IDPA with s
using directional transmission technique. Given a rectangular area of 20r × 20r,
we put d in the center of the area. At each round of experiment, we independently
deploy 400r2ρ nodes inside the area according to 2D uniform distribution and
randomly pick n nodes inside d’s receiving range, where ρ is referred to as the
node density. We say (s, d) may succeed only if all of the three necessary conditions
presented in the proof of Theorem 4.3.1 are satisfied. For each configuration of
route number n and node density ρ, 107 experiments have been conducted, and
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n = 4, theo
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Figure 4.4: Upper bounds of attackers’ success probability
Both experimental and theoretical upper-bounds are plotted in Figure 4.4,
where “theo” denotes the theoretical upper-bounds obtained using (4.2), “expe”
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denotes the experimental upper-bounds obtained through experiments described
above, and “n” denotes the number of node-disjoint routes to be picked by the
malicious SD pair (s, d). In Figure 4.4, the normalized node density is defined as
the average number of nodes inside an area of πr2. Since both the theoretical and
experimental upper-bounds corresponding to n = 4 and n = 5 are almost equal
to 0 across all illustrated node densities (e.g., for n = 4, all values are less than
2 × 10−3), the four curves associated to n = 4, 5 have almost overlapped into one
single curve, which is the lowest curve illustrated in Figure 4.4. For n = 2, 3, we
can see that the success ratio increases first with the increase of node density until
it arrives at a peak, then decreases with the further increase of node density, which
is consistent with (4.2). The reason is as follows: with the increase of the node
density, the probability P1 that the condition C1 can be satisfied increases mono-
tonically from 0 to 1, the probability P2 that the condition C2 can be satisfied
keeps unchanged, while the probability P3 that the condition C3 can be satisfied
decreases monotonically from 1 to 0, and when ρ is small, the value of P1 dom-
inates the bound, while when ρ is large, the value of P3 dominates the bound.
From Figure 4.4 we can also see that there exist gaps between theoretical results
and experimental results. The reason is that when we calculate the probability of
condition C3 being satisfied, only a subset of applicable nodes have been consid-
ered, which make the theoretical upper-bounds a little bit looser (higher) than the
experimental upper-bounds.
The above upper bounds are evaluated based on a fixed topology, that is, the set
of links E(t) keeps unchanged for all time index t. However, due to node mobility,
E(t) will change over time t, therefore s needs to frequently update routes. Then
after several route updates, the probability that s still has not been detected as
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malicious will be very small. For example, assume that each route update is
independent, after 5 times of route updates, even for n = 2, the probability that
s has not been detected as malicious is less than 0.06%. That is, attackers has
negligible chance to flee. In summary, when the malicious SD pair (s, d) tries to
launch IDPA, to avoid being detected and to maximize the damage, the optimal
strategy is to use only one route to inject data packets by conforming to both the
maximum hop number Lmaxhop and the legitimate rate λs,d, which is equivalent to
say that the optimal strategy is not to launch IDPA.
Besides injecting traffic by themselves, attackers may also impersonate good
nodes to launch injecting traffic attacks in attempt to avoid being detected as
well as let those impersonated good nodes being mistakenly detected as malicious.
Next we analyze the effects of possible impersonation attacks that can be launched
by attackers. In the proposed mechanisms, the only way that an attacker m
can impersonate a good node s who has not been compromised is to first record
the packets that s has transmitted, then later forwards/broadcasts these packets.
Specifically, there are two situations:
• Situation 1: m recorded a query packet issued by s and rebroadcast it later.
However, since this query packet has been seen by all other nodes in the
network due to the flooding nature of query message, no nodes will further
process this query packet.
• Situation 2: m recorded a data packet issued by s and forwarded it later.
However, since nodes on the route associated to this data packet will only
process this packet at most one time, forwarding this packet at time t1 by m
cannot cause damage to other nodes.
In summary, impersonation attack cannot cause further damage to good nodes in
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the network. Further, it is ready to check that as long as a good node s has not
been compromised, with no chance it will be marked as malicious. That is, the
false alarm ratio of the above detect rules is 0.
4.4 Centralized Detection with De-centralized Im-
plementation
The defense system described in Section 4.2 are fully distributed. However, the
drawback this system is that it may have relatively high storage complexity. Mean-
while, each node needs to have prior knowledge of the set of legitimate traffic pairs,
which may not be available to all nodes in general. Next we describe a modified ver-
sion of the proposed defense system. In the modified version, instead of performing
attacker detection by itself, each good node will report the observed information
to certain nodes which we called centralized detectors, then the centralized detec-
tor will perform attacker detection based on the collected traffic information. In
general, the centralized detectors will be under stronger protection than normal
nodes and may have more powerful computation capability and more storage, such
as base station.
The detailed description of the modified defense system is as follows. First,
the route discovery and packet delivery procedure is the same as described in Sec-
tion 4.2.1. Second, the monitoring mechanism is still header watcher as described
in Section 4.2.2 with the following modification: for each good node, instead of
storing all listened valid packet headers locally, most time it does not need to
any packet headers locally, but only needs to store the following three-tuple (traf-
fic pair, sequence number, route) that is associated to each listened valid packet
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headers. A good node needs to record the full packet headers only if it has been
notified by the centralized detectors to do so, as explained next. Furthermore,
instead of reporting each listened packet header information separately, each good
node will report the listened packet header information in a batch mode, that is,
each report consists of many listened packet header information.
For the centralized detector, its job is to perform injecting traffic attack detec-
tion by applying similar detection rules as described in Section 4.2.3. The major
difference lies in that when the centralized detector performs injecting traffic at-
tack detection, the procedure are two steps. In the first step, the detector will
check whether a node has injected two packets with the same sequence number or
whether a sequence number is larger than specified upper-bound based only on the
collected partial packet header information, that is, without checking the packet
header signatures. If any of the two conditions has been satisfied, the detector
then will request those nodes who report such information to submit full packet
headers. That is, the centralized detector needs concrete evidence to charge the
attacker.
Now we use an example to illustrate the modified detection procedure. Assume
that node a has reported a sequence number seq1 and route R1 associated to traffic
pair (s, d), and node b has reported a sequence number seq2 and route R2 associated
to traffic pair (s, d). After the centralized detector has received these reports, it
will find that seq1 = seq2 but R1 6= R2. Then the detector has reason to suspect
that s has launched injecting traffic attacks. When this happens, the detector will
ask node a and b to report the full packet headers next time such that it can collect
concrete evidence to charge s.
From the above description we can see that although the attacker detection
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is performed in a centralized, the monitoring is still fully distributed. Now we
analyze the detection performance of the modified defense system. It is easy to see
that either simple IDPA or long-route IDPA can be easily detected. Meanwhile,
for the multi-route IDPA, requiring packets sent via different route to use different
sequence number has not gain from the attacker’s point of view, and allowing
packets sent via different route to use same sequence number will be detected
immediately when omnidirectional transmission technique is used. Now we focus
on the scenario that the attackers allow packets sent via different route to use
same sequence number will be detected immediately, and directional transmission
technique is used to avoid being detected.
Given that an attacker s picks n node-disjoint routes to simultaneously inject
packets and packets on different routes will share the same set of sequence num-
bers, as long as at least two nodes on the selected routes are good, it is easy to
check that with zero probability that s can avoid being detected. In other words,
attackers have no chance to launch IPDA without being detected. Comparing to
the fully distributed defense system described in Section 4.2, the storage overhead
of the modified defense system can be dramatically reduced, but some extra com-
munication overhead is introduced due to that each node needs to report to the
centralized detector. However, since the size of each report is very small comparing
to the data packet, the extra communication overhead is negligible. For example,
if the average packet size is 1000 bytes, and the report size is 20 bytes, then the
increased overall traffic is only 2%.
Until now we have assumed that each good node will keep listening all the
packet transmission in its neighborhood. Next we show how to further decrease
the overhead by letting nodes selectively listen packet transmissions, with negligible
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degradation of the detection performance. Specifically, each node can selectively
listen its neighbors’ transmission with a certain probability p, which we called
probabilistic monitoring. That is, a packet transmission event happens in a good
node’s neighborhood, with only probability p this node will monitor this transmis-
sion and report the observation to the centralized detector. Now when an attacker
has injected n ≥ 2 packets with the same sequence number via n node-disjoint
routes, with no more than probability p(n) = (1 − p)n + p(1 − p)n−1 the attacker
can avoid being detected. Furthermore, after the attacker has injected k packets,
the probability that it will not be detected will be decreased to p(n)k, which goes to
0 with the increase of k. By applying probabilistic monitoring, the communication
overhead can be further decreased by 1− p, while the detection performance only
suffers negligible degradation.
One possible drawback of such centralized detection mechanism is that the
detector itself can also become attackers’ target. Besides increasing the protection
level, one can also increase the number of centralized detectors. For example, if
there are 2 detectors in the network, even one has been compromised, the other
still work well. In this case, for each node, it can either submit report to both
detectors, or each time randomly pick one to submit, where the later is equivalent
to reducing p by half.
4.5 Simulation Studies
In the simulations, 100 good nodes and various number of malicious nodes are
randomly deployed inside a rectangular area of 1500m*1500m, and the maximum
transmission range for each node is 300 m. As mentioned before, random waypoint
mobility model is used, with the average pause time being 300s, and vmax = 10m/s.
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In the simulations, 50 good nodes are selected as the packet generators, and
each will randomly pick a good node to send packets, therefore the total number
of SD pairs are 50. For each malicious node who launches injecting traffic attacks,
it will randomly pick another malicious node who also launches injecting traffic
attacks as the destination to inject packets. For each malicious node who launches
routing disruption attacks, it will not inject traffic to the network. All SD pairs
(good or malicious) are set to be legitimate, and for each pair, packets are generated
according to a Poisson process with a pre-specified traffic rate known by all nodes,
where the average packet inter-arrival time is 1 second. For malicious nodes who
launch injecting traffic attacks, they will increase the average packet injection rate
by 10 times. Also, all data packets have the same size of 1024 bytes.
In our simulations, each configuration has been run 20 independent rounds us-
ing different random seeds, and the result are averaged over all the 20 rounds. For
each round, the simulation time is set to be 5000 seconds. When we calculate the
energy efficiency, only transmission energy consumption has been considered, one
reason is that transmission energy consumption plays a major role in overall energy
consumption, and another reason is that receiving energy consumption may vary
dramatically over different communication systems due to their different imple-
mentations. However, both data and route request packets have been considered.
We assume the transmission energy needed per data packet is normalized to be 1.
We first investigate the tradeoff between limiting the route request rate and
system performance. Although the performance also depends on other factors
such as the mobility pattern, the number of nodes in the network, the average
number of hops per route, etc., to better illustrate the tradeoff between limiting
















































(a) Energy efficiency (b) End-to-end throughput
Figure 4.5: Limiting route request rate vs. system performance
fixed. However, similar results can also be obtained by changing these parameters.
Fig. 4.5 illustrates the tradeoff between limiting the route request rate and
network performance. In this set of simulations, all malicious nodes will only
inject route request packets and will not inject any data packets or launch routing
disruption attacks. We assume that all good nodes have the same minimum route
request forwarding interval denoted by Tmin, but all malicious nodes will set their
route request rate to be 1 per second. From Fig. 4.5(a) we can see that with the
increase of Tmin from 1 to 80 seconds, the energy efficiency of good nodes also
increases, and keeps almost unchanged from 80 to 160 seconds. The reason is that
when Tmin is small, attackers can waste good nodes’ energy through injecting a
lot of route request packets to request others to forward. Fig. 4.5(b) shows that
with the increase of Tmin from 1 second to 20 seconds, the end-to-end throughput
of good nodes keeps almost unchanged, while with the increase of Tmin from 80
seconds to 160 seconds, the end-to-end throughput of good nodes drops almost















































IDPA under no defense
general IDPA strategy
optimal IDPA strategy
(a) Energy efficiency (b) End-to-end throughput
Figure 4.6: Effects of IDPA under different configurations
Fig. 4.6 shows the simulation results under various types of IDPA. In Fig. 4.6,
“IDPA under no defense” denotes the case that attackers launched simple IDPA
and the underlying system has not launched any defending mechanism; “general
IDPA strategy” denotes the case that attackers launch IDPA but the mechanisms
described in Section 4.2 have been launched, where both multiple-route IDPA and
long-route IDPA have been simulated; “optimal IDPA strategy” denotes the case
that attackers will use only one route to inject data packets which conforms both
to the maximum hop number Tmaxhop = 10 and to the legitimate maximum packet
injection rate and the mechanisms described in Section 4.2 have been launched.
From Fig. 4.6(a) we can see that when there is no defending mechanisms for
IDPA, even simple IDPA can dramatically degrade the energy efficiency of good
nodes. When the defending mechanisms described in Section 4.2 are employed,
from attackers’ point of view, launching IDPA has no any gain in decreasing the en-
ergy efficiency of good nodes. However, if attackers apply the optimal IDPA strat-
egy, they can still degrade the energy efficiency of good nodes. From Fig. 4.6(b)
we can see that without employing necessary defending mechanisms, with the in-
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crease of the number of attackers, even simple IDPA can dramatically degrade the
end-to-end throughput of good nodes due to the congestion they caused. When
the defending mechanisms described in Section 4.2 are employed, launching IDPA
has almost no effects on the performance of good nodes’ end-to-end throughput.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter we have studied the possible injecting traffic attacks that can be
launched in mobile ad hoc networks, and proposed a set of mechanisms to de-
fend against such attacks. Both query flooding attacks and injecting general data
packets attacks have been investigated. Furthermore, for injecting general data
packets attacks, the situations that attackers may use some advanced transmission
techniques, such as directional antennas or beamforming, to avoid being detected
have also been studied. Two set of defense mechanisms have been proposed, one is
fully distributed, while the other is centralized with de-centralized implementation.
Our theoretical analysis has shown that when the proposed mechanisms are used,
the best strategy for attackers is not to launch injecting traffic attacks. Extensive
simulation studies have also agreed with our theoretical analysis.
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Chapter 5
Game Theoretic Analysis of
Security in Cooperative Ad Hoc
Networks
Although in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 several mechanisms have been proposed
to defend cooperative ad hoc networks against various insider attacks, there still
exist some important issues which have not been fully addressed. A significant
one is the optimality measure of defense mechanisms. For example, what metrics
should be used to measure the optimality of the defense mechanism? Under certain
optimality metrics, what are the optimal defending strategies, especially when the
environment is noisy and the monitoring is not perfect? What strategies should
the attackers use to maximize the damage to the network, and consequently what
is the maximum possible damage that the attackers can cause? In this chapter
we will formally address the above issues. Specifically, we will try to derive the
optimal defending strategies as well as the maximum possible damage that can be
caused by insider attackers under noise and imperfect monitoring.
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 describes the secure routing
and packet forwarding game model with incomplete type information. Section 5.2
presents the devised defending strategies by incorporating statistical attacker de-
tection mechanisms, as well as possible attacking strategies. The optimality of the
devised strategies is analyzed in Section 5.3. Simulation results are presented in
Section 5.4. Section 5.5 summarizes this chapter.
5.1 Game Model
In this chapter we jointly consider routing and packet forwarding in cooperative
ad hoc networks, and model the interactions between good nodes and attackers
as games, referred to as secure routing and packet forwarding games. We adopt
Nash equilibrium as a basic optimality metric. In order to fully address the above
issues, we focus on the following scenario: initially good nodes do not know who
are attackers while attackers can know who are good nodes. This scenario can be
regarded as the worst-case scenario from the defenders’ point of view, that is, if a
strategy can work well under this scenario, they can work well under any scenarios.
We consider cooperative ad hoc networks deployed in adversarial environments.
According to their objectives, nodes in such networks can be classified into two
types: good and malicious. The objective of good nodes is to optimize the overall
system performance, while the objective of malicious nodes is to maximize the
damage that they can cause to the system. In such networks, each node may
generate (or collect) some data scheduled to be delivered to certain destinations,
and the data rate from each node is determined by the common system goal, which
is usually application-specific.
In this chapter we will still focus on insider attacks. Since we focus on packet
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forwarding, we will mainly consider the following two representative attack models:
dropping packets and injecting traffic. By dropping other nodes’ packets, all the
resources spent to transmit these packets are wasted, and the network’s perfor-
mance is degraded. Attackers can also inject an overwhelming amount of packets
into the network: once the others have forwarded these packets but cannot get
payback, those resources spent to forward these packets are wasted. Meanwhile,
the attackers are allowed to collude to increase their attacking capability.
As we have known in Chapter 4, in cooperative ad hoc networks, without know-
ing any information about node’s legitimate data generation rate, the detection of
injecting traffic attacks will become extremely hard (or impossible). Fortunately,
since cooperative ad hoc networks are designed to fulfill certain common goals, it
holds in general that a node’s legitimate data generation rate can be known or
estimated by some other nodes in the network. For example, in ad hoc sensor net-
works designed to do environment surveillance, each node needs to send collected
information to the centralized data collector, and the amount of data that each
node can send is usually pre-determined by the system goal, and can be known
or estimated by some other legitimate nodes. Similar as in Chapter 4, we assume
that for each node s in the network, the number of packets that it will generate
by time t is Ts(t), which is usually different for different node
1. In general, the
exact value of Ts(t) may not be known by other nodes in the network. In this
chapter we assume that the upper-bound of Ts(t), denoted by fs(t), can be known
or estimated by some nodes in the network.
To formally analyze the security in cooperative ad hoc networks, we model
1In general, the number of packets that each node s will generate by time t can be modeled
as a random variable, and Ts(t) can be regarded as a specific realization.
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the dynamic interactions between good nodes and attackers as a secure routing
and packet forwarding game with incomplete type information and imperfect
observation:
• Players: The set of players is denoted by N , which is the set of legitimate
nodes in the network.
• Types: Each player i ∈ N has a type θi ∈ Θ where Θ = {good, malicious}.
Initially, each attacker knows any other player’s type, while each good player
assumes all nodes are good. That is, good nodes have incomplete information
of the others’ type. Let Ng denote the set of good players and Nm = N −Ng
the set of attackers.
• Strategy space:
1. Route participation stage: For each player, after receiving a message
requesting it to be on a certain route, it can either accept this request,
denoted by A, or not accept this request, denoted by NA.
2. Route selection stage: For each player who has a packet to send,
after discovering a valid route2, its decision can be either request/use
this route to send the packet, denoted by R, or not request/use this
route to send the packet, denoted by NR.
3. Packet forwarding stage: For each relay node, once it has received a
packet requesting it to forward, its decision can be either forward this
packet, denoted by F, or drop this packet, denoted by D.
2A valid route means that all nodes on this route have agreed to be on this route and each
node on this route lies inside the transmission range of its previous player on this route.
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• Cost: For any player i ∈ N , transmitting a packet, either for itself or for
the others, will incur cost ci.
• Gain: For each good player i ∈ Ng, if a packet originated from it can be
successfully delivered to its destination, it can get gain gi.
• Imperfect execution: Due to noise, with probability pe each decision F
can be mistakenly executed as D.
• Imperfect observation: With probability pm each forwarding outcome
can be observed as dropping by the source (i.e., miss probability), and with
probability pf each dropping outcome can be observed as forwarding by the
source (i.e., false positive probability). Meanwhile, when a node has injected
a packet, with probability ps it can avoid being detected by those who know
its legitimate traffic injection rate.
• Utility: For each player i ∈ N , let Si(t) denote the number of i’s pack-
ets that have been scheduled to send and have successfully arrived at their
destinations by time t, let Fi(j, t) denote the number of packets that i has
forwarded for player j ∈ N by time t, and let Wi(j, t) denote the total times
of wasted packet transmissions that i has caused to j by time t due to i
dropping those packets that have been transmitted by j. Let tf denote the
lifetime of this network. Then we can model the players’ utility (payoff)
functions as follows:
1. Good players: Since all good players belong to the same authority

















2. Malicious players: Since malicious players are allowed to collude, we









Here parameter α is introduced to determine the relative importance
of attackers’ cost comparing to good players’ cost. That is, from the
attackers’ point of view, it is worth spending cost c to cause the damage




The objective of good players is to maximize Ug, while the objective of
attackers is to maximize Um. If the game will be played for an infinite
duration, then their utility functions will become Ug = limt→∞ Ug(t) and
Um = limt→∞ Um(t), respectively.
Remark 1: On the right-hand side of (5.1), the numerator denotes the net
profit (i.e., total gain minus total cost) that the good nodes obtained, and the
denominator denotes the total number of packets that good nodes need to send.
The utility function (5.1) represents the average net profit that good nodes can
obtain per packet that needs to be delivered. Since good nodes do not have any
prior knowledge of the other nodes’ types, each good node may not know its exact
payoff by time t, which introduce extra difficulty for optimal strategy design.
Remark 2: In (5.3), Wi(j, t)cj represents the total damage (or wasted energy)
that i has caused to j by time t due to i launching dropping packets attacks,
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Fj(i, t)cj represents the total damage that i has caused to j by time t due to i
launching injecting traffic attacks, and Fi(t)ci represents the total cost incurred to
i by launching both injecting traffic and dropping packets attacks by time t. In
summary, the numerator of the right-hand side of (5.3) represents the net damage
that the attackers caused to the good nodes. Since this value may increase mono-
tonically, it is normalized by dividing the network lifetime tf . Now this utility
function represents the average net damage that the attackers cause to the good
nodes per time unit. From (5.3) we can see that in this game setting the attackers’
goal is to waste the good nodes’ energy as much as possible. Alteratively, attackers
can also have other types of goals, such as minimizing the good nodes’ payoff. In
Section 5.3 we will show that the performance of the proposed defending strategy
is not sensitive to the attackers’ specific goal, and in most situations maximizing
(5.3) has the same effect as minimizing the good nodes’ payoff under the proposed
defending strategies.
Remark 3: The above game can be divided into many subgames as explained
below. Once a player wants to send a packet to a certain destination, a subgame
will be initiated which consists of three stages: in the first stage, the source will
request some players to be on a certain route to the destination; in the second
stage, the source will decide whether it should use this route to send the packet;
in the third stage, each relay will decide whether it should help the source to
forward this packet once receiving it. We refer to each subgame as a single routing
and packet forwarding subgame. It is worth noting that a subgame may terminate
immediately after finishing the first or the second stage.
To simplify our illustration, we assume that gi = g for all i ∈ Ng and ci = c
for all i ∈ N . Like many other routing protocols for ad hoc networks, in the
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above game, the maximum number of hops per route will be upper-bounded by
Lmax, which is a pre-determined system parameter. Without loss of generality, we
assume that (1− pe)Lmaxg > Lmaxc, otherwise the expected gain may be less than
the expected cost. Since in ad hoc networks energy is usually the most precious
resource, we can directly relate the cost to energy. The physical meaning of gain g
may vary according to specific applications. However, as to be shown in Section 5.3,
as long as g is reasonably large, it will affect the strategy design.
According to the above game model, in each single routing and packet for-
warding subgame, for the initiator of this subgame, its strategy space is {R, NR},
while for each relay node, its strategy space is {(A, F), (A, D), (NA, F), (NA,
D)}. Here (A, F) means that a relay node agrees to be on a certain route in the
route participation stage and will forward the packet from the source in the packet
forwarding stage, (A, D) means that a relay node agrees to be on a certain route
in the route participation stage but will drop the packet from the source in the
packet forwarding stage, (NA, F) means that a relay node does not agree to be on a
certain route but will forward the packet from the source in the packet forwarding
stage, and (NA, D) means that a relay node does not agree to be on a certain
route and will drop the packet from the source in the packet forwarding stage.
In the above game we have assumed that some necessary monitoring mecha-
nisms will be launched to detect possible packet dropping. We have also assumed
that when a node transmits a packet, its neighbors can know who is the source
of this packet and who is currently transmitting this packet. However, we do not
assume any perfect monitoring, and each node makes its decision only based on
local private and imperfect observation. In general, pf , pm, and ps are determined





Figure 5.1: A single routing and packet forwarding subgame.
known or estimated by each node, but ps may not be known by those detectors.
5.2 Defense Strategies with Statistical Attacker
Detection
We first briefly study a simple subgame with complete type information and perfect
observation: P1 requests P2 to forward a packet to P3 through the route “P1 →
P2 → P3”, and P2 has agreed to be on this route, as illustrated in Fig. 5.1. Since the
type information is complete, all players know each other’s type. This is a two-stage
extensive game with P1 moving first. If P1’s action is NR, then the game will be
terminated immediately, otherwise P2 will take its action accordingly. The payoff
profiles for this game under different scenarios are shown in Fig. 5.2, where the first
value in each payoff profile corresponds to P1’s payoff and the second corresponds
to P2’s payoff. Based on the types of P1 and P2, there are four different scenarios:
• Scenario 1: P1 is good and P2 is bad. Then the only Nash equilibrium is
(NR, D) with payoff profile (0, 0).
• Scenario 2: P1 is bad and P2 is good. Then the only Nash equilibrium is
(NR, D) with payoff profile (0, 0).
• Scenario 3: Both players are good. In this scenario, if g > 2c, the only Nash
equilibrium is (R, F) with payoff profile (g − 2c, g − 2c); if g < 2c, the only
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Nash equilibrium is (NR, F) with payoff profile (0, 0); while if g = 2c, there
are two Nash equilibria (NR, F) and (R, F), both have the same payoff profile
(0, 0).
• Scenario 4: Both players are bad. Then the only Nash equilibrium is (NR,
D) with payoff profile (0, 0).
Based on the above analysis we can conclude that in a two-hop subgame with
complete type information:
1. A good node should neither forward any packet for attackers nor request any
attackers to forward packets. Meanwhile, good nodes should always forward
packets for other good nodes provided g > 2c.
2. A malicious node should not forward any packet and should not request other
nodes to forward packets.
This can be easily generalized to the multi-hop scenario, that is, no good nodes
should work with malicious nodes.
However, defending against insider attacks in realistic scenarios is much more
challenging due to the following reasons. First, good nodes cannot know who are
attackers a priori. Second, owing to noise, decision execution may not be perfect.
Third, monitoring errors will be very common because of the fully distributed
nature and limited available resources. Consequently, the attackers can easily take
advantage of such information asymmetry and imperfectness to cause more damage
and to avoid being detected.
To handle incomplete type information, certain attacker detection mechanisms
should be applied. In general, one can base on what being observed to detect
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Figure 5.2: The payoff profiles under different scenarios.
later drops it, other nodes (either its neighbor or the source of the packet) who
has observed this inconsistency (i.e., agreeing to forward but dropping) can mark
this node as malicious. If there is no decision execution error and the observation
is perfect, such method can detect all intentional packet dropping.
However, noise always exists and the monitoring is impossible to be perfect.
Under such realistic circumstances, detecting malicious behavior will become ex-
tremely hard due to that an observed misbehavior may either be caused by inten-
tion, or by unintentional execution error, or simply due to observation error. Now
a node should not be marked as malicious just simply because it has been observed
dropping some packets. Accordingly, the attackers can take advantage of noise and
observation errors to cause more damage without being detected.
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5.2.1 Statistical Dropping Packet Attack Detection
To combat insider attacks under noise and imperfect observation, we first study
what should be normal observation when no attackers are present. In this case,
when a node has made a decision to forward a packet (i.e., decision F), the probabil-
ity pF that the outcome observed by the source is also forwarding can be calculated
as follows:
pF = (1− pe)(1− pf ) + pepm. (5.4)
Let Ri(j, t) denote the number of times that node j has agreed to forward for
node i by time t, and F̃j(i, t) denote the number of times that i has observed that j
has forwarded a packet for it by time t. Based on the Central Limit Theorem [49],





F̃j(i, t)−Ri(j, t) · pF√












In other words, when Ri(j, t) is reasonably large, F̃j(i, t) − Ri(j, t)pF can be ap-
proximately modeled as a Gaussian random variable with mean 0 and variance
Ri(j, t)pF (1− pF ).
Let isDPAi(j) denote i’s belief about whether j has launched dropping packets
attack, where isDPAi(j) = 1 indicates that i believes j has launched dropping
packets attack, while isDPAi(j) = 0 indicates that i believes j has not launched
dropping packets attack. Let Bth be a reasonably large constant (e.g., 200). Then
the following hypothesis testing rule can be used by i to judge whether j has
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1 if F̃j(i, t) < Ri(j, t)pF − x
√
Ri(j, t)pF (1− pF ) and Ri(j, t) > Bth
0 otherwise.
(5.7)
If (5.7) is used to detect dropping packets attack, the false alarm ratio would be
no more than 1 − Φ(x). It is worth mentioning that even for a small positive x,
the value of Φ(x) can still approach to 1 (e.g, Φ(5) > 0.999).
5.2.2 Statistical Injecting Traffic Attack Detection
In Section 5.2.1 we focus on dropping packets attacks. Attackers can also try to
inject an overwhelming amount of traffic to waste the good nodes’ resources. Let
isITAi(j) denote i’s belief about whether j has launched injecting traffic attack,
where isITAi(j) = 1 indicates that i believes j has launched injecting traffic
attack, while isITAi(j) = 0 indicates that i believes j has not launched injecting
traffic attack. Let T̃j(t) denote the number of packets that have been injected by
j and have been observed by those nodes who know j’s legitimate traffic injection





1 if T̃j(t) > fj(t)
0 otherwise.
(5.8)
Under this detection rule, the maximum number of packets that attacker j can
inject without being detected will be no more than fj(t)/(1− ps). This detection
rule is very conservative since only those observed packet injection events are used.
If ps can also be known by good nodes, we can modify (5.8) to further limit the
number of packets that j can inject without being marked as malicious, such as
changing the threshold from fj(t) to
fj(t)
1−ps . Since ps is usually not known and may
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change across different nodes, in this chapter when performing injecting traffic
attack detection, we will not incorporate ps into the detection rule.
The detection rule (5.8) can work well only when no retransmission is allowed.
Next we show how to detect injecting traffic attack when retransmission is allowed
upon unsuccessful delivery. We first make a simple assumption that all selected
routes have the same number of hops, denoted by L, and let q = (1 − pe)L.
Then for each packet, the total number of tries needed to successfully deliver





. For any node j ∈ N , if ps = 0 and j has never
intentionally retransmitted a packet that has been successfully delivered to its











In other words, when T̃j(t) is reasonably large, T̃j(t) − Tj(t)/q can also be ap-
proximately modeled as a Gaussian random variable with mean 0 and variance













and T̃j(t) > Bth
0 otherwise.
(5.10)
Similarly, when the above detection rule is used, the false alarm ratio would be
no more than 1 − Φ(x). In this case, the number of packets that attacker j can





Comparing to the case that no retransmission is allowed, when retransmission is
allowed, attackers can inject more packets without being detected, though good
nodes can also enjoy higher throughput.
In general the number of hops per selected route varies according to the loca-
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tions of the source and destination and the network topology. Let L̄min denote the
average number of hops per selected route. When calculating q used in (5.10), an
alternative way is to let q = (1−pe)L̄min . However, this may lead to higher false pos-
itive probability since some nodes may experience longer routes due to their loca-
tions. In this chapter we adopt a more conservative way by letting q = (1−pe)Lmax .
As a consequence, even when ps = 0, the resulted false positive probability will
be far less than 1−Φ(x), with the penalty that the attackers can also inject more
packets without being detected. For example, for Lmax = 10, L̄min = 4, pe = 0.02,
the extra increase would be about 12.9% (i.e., (1− pe)L̄min−Lmax − 1). Accordingly,
the good nodes’ payoff will also be decreased.
5.2.3 Secure Routing and Packet Forwarding Strategy
Based on the above analysis, we can arrive at the following strategy to secure
routing and packet forwarding in cooperative ad hoc networks under noise and
imperfect monitoring:
Secure Routing and Packet Forwarding Strategy: In the secure routing and
packet forwarding game under noise and imperfect monitoring, initially each good
node will assume all other nodes are good. For each single routing and packet
forwarding subgame, assuming that P0 is good and is the source who wants to
send a packet to Pn at time t, and a route “P0 → P1 → · · · → Pn” has been
discovered by P0. After P0 has sent requests to all the relays on this route asking
them to participate, for each good node on this route the following strategies should
be taken in different stages:
1. In the route participation stage: A good relay Pi takes action A if and only
if no nodes on this route have been marked as malicious and n ≤ Lmax;
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otherwise, it takes NA.
2. In the route selection stage: P0 will take action R if and only if all the
following conditions can be satisfied: a) the packet is valid (i.e., it is scheduled
to be sent by P0), b) n ≤ Lmax, c) no nodes on this route have been marked
as malicious by P0, d) all relays have agreed to forward packets in the route
participation stage, and e) this route has the minimum number of hops among
all good routes to Pn known by P0; otherwise, P0 should take action NR.
3. In the packet forwarding stage: For each relay Pi, it will take action F if
and only if it has agreed to be on this route in the route participation stage;
otherwise, it should take action D.
Let x be a positive constant. For any node j, it will be marked as malicious by node
i if it has been detected by any following rules: (5.7), (5.8) if retransmission is not
allowed, and (5.10) if retransmission is allowed, where in (5.10) q = (1− pe)Lmax.
Meanwhile, node j will also be marked as malicious if it has requested to send a
packet through a route with the number of hops greater than Lmax.
In the above defense strategy, each good node needs to know or estimate the
following parameters: pe, pf , pm, and Lmax. Meanwhile, it also needs to set the
two constants that are used in (5.7) and (5.10): Bth and x. Lmax is a system-
level parameter and is known by all nodes in the network. The packet dropping
probability pe can be either trained off-line, or estimated online by each node
through evaluating its own packet dropping ratio. In general different node may
experience different pe at different time or location. Under such circumstances,
to reduce the false positive when performing attacker detection using (5.7) and
(5.10), a node may set pe to be a little bit larger than the one experienced by itself.
The two observation error related parameters pf and pm can be provided by the
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underlying monitoring mechanism. Similarly, different node may also experience
different pf and pm at different situations. Therefore, when a node uses (5.7) to
perform attacker detection, to limit the false positive, it may use the upper-bounds
of pf and pm provided by the underlying monitoring mechanisms. The effects of
these parameters will be further studied in later sections.
5.2.4 Attacking Strategy
Since this chapter focuses on insider attackers, it is reasonable to believe that
attackers can know the defending strategies employed by the system. This can
be regarded as the worst-case scenario from the defenders’ point of view. In other
words, if the proposed defending strategy can work well in this scenario, it can also
work well in any scenarios. This subsection studies what strategies the attackers
should use to maximize their utility (or the damage to the network) when the
proposed secure routing and packet forwarding strategy is used by the good nodes.
We first study dropping packets attack. According to the proposed secure
routing and packet forwarding strategy, once a node i has been marked as malicious
by another node j, i will not be able to cause damage to j again. Therefore, an
attacker should avoid being detected in order to continuously cause damage to the
good nodes. One simple strategy is to always apply the strategy (A, D). However,
when applying this strategy, the maximum number of good nodes’ packets that an
attacker can drop without being detected will be no more than |Ng| · Bth, while
the penalty is that it will be detected as malicious and cannot cause damage to
the good nodes any more.
Intuitively, attackers can selectively drop packets to avoid being detected and
still cause continuous damage to good nodes. According to the proposed secure
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routing and packet forwarding strategy, the number of a good node i’s packets that






where n is the number of packets that j has agreed to forward for i. In other
words, j has to forward at least n(1 − pe) − x
√
n
1+pm−pf packets for i in order to
avoid being marked as malicious. However, recall that even there are no attackers,
in average n(1 − pe) packets will be dropped due to noise. That is, the extra













n(1−pe) = 0, selectively dropping i’s
packets can bring almost no gain to j if the game will be played for long enough
time.
According to the secure routing and packet forwarding strategy, a good node
will not start performing dropping packet attack detection before having enough
interactions with another node (e.g., Bth). Therefore, the following dropping packet
attack strategy can be used by an attacker j when acting as relay nodes: for each
good node i, it can drop the first Bth − 1 i’s packets by playing (A, D), then start
playing (NA, D) forever. With this strategy, the damage that j can cause to i is
upper-bounded by Bthc without introducing any cost to j. It is easy to see that
the relative damage (normalized by time) Bthc
tf
decreases monotonically with the
increase of the network lifetime tf .
Until now we have assumed that all nodes will experience the same pe, pf , and
pm. However, such assumption may not hold in general. For example, attackers


















npF (1− pF ).
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denote the actual false positive probability and miss probability experienced by an
attacker j. When j tries to drop i’s packets, in order to avoid being detected, the
actual packet drop ratio p′e that j will apply to drop i’s packet should satisfy the
following condition:
(1− p′e)(1− p′f ) + p′ep′m > pF −
x
√
npF (1− pF )
n
, (5.11)
where n is the number of packets that j has agreed to forward for i. It is easy to
check that to satisfy (5.11) for all possible n, the maximum packet dropping ratio
p′e that j can apply is upper-bounded by
p′e ≤
pe(1− pf − pm) + (pf − p′f )
1− p′f − p′m
(5.12)
From (5.12) we can see that increasing the miss probability p′m and/or decreasing
the false positive probability experienced by j can also increase p′e, and conse-
quently increase the damage to i. Let Lavg denote the average number of wasted
packet transmissions caused by j when it drops i’s packets, according to the payoff
definition (5.3), as long as p
′
e−pe
1−pe ≤ αLavg, launching dropping packet attack with
p′e can introduce no gain to j. However, if
p′e−pe
1−pe > αLavg, j should launch drop-
ping packet attacks by selectively dropping the good nodes’ packets with dropping
probability calculated based on (5.12).
Now we study injecting traffic attack. According to the secure routing and
packet forwarding strategy, to avoid being marked as launching injecting traffic
attack, an attacker j should be sure that T̃j(t) ≤ fj(t). However, j may not know
the exact value of T̃j(t), and needs to estimate T̃j(t) by itself. Recall that for each
packet injected by j, with probability ps it can avoid being detected. It is readily
to show that T̃j(t)− Fj(j, t)(1− ps) can be approximately modeled as a Gaussian
random variable with mean 0 and variance Fj(j, t)ps(1− ps), where Fj(j, t) is the
total number of packets injected by j until time t.
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Based on the above analysis, when no retransmission is allowed, a good injecting
traffic strategy is as follows: j should try to limit the number of injected packets
Fj(j, t) to satisfy the following condition:
Fj(j, t)(1− ps) + y
√
Fj(j, t)ps(1− ps) < fj(t), (5.13)
where y is a large positive constant. By using this strategy, the probability that j
will be detected is upper-bounded by 1−Φ(y). When retransmission is allowed, ac-
cording to the secure routing and packet forwarding strategy, the condition should
be changed as follows:
Fj(j, t)(1− ps) + y
√






where y is a large positive constant and x and q are defined in the secure routing
and packet forwarding strategy.
In summary, we can arrive at the following attacking strategy, referred to as
optimal attacking strategy:
1. Dropping packet attack: For any attacker j, if the maximum possible p′e
calculated using (5.12) is larger than pe and
p′e−pe
1−pe ≤ αLavg, it should try
to selectively drop the good nodes’ packets with probability p′e; otherwise, it
should apply the following strategy: for any good node i, j should try to drop
the first Bth − 1 i’s packets by playing (A, D), then start playing (NA, D)
forever when acting as relay node for i.
2. Injecting traffic attack: For any attacker j, if no retransmission is al-
lowed, it should try to inject traffic by following (5.13); otherwise, it should
try to inject traffic by following (5.14). Meanwhile, when j has decided to
inject a packet, it should pick a route with the following properties: a) the
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number of hops is no more than Lmax, b) all relays are good nodes, c) among
all the routes known by j which satisfy (a) and (b), this route has the maxi-
mum number of hops.
5.3 Optimality Analysis
In this section we analyze the optimality of the proposed strategy profile, where all
good nodes follow the strategy described in Section 5.2.3 and all attackers follow
the strategy described in Section 5.2.4. We will focus on the worst-case scenario
from the good nodes’ point of view: when a malicious node wants to send a packet
to another node, it can always find a route with Lmax hops and all relay nodes
being good. This also is the best-case scenario from the attackers’ point of view.
We focus on the scenario that all nodes experience the same pe, pf , and pm. The
scenario that different node will experience different pe, pf , and pm will be discussed
at the end of this section.
Theorem 5.3.1 In the secure routing and packet forwarding game in noiseless
environment with perfect observation (i.e., pe = pf = pm = ps = 0), the proposed
strategy profile with Bth = 1 form a Nash equilibrium.
Proof To show that the proposed strategy profile forms a Nash equilibrium, we
only need to show that no player can increase its payoff by unilaterally changing
its own strategy:
• P0’s actions when it is good: According to the secure routing and packet
forwarding strategy, P0 will take action R if and only if 1) the packet to
be sent is valid, 2) n ≤ Lmax, 3) no nodes on this route have been marked
as malicious by P0, 4) all relay nodes have agreed to be on this route, and
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5) this route has the minimum cost among all good routes to Pn known by
P0. First, if P0 takes action R when the packet to be sent is not valid, the
good nodes’ payoff cannot be increased, or may even be decreased. Second,
if P0 takes action R when n > Lmax, P0 will be marked as malicious by
other good nodes and cannot send any packets again, which will decrease
the good nodes’ payoff. Third, if P0 takes action R when some nodes have
been marked as malicious by P0 or some nodes do not agree to be the route,
then the packet will be dropped by a certain relay node, and consequently
all cost spent to transmit this packet will be wasted, and the good nodes’
payoff will be decreased. Fourth, if P0 takes action R when the selected route
does not have the minimum cost among all good routes to Pn known by P0,
then comparing to the situation that the good route with the minimum cost
is used, some extra cost will be wasted if this route is used instead, which
will decrease the good nodes’ payoff. Finally, if all the above conditions are
satisfied but P0 takes action NR, the good nodes’ payoff will not increase
too, since not sending the packet or sending the packet using non-minimum
cost route can bring no gain or can only bring less gain.
• P0’s decision when it is malicious: According to the optimal attacking
strategy, P0 will take action R if and only if 1) FP0(P0, t) < fP0(t), 2) n =
Lmax, 3) all relay nodes are good, and 4) all relay nodes have agreed to be on
this route. First, if P0 takes action R when FP0(P0, t) ≥ fP0(t) or n > Lmax,
P0 will be marked as malicious by good nodes and cannot inject any packets
again, which will surely decrease the attackers’ payoff. Second, if P0 takes
action R when n < Lmax or some relay nodes are malicious or some relay
nodes do not agree to be on this route, since P0 can always find a route with
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Lmax hops and with all relay nodes being good, using a suboptimal route
surely cannot increase P0’s attack efficiency. Third, if all those conditions
are satisfied but P0 takes action NR, since the maximum possible damage
that can be caused by each packet injecting is (Lmax − 1)c, the attackers’
payoff cannot be further increased either.
• Pi’s decision (0 < i < n) when it is good: According to the secure routing
and packet forwarding strategy, Pi will take action (A, F) if all the other
nodes on this route have not been marked as malicious by it and n ≤ Lmax;
otherwise, it will take action (NR, D). When no nodes on this route have
been marked as malicious by it and n ≤ Lmax, since refusing to be on this
route may cause the source to select a route with higher cost and dropping
packet will waste other good nodes’ cost, both will cause Pi’ payoff to be
decreased. When some nodes on this route have been marked as malicious
by Pi or n > Lmax, if Pi agrees to be on this route or does not drop the
packet, since the packet will finally be dropped by malicious node, all effort
that has been spent by good nodes in this subgame will be wasted, which
surely cannot increase Pi’s payoff either.
• Pi’s decision (0 < i < n) when it is malicious: According to the optimal
attacking strategy, Pi will always take action (NA, D). We first consider
the situation that P0 is good. If Pi takes action (A,D), it will be detected
as malicious immediately and cannot cause damage to P0 any more, which
surely cannot increase the attackers’ payoff. If Pi takes action (A,F ), this
can only contribute to good nodes by helping good nodes forward packets,
and cannot increase the attackers’ payoff. Meanwhile, taking action (NA, F )
surely cannot cause damage to the good nodes, since good nodes will not use
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Pi to forward packets. Now let’s consider the situation that the initiator P0
is malicious. It is also easy to check that taking action (NA, D) is always
a best strategy from the malicious nodes’ point of view since P0 can always
find a better route, that is, a route with Lmax hops and with all relay nodes
being good.
Based on the above analysis we can see that no player can increase its payoff
by unilaterally changing its own strategy.









when tf is infinite.
According to the secure routing and packet forwarding strategy, a good node will
not work with any node that has been marked as malicious by itself. First, as we
have shown in Section 5.2.4, playing (A, D) cannot increase the attackers’ payoff
provided tf is infinite. Second, it is easy to see that playing (NA, F) and (A, F)
cannot increase the attackers’ payoff either, since when an attacker plays (NA, F),
no good nodes will request it to forward packets, while when an attacker plays
(A, F), it can only make contribution to the good nodes. Third, when an attacker
tries to inject packets, similar to the analysis in the proof of Theorem 5.3.1, it
should always use the route with all relay nodes being good and having agreed
to be on the route. Meanwhile, from an attacker’s point of view, injecting more
packets than specified will make it to be marked as malicious and cannot cause any
more damage to the good nodes, and consequently decrease its payoff. Therefore,

















1− ps (Lmax − 1− α)c. (5.15)
Here
fi(tf )
1−ps is the number of packets that attacker i can inject to the network by
time tf without being marked as malicious, (Lmax − 1)c is the maximum possible
damage that can injected packet can cause to good nodes, αc is the cost incurred
to attackers by forwarding a packet, and |Ng|BthLavgc is the damage that j can
caused by launching dropping packet attack.
When retransmission is allowed upon unsuccessful delivery, from the attackers’
point of view, the only difference is that they can inject more packets without
























(1− ps)q (Lmax − 1− α)c (5.16)
Now we analyze the good nodes’ payoff. Recall that L̄min denotes the aver-
age number of hops among those routes selected by good nodes. We first con-
sider the situation that the environment is noisy and no retransmission is al-




= (1− pe)L̄min . According to (5.1), for each i ∈ Ng, Fi(t) comes from
two parts: forwarding packets for the good nodes and forwarding packets for the at-
tackers. The total number of packets that the good nodes have forwarded for them-
selves is
∑
i∈Ng Ti(t)L̄min by time t, and the total number of packets that the good
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Meanwhile, for any given positive value x adopted in the secure routing and packet
forwarding strategy, the overall false positive probability will be upper-bounded
by 1−Φ(x), that is, at most 1−Φ(x) percentage of good nodes will be mistakenly
marked as malicious. Let T avgi =
Ti(tf )
tf





























When the environment is noiseless or when the retransmission is allowed,




= 1 for i ∈ Ng. Meanwhile, the total number of packets that the good





and the total number of packets that the good nodes have forwarded for the at-




q(1−ps)(Lmax−1). Thus in this case the good nodes’
payoff can be lower-bounded by
















On the other hand, when the proposed optimal attacking strategy is used by
attackers, from the good nodes’ point of view, when no retransmission is allowed,
the maximum possible payoff can also be upper-bounded by














While when retransmission is allowed, the maximum possible payoff can also be
upper-bounded by

















From the above payoff analysis we can see that the good nodes’ payoff can be
lower-bounded by certain value, no matter what strategies the attackers use and
what kind of goals the attackers have. In other words, the attackers’ goal has
little effect on good nodes’ payoff when the proposed secure routing and packet
forwarding strategy is used by good nodes. From the above payoff analysis we can
also see that as long as the gain g is reasonably large, it will not play an important
role in the strategy design.
Theorem 5.3.2 In the infinite duration secure routing and packet forwarding
game under noise and imperfect observation, the proposed secure routing and packet
forwarding strategy is asymptotically optimal from the good nodes’ point of view in
the sense that for any ε > 0, we can always find a x∗ > 0 such that no other
equilibrium strategies can further increase the good nodes’ payoff by more than ε
as long as the attackers also play optimally.
Proof We first consider the situation that no retransmission is allowed. Based on
the above analysis we can see that from the attackers’ point of view, to maximize
their payoff, the optimal attacking strategy is to inject no more packets to the net-
work than they are allowed and will not forward any packet for the good nodes. In
this case the good nodes’ maximum possible payoff is defined in (5.19). According
to (5.17), the difference between the actual payoff and maximum possible payoff is
(1− Φ(x))(1− pe)L̄ming. Since Φ(x) → 1 as x →∞, for any ε > 0, we can always
find a constant x∗ such that the actual payoff is within ε of the maximum possible
payoff. Similarly, we can also prove this under the situation that retransmission is
allowed.
Theorem 5.3.3 In the infinite duration secure routing and packet forwarding
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game, the proposed strategy profile is strongly Pareto optimal4.
Proof To show the proposed strategy profile is strongly Pareto optimal, we only
need to show that no other strategy profiles can further increase some players’
payoff without decreasing any other player’s payoff.
We first show that the good nodes’ payoff cannot be further increased without
decreasing the attackers’ payoff. According to (5.17), to further increase the good
nodes’ payoff, one can either decrease L̄min, or decrease f
avg
j . First, since the
minimum-hop routes have been used, L̄min cannot be further decreased. Second,
according to (5.3) and (5.15), decreasing favgj always decreases the attackers’ payoff.
Next we show that the attackers’ payoff cannot be further increased without
decreasing the good nodes’ payoff. According to (5.3), to increase the attackers’
payoff, one can either try to increase
∑
i∈Nm,j∈Ng Wi(j, t) and
∑
i∈Nm,j∈Ng Fj(i, t),




i∈Nm,j∈Ng Fj(i, t) comes completely from
injecting traffic attacks, which has been maximized and cannot be further in-
creased. Since
∑
i∈Nm,j∈Ng Wi(j, t) comes from launching dropping packet attacks,
increasing
∑
i∈Nm,j∈Ng Wi(j, t) will also decrease the good players’ payoff. Now we
consider
∑
i∈Nm Fi(t). According to the above packet forwarding strategy, attacker
i will not forward packets for others, so Fi(t) comes totally from transmitting pack-
ets for itself. Therefore, Fi(t) cannot be further decreased without decreasing the
attackers’ payoff.
4A strategy profile is said to be Pareto optimal if there is no other strategy profile which
can simultaneously increase all players’ payoff; a strategy profile is said to be strongly Pareto
optimal if there is no other strategy profile which can increase at least one player’ payoff without
decreasing any other players’ payoff [64].
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Until now we have focused on the scenario that pe, pf , and pm keep being the
same for all nodes at all times. However, as we have mentioned, this may not hold
in general. Next we study the consequence when different nodes may experience
different pe, pf , and pm. First, from the good nodes’ point of view, such variation
may increase false positive probability when performing attacker detection. For
example, for a node experiencing lower packet dropping ratio, when it uses this
ratio to perform dropping packet attacker detection, with much higher probability
those nodes experiencing higher packet dropping ratio can be mistakenly marked
as malicious (e.g., higher than 1− Φ(x)). As mentioned in Section 5.2.3, to avoid
high false positive probability, a good node may need to set a higher pe than the
one experienced by itself when performing attacker detection. Meanwhile, a good
node may also need to increase Bth and x to handle possible bursty packet dropping
effect, which is normal in wireless networks due to fading. Similarly, when nodes
experience different pf and pm, a good node may need to use the upper-bounds
of pf and pm to avoid high false positive probability when performing attacker
detection. As a penalty, these variations can be taken advantage of by attackers
to inject more packets and drop more packets without being marked as malicious,
which consequently leads to the decrease of good nodes’ performance. However,
our simulation studies indicate that even in such realistic scenarios, the proposed
secure routing and packet forwarding strategy can still work very well.
5.4 Simulation Studies
We have conducted a series of simulations to evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed strategies in both static and mobile ad hoc networks. In each ad hoc network,
nodes are randomly deployed inside a rectangular area of 1000m × 1000m. For
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Table 5.1: Mobility patterns
Pattern 1: vmax = 10m/s, vmin = 1m/s, pause time = 500 s
Pattern 2: vmax = 15m/s, vmin = 5m/s, pause time = 300 s
Pattern 3: vmax = 15m/s, vmin = 5m/s, pause time = 100 s
Pattern 4: vmax = 30m/s, vmin = 10m/s, pause time = 100 s
mobile ad hoc networks, nodes move randomly according to the random waypoint
model. The following physical layer model is used: two nodes can directly com-
municate with each other only if they are in each other’s transmission range, but
it can be easily extended to more realistic model where the error probability is a
function of distance. Based on the above models, the static ad hoc networks can be
regarded as the noiseless case, while the mobile ad hoc networks can be regarded
as the noisy case where the decision execution error (i.e., the decision is F but the
outcome is D) is only caused by link breakage. For each node, the transmission
power is fixed, and the maximum transmission range is 200m.
In the simulations, each good node will randomly pick another good node as the
destination. Similarly, each attacker will also randomly pick another attacker as
the destination. In both cases, packets are scheduled to be sent to this destination
according to a constant rate. The total number of good nodes is set to be 100
and the total number of attackers varies from 0 to 40. For each good or malicious
node, the average packet inter-arrival time is 1 second, that is, Ti(t) = btc for any
time t and any node i ∈ N . Further, each good node i ∈ Ng will set fi(t) = btc+2
for any other node i ∈ N . All data packets have the same size.
Since the link breakage ratio pe plays an important role in the strategy design,
we first study the characteristics of link breakages in mobile ad hoc networks





















































































































Figure 5.4: The evolution of pe in mobile ad hoc networks
be considered. For each node, the average link breakage ratio experienced by it is
calculated as the ratio between the total number of link breakages it experienced
as the transmitter and the total number of packet transmissions it has tried as the
transmitter. The total simulation time is 30000s. Fig. 5.3 shows the link breakage
ratios experienced by different nodes under four different mobility patterns listed in
Table 5.1. First, from these results we can see that the average link breakage ratio
will change under different mobility patterns. Second, under the same mobility
pattern, the average link breakage ratio experienced by each node is almost the
same.
Fig. 5.4(a)-(c) show the evolution of the average link breakage ratios over time
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when mobility pattern 4 is used. In this set of simulations, 2 nodes are randomly
selected among the 100 nodes in the network. Fig. 5.4(a) shows the link breakage
ratio averaged over every 100 seconds, Fig. 5.4(b) shows the link breakage ratio
averaged over every 1000 seconds, and Fig. 5.4(c) shows the accumulated average
link breakage ratio. From these results we can see that the link breakage ratio
experienced by each node may vary dramatically in a short period, but will become
stable in a long period. These results suggest that when performing attacker
detection, if tf is not large enough, pe should be set higher than the long-term
average to avoid high false positive probability, while if tf is large or goes to
infinity, the average link breakage ratio can be used when performing attacker
detection, with a reasonably large Bth.
Now we study the performance of the proposed strategies in different scenarios.
We use “noiseless scenario” to denote static ad hoc networks, and use “noisy
scenario” to denote mobile ad hoc networks. In both cases, all good nodes follow
the secure routing and packet forwarding strategy described in Section 5.2.3, and all
(insider) attackers follow the optimal attacking strategy described in Section 5.2.4
with the only modification being that no attacker will intentionally drop packets.
The total simulation time tf is set to be 10000 seconds, and all results are averaged
over 20 independent rounds. The following parameters are used: g = 20, c = 1,
α = 1, Lmax = 10, pf = 0.05, pm = 0.05, ps = 0.05. The acceptable false alarm
ratio is set to be 0.1%. For mobile ad hoc networks, the mobility pattern 4 listed
in Table 5.1 is used. Since tf is not very large, pe is set to be 3%, which is obtained
through off-line training. For static ad hoc networks, we focus on the case that the
attackers can always find routes with Lmax hops to inject packets. For mobile ad
hoc networks, four scenarios are considered, as listed in Table 5.2, and DSR [47] is
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Table 5.2: Noisy scenarios
Scenario 1: Retransmission is allowed, and attackers can always find a Lmax-
hop route with all relays good.
Scenario 2: No retransmission is allowed, and attackers can always find a
Lmax-hop route with all relays good.
Scenario 3: Retransmission is allowed, and attackers may not find a Lmax-hop
route with all relays good.
Scenario 4: No retransmission is allowed, and attackers may not find a Lmax-
hop route with all relays good.
used as the underlying routing protocol to perform route discovery. The simulation
results are illustrated in Fig. 5.5.
Fig. 5.5(a) compares the good nodes’ payoff under different scenarios. First,
we can see that when no attackers are present, the noiseless scenario has the
highest payoff, and the noisy scenario 2 & 4 (no retransmission is allowed upon
unsuccessful packet delivery) have the lowest payoff. The reason is that the good
nodes’ payoff is determined not only by their transmission cost, but also by the
packet delivery ratio. Under noisy environments, when no retransmission is allowed
upon unsuccessful packet delivery, the packet delivery ratio will also be decreased,
as illustrated in Fig. 5.5(a), where in this case the packet delivery ratio is only
about 89% (illustrated in Fig. 5.5(c)). Second, we can see that the allowance
of retransmission upon unsuccessful packet delivery can increase the good nodes’
payoff in these scenarios (noisy scenario 1 vs. noisy scenario 3, and noisy scenario
2 vs. noisy scenario 4). However, with the increase of the number of attackers,
the performance gap between the two scenarios (with or without retransmission)













































































Noisy scenario 1 & 3


















g = 20, no retransmission 
g = 20, with retransmission
g = 15, no retransmission 
g = 15, with retransmission
g = 10, no retransmission 
g = 10, with retransmission
(c) (d)
Figure 5.5: Payoff comparison when no attackers will drop packets
noisy scenario 4). Third, in general, noise will decrease the good nodes’ payoff,
however, the noisy scenario 3 can achieve higher payoff than the noiseless scenario
when the attacker number is no less than 30. The reason is that in the noiseless
scenario, attackers can always find Lmax-hop routes, while in the noisy scenario
3, the average hop number per route selected by the attackers is much less than
Lmax, and the caused damage is less than in noiseless scenario.
Fig. 5.5(b) demonstrates the attackers’ payoff under different scenarios. First,
as shown in the case of noisy scenario 3 & 4, when the attackers cannot always use
Lmax-hop routes to inject packets, their payoff will be decreased a lot comparing to
the cases that they can, as shown in the case of noisy scenario 1 & 2. Second, the
allowance of retransmission upon unsuccessful packet delivery can also increase
the attackers’ payoff, since now more packets can be injected by the attackers.
Third, since the attackers’ packets may also be dropped under the noisy scenar-
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ios, without allowing retransmission, the attackers’ payoff will also be decreased
comparing to the noiseless scenario, as shown by the noisy scenario 2. However,
when retransmission is allowed, comparing to the noiseless scenario, the attackers’
payoff can still be increased even under the noisy scenarios, as illustrated by the
noisy scenario 1.
Finally, Fig. 5.5(d) illustrates the good nodes’ payoff under different g values,
where now only the noisy scenario 3 & 4 are considered. First, from these results
we can see that with the increase of the number of attackers, the performance gap
between these two scenarios will also decrease. The reason is that the attackers
can take advantage of retransmission to cause more damage to the good nodes.
Second, with the decrease of g, the performance gap between these two scenarios
will also decrease. For example, when g = 10 and the number of attackers is 40,
there is almost no difference. In summary, the gain introduced by the allowance of
retransmission becomes less and less with the increase of the number of attackers
or with the decrease of g. However, it is worth mentioning that g does not change
the underlying strategy design as long as it is reasonably large.
Thus far we have only considered the situations that no attackers will intention-
ally drop packets. Next we study the situation when the attackers will also try to
drop the good nodes’ packets. In this set of simulations, three attacking strategies
will be studied: in “attacking strategy 1”, no attackers will intentionally drop the
good nodes’ packets. In “attacking strategy 2”, each attacker will only drop the
first B′th packets for any good node that has requested it to forward, then will stop
participating route discoveries initiated by that good node, where dropping B′th
packets will not be detected as malicious. In these simulations, we set B′th = 20.


















































Figure 5.6: Payoff comparison when some attackers will drop packets
discoveries initiated by the good nodes and will drop the good nodes’ packets in
such a way that it will not be detected as malicious, which can be regarded as
selective dropping.
Fig. 5.6(a) illustrates the good nodes’ payoff under different attacks. First,
comparing to the attacking strategy 1, the attacking strategy 3 even increases the
good nodes’ payoff, though the attackers can drop some good nodes’ packets. The
reason is that when the attacking strategy 3 is used, the attackers also need to keep
forwarding packets for the good nodes, which will increase the number of nodes
that the good nodes can use and reduce the value of L̄min. Since the number of
packets that the attackers can drop without being detected as malicious is very
limited, the extra damage that they can cause is also very limited, and the good
nodes’ payoff will be increased consequently. Second, comparing to the attacking
strategy 1, the attacking strategy 2 can decrease the good nodes’ payoff a little bit
due to the extra number of packets that they have dropped. However, since the
number of packets that the attackers can drop is always bounded, with the increase
of time, the effect of such packet dropping becomes less and less noticeable.
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Fig. 5.6(b) illustrates the attackers’ payoff. First, attacking strategy 2 can in-
crease the attackers’ payoff comparing to attacking strategy 1. The reason is that
the attackers can drop some extra packets without being detected when attacking
strategy 2 is used. However, attacking strategy 3 can dramatically decrease the
attackers’ payoff comparing to attacking strategy 1, the reason is that forward-
ing packets for the good nodes will also incur a lot of cost, while the number of
packets that they can drop without being detected as malicious is very limited. In
summary, from the attackers’ point of view, when the network lifetime is finite,
attacking strategy 2 should be used, while its advantage over attacking strategy 1
is very limited, and will decrease with the increase of network lifetime.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter we have formally investigated how to secure cooperative ad hoc
networks against insider attacks under realistic scenarios. We model the dynamic
interactions between good nodes and attackers in such networks as securing routing
and packet forwarding game. The optimal defense strategies have been devised,
which are optimal in the sense that no other strategies can further increase the
good nodes’ payoff under attacks. The maximum possible damage that can be
caused by the attackers have also been analyzed. By focusing on the worst-case
scenario from the good nodes’ point of view, that is, the good nodes have no prior
knowledge of the other nodes’ types while the insider attackers can know who are
good nodes, the devised strategies can work well under any scenarios. Extensive
simulations have also been conducted, which demonstrate that the proposed de-





Stimulation in Autonomous Ad
Hoc Networks
In Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 we have mainly focused on designing
defense mechanisms to secure cooperative ad hoc networks. From now on we will
focus on designing attack-resistant cooperation strategies for autonomous ad hoc
networks where nodes belong to different authorities and pursue different goals.
In this chapter we will present a reputation-based self-organized system for au-
tonomous ad hoc networks such that cooperation among selfish nodes can be
effectively stimulated even under attacks. This chapter is organized as follows.
Section 6.1 describes the system model and formulates the problem. Section 6.2
describes the proposed ARCS system. Section 6.3 presents the performance anal-
ysis of the system under various attacks. Simulation studies are presented in
Section 6.4. Finally Section 6.5 summarizes the contribution of this chapter.
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6.1 System Model
We consider autonomous ad hoc networks where nodes belong to different au-
thorities and have different goals. We assume that each node is equipped with a
battery with limited power supply, and may act as a service provider: packets are
scheduled to be generated and delivered to certain destinations with each packet
having a specific delay constraint. If a packet can be successfully delivered to its
destination within the specified delay constraint, the source of the packet will get
some payoff, otherwise, it will be penalized.
According to their objectives, the nodes in such networks can be classified into
two types: selfish and malicious. The objective of selfish nodes is to maximize the
payoff they can get using their limited resources, and the objective of malicious
nodes is to maximize the damage that they can cause to the network. Since energy
is usually the most stringent and valuable resource for battery-supplied nodes in
ad hoc networks, we restrict the resource constraint to the energy. However, the
proposed schemes are also applicable to other types of resource constraints. For
each node in the network, the energy consumption may come from many aspects,
such as processing, transmitting, and receiving packets. In this chapter, we focus
on the energy consumed in communication-related activities. We focus on the
situation that all nodes in the network are legitimate, no matter selfish or malicious.
Before formulating the problem, we first introduce some notations to be used,
as listed in Table 6.1. We assume that all data packets have the same size, and the
transmitting power is the same for all nodes. We use “packet delivery transaction”
to denote sending a packet from its source to its destination. We say a transaction
is “successful” if the packet has successfully reached its destination within its delay
constraint; otherwise, the transaction is “unsuccessful”.
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Table 6.1: Notations used in the problem formulation
E The energy needed to transmit and receive a data packet and a receipt.
ES,max S’s total available energy when it enters the network.
αS The payoff that source S gets for each successfully delivered data packet.
βS The penalty that source S receives for each unsuccessfully delivered data
packet.
ES The amount of energy that S has spent until now.
NS,succ # successful data packet deliveries until now with S being the source.
NS,fail # unsuccessful data packet deliveries until now with S being the source.
ES,waste The energy that has been wasted until now due to S’s its malicious behavior.
ES,contribute The energy that S has spent until now on successfully transmitting packets for
others.
For each node S, if it is selfish, its total profit Profit(S) is defined as follows:
Profit(S) = αSNS,succ − βSNS,fail. (6.1)
Then the objective of each selfish nodes S can be formulated as follows:
max Profit(S) s.t. ES ≤ ES,max. (6.2)
If S is malicious, then the total damage DS that S has caused to other selfish
nodes until the current moment is calculated as
DS = ES,waste − ES,contribute. (6.3)
Since in the current system model malicious nodes are allowed to collude, in this







Table 6.2: Records kept by node S
Credit(A,S) The energy that A has spent until now on successfully transmitting pack-
ets for S.
Debit(A, S) The energy that S has spent until now on successfully transmitting pack-
ets for A.
Wby(A,S) The wasted energy that A has caused to S until now.
Wto(A,S) The wasted energy that S has caused to A until now.
LBwith(A,S) The wasted energy caused to S until now due to the link breakages
between A and S.
Blacklist(S) The set of nodes that S believes are malicious and S does not want to
work together with.
Blacklist(A,S) The subset of A’s blacklist known by S until now.
6.2 Description of ARCS System
This section describes the proposed ARCS system for autonomous ad hoc networks.
In the ARCS system, each node S keeps a set of records indicating the interactions
with other nodes, as listed in Table 6.2. In a nutshell, when a node has a packet
scheduled to be sent, it first checks whether this packet should be sent and which
route should be used. Once an intermediate node on the selected route receives a
packet forwarding request, it will check whether it should forward the packet. Once
a node has successfully forwarded a packet on behalf of another node, it will request
a receipt from its next node on the route and submit this receipt to the source of the
packet to claim credit. After a packet delivery transaction finishes, all participating
nodes will update their own records to reflect the changed relationships with other
nodes and to detect possible malicious behavior. For each selfish node S, all the
records listed in Table 6.2 will be initiated to be 0 when S first enters the network.
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6.2.1 Cooperation Degree
In [28], Dawkins illustrates that reciprocal altruism is beneficial for every ecological
system when favors are granted simultaneously, and gives an example to explain the
survival chances of birds grooming parasites off each other’s head which they cannot
clean themselves. In that example, Dawkins divides the birds into three categories:
suckers, which always help; cheats, which ask other birds groom parasites off their
heads but never help others; and grudgers, which start out being helpful to every
bird but refuse to help those birds that do not return the favor. The simulation
studies have shown that both cheats and suckers extinct finally, and only grudgers
win over time. Such selfish behavior and cooperation are also developed at length
in [10,11].
In order to best utilize their limited resources, selfish nodes in autonomous ad
hoc networks should also act like the grudgers. In the ARCS system, each selfish
node S keeps track of the balance B(A, S) with any other node A known by S,
which is defined as:
B(A, S) = (Debit(A, S)−Wto(A, S))− (Credit(A, S)−Wby(A, S)). (6.5)
That is, B(A, S) is the difference between what S has contributed to A and what
A has contributed to S in S’s point of view. If B(A, S) is a positive value, it can be
viewed as the relative damage that A has caused to S; otherwise, it is the relative
help that S has received from A.
Besides keeping track of the balance, each node S will also set a threshold
Bthreshold(A, S) for each known node A in the network, which we called cooperation
degree. A necessary condition for S to help A, e.g., forwarding packet for A, is
B(A, S) < Bthreshold(A, S). (6.6)
117
Setting Bthreshold(A, S) to be ∞ means that S will always help A no matter what
A has done, as the suckers act in the example. Setting Bthreshold(A, S) to be −∞
means that S will never help A, as the cheats act in the example. In the ARCS
system, each selfish node will set Bthreshold(A, S) to be a relatively small positive
value, which means that initially S is helpful to A, and will keep being helpful to
A unless the relative damage that A has caused to S exceeds Bthreshold(A, S), as
the grudgers act in the example where they set the threshold to be 1 for any other
bird. By specifying positive cooperation degrees, cooperation among selfish nodes
can be enforced, while by letting the cooperation degrees to be relatively small,
the possible damage caused by malicious nodes can be bounded.
6.2.2 Route Selection
In the ARCS system, source routing is used, that is, when sending a packet, the
source lists in packet header the complete sequence of nodes through which the
packet is to traverse. Due to insufficient balance, malicious behavior and possible
node mobility, not all packet delivery transactions can succeed. When a node has
a packet scheduled to be sent, it needs to decide whether it should start the packet
delivery transaction and which route should be used.
In the ARCS system, each route is specified an expiring time indicating that
after that time the route will become invalid, which is determined by the inter-
mediate nodes during the route discovery procedure. Assume that S has a packet
scheduled to be sent to D, route R = “R0R1 . . . RM” is a valid route known by S
with R0 = S, RM = D, and M being the number of hops. Let Pdrop(Ri, S) denote
the probability that node Ri will drop S’s packet, and let Pdelivery(R, S) denote the
probability that a packet can be successfully delivered from S to D through route
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0 (∃Ri ∈ R) B(Ri, S) < −Bmax(S,Ri)
0 (∃Ri, Rj ∈ R) Ri ∈ Blacklist(Rj, S)
∏M−1
i=1 (1− Pdrop(Ri, S)) otherwise
(6.7)
That is, a packet delivery transaction has no chance to succeed unless S has enough
balance to request help from all intermediate nodes on the route and no node has
been marked as malicious by any other node on the route. Once a valid route R
with non-zero Pdelivery(R, S) is used to send a packet by S, the expected energy
consumption can be calculated as:











and the expected profit of S is
Profit(R, S) = αSPdelivery(R, S)− βS(1− Pdelivery(R, S)). (6.9)
Let Q(R,S) be the expected profit per unit energy when S uses R to send a






Then in the ARCS system, which route should be selected is decided as follows:
Route Selection Decision: Among all routes R known by S which can reach D,
route R∗ will be selected if and only if Pdelivery(R∗, S) > 0 and Q(R∗, S) ≥ Q(R,S)
for any other R ∈ R.
The above decision is optimal in the sense that no other known routes can
provide better expected energy efficiency than route R∗. Since the accurate value
of Pdrop(Ri, S) is usually not known, in the ARCS system, Pdrop(Ri, S) is estimated
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as the ratio between the number of S’s failed transactions caused by Ri and S’s
total transactions passing Ri.
After the route with the highest expected energy efficiency has been found by
the sender S, suppose it is route R∗, in the next step S should decide whether it
should use R∗ to start a data packet delivery transaction. If the route quality is
too low, simply dropping the packet without trying may be a better choice. Let





Then in the ARCS system, the following decision rule is used:
Packet Delivery Decision: S will use route R∗ to start a data packet delivery
transaction if and only if the following condition holds:
Profit(R
∗, S) ≥ Qavg(S)Eavg(R∗, S)− βS. (6.12)
The left hand side of (6.12) is the expected profit when S uses R∗ to start a
packet delivery transaction, and the right hand side of (6.12) is the predicted
profit by simply dropping the packet without trying, where βS is the penalty due
to dropping a packet and Qavg(S)Eavg(R
∗, S) is the gain that S predicts to get
with energy Eavg(R
∗, S) based on its past performance. If Qavg(S) is stationary
over time, the above decision is optimal in the sense that the total profits can be
maximized under the energy constraint.
6.2.3 Data Packet Delivery Protocol
In the ARCS system, a data packet delivery consists of two stages: forwarding
data packet stage and submitting receipts stage. In the first stage, the data packet
is delivered from its source to its destination, while in the second stage, each
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Table 6.3: Notations used in the data packet delivery protocols
signS(m) S generates a signature based on the message m.
verifyS(m, s) Other nodes verify whether s is the signature generated by node S based
on the message m.
v ← m Assign the value of m to the variable v.
MD() A message digest function, such as SHA-1 [1].
seqS(S,D) The sequence number of the current packet being processed with S being
the source and D being the destination.
participating node on the route will submit a receipt to the source to claim credit.
Table 6.3 lists some notations to be used.
Forwarding Data Packet Stage: Suppose that node S is to send a packet
with payload m and sequence number seqS(S, D) to destination D through the
route R. The sender S first computes a signature s = signS(MD(m), R, seqS(S,D)).
Next, S transmits the packet (m,R, seqS(S, D), s) to the next node on the route, in-
creases seqS(S, D) by 1, and waits for receipts to be returned by the following nodes
on route R. Once a selfish node A has received the packet (m,R, seqS(S, D), s),
A first checks whether it is the destination of the packet. If it is, after necessary
verifications, A returns a receipt to its previous node on the route to confirm the
successful delivery; otherwise, A checks whether the packet should be forwarded.
A is willing to forward the packet if and only if all the following conditions are sat-
isfied: 1) A is on the route R; 2) seqS(S,D) > seqA(S, D), where seqA(S, D) is the
sequence number of the last packet that A has forwarded with S being source and
D being the destination; 3) the signature is valid; 4) B(S, A) < Bthreshold(S,A); 5)
no node on route R has been marked as malicious by node A.
Once A has successfully forwarded the packet (m,R, seqS(S,D), s) to the next
node on the route, it will specify a time to wait for a receipt being returned by
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Protocol 1 Forwarding data packet stage
. A is the current node, S is the sender, D is the destination. (m,R, seqS(S,D), s) is the
received data packet from A’s previous node if A 6= S; otherwise, (m,R, seqS(S,D), s)
is the data packet generated by A.
if (A = S) then
S forwards (m,R, seqS(S, D), s) to next node, increases seqS(S, D) by 1, and waits
for receipts to be returned.
else if ((A = D) and (verifyS((m,R, seqS(S, D)), s) = true) and (seqS(S, D) >
seqA(S, D))) then
A assigns the value of seqS(S, D) to seqA(S, D), and returns a receipt to its previous
node.
else
if ((A /∈ R) or (verifyS((m,R, seqS(S, D)), s) 6= true) or (seqS(S, D) ≤ seqA(S,D))
or (∃Ri ∈ R, Ri ∈ Blacklist(A))) then
A simply drops this packet.
else if ((B(S, A) > Bthreshold(S,A)) or (the link to A’s next node is broken)) then
A drops the packet, and returns a receipt to its previous node which also includes
the dropping reason.
else
A assigns the value of seqS(S,D) to seqA(S,D), forwards (m,R, seq(S, D), s) to




the next node before that time to confirm the successful transmission, which A
will use to claim credit from S. In the ARCS system, a selfish node sets its waiting
time to be the value of Tlink multiplied by the number of hops following this node,
where Tlink is a relatively small interval to account for the necessary processing and
waiting time (e.g., time needed for channel contention) per hop. Since in general
the waiting time is small enough, we can assume that if a node can return a receipt
to its previous node in time, the two nodes will still keep connected. The protocol
execution of each participating selfish node in this stage is described in Protocol 1.
Submitting Receipts Stage: In autonomous ad hoc networks, nodes may
not be willing to forward packets on behalf of other nodes. So after a node (e.g.,
A) has forwarded a packet (m,R, seqS(S, D), s) for another node (e.g., S), A will
try to claim corresponding credit from S, which A can use later to request S to
return the favor. To claim credit from S, A needs to submit necessary evidence to
convince S that it has successfully forwarded packets for S. In the ARCS system, in
order for A to show that it has successfully forwarded a packet for S, A only needs
to submit a valid receipt generated by any node following A on the route (e.g., B)
indicating that B has successfully received the packet. One possible format of such
a receipt is
{MD(m), R, seqS(S, D), B, signB(MD(m), R, seqS(S,D), B)}.
That is, the receipt consists of the message {MD(m), R, seqS(S,D), B} and the
signature generated by node B based on this message. For each selfish node, if
it has dropped the packet or cannot get a receipt from its next node in time, or
the received receipt is invalid, it will generate a receipt by itself and return it to
its previous node; otherwise, it will simply send the received receipt back to its
previous node on the route. The protocol execution of each participating selfish
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node in this stage is described in Protocol 2.
Protocol 2 Submitting receipt stage
. A is the current node, (MD(m), R, seqS(S,D), B, s) is the successfully received packet to be
processed.
if ((A = D) or (no valid receipts have been returned by the next node after waiting enough
time)) then
s ← signA(MD(m), R, seqS(S,D), A).
Send the receipt {MD(m), R, seqS(S, D), A, s} to A’s previous node on R.
else
receipt = {MD(m), R, seqS(S, D), B, s}, which is the returned receipt from the next node
on the route.
if (verifyB((MD(m), R, seqS(S,D), B), s) = true)) then
Send receipt to A’s previous node on R.
else
s ← signA(MD(m), R, seqS(S, D), A).




In the ARCS system, after a packet delivery transaction has finished, no matter
whether it is successful or not, each participating node will update its records
to keep track of the changing relationships with other nodes and to detect pos-
sible malicious behavior. Next we use Fig. 6.1 to illustrate the records updating
procedure, where S is this initiator of the transaction, D is the destination, and
R = “S . . . AMB . . . D” is the associated route.




n hops m hops
Figure 6.1: Update records
• Case 1: S has received a valid receipt signed by D which means that this
transaction has succeeded. Then for each intermediate node X, S updates
Credit(X, S) as follows:
Credit(X, S) = Credit(X, S) + E. (6.13)
• Case 2: S has successfully sent a packet to its next node, but cannot receive
any receipt in time. In this case, let X be S’s next node, S then updates its
records as follows:




That is, refusing to return a receipt will be regarded as malicious behavior.
• Case 3: If S has received a valid receipt which is not signed by D, but signed
by an intermediate node (e.g., M), which means that either M has dropped
the packet or a returned receipt has been dropped by a certain node following
M (including M) on the route in the submitting receipt stage. In this case,
for each intermediate node X between S and M, S still updates Credit(X, S)
using (6.13). Since node M’s transmission cannot be verified by S, S has
enough evidence to suspect that the packet is dropped by M. To reflect this
suspect, S updates Wby(M,S) as follows:
Wby(M,S) = Wby(M,S) + nE. (6.16)
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where nE accounts for the amount of energy that has been wasted in this
transaction with n being the number of hops between S and M.
If a transaction fails, S also keeps a record of (MD(m), R, seqS(S, D), s) for this
transaction as well as a copy of the returned receipt if there exists.
For each intermediate node (e.g., node M in Fig. 6.1) that has participated in
the transaction, if it is selfish, it updates its records as follows:
• Case 1: M has successfully sent the packet to node B, and has got a receipt
from B to confirm the transmission. In this case, M only needs to update
Debit(S, M) as follow:
Debit(S, M) = Debit(S, M) + E. (6.17)
• Case 2: M has successfully sent the packet to node B, but cannot get a valid
receipt from B. In this case, M updates its records as follows:
Wto(S,M) = Wto(S, M) + nE, (6.18)




• Case 3: M has dropped the packet due to link breakage between M and
B. Although this packet dropping is not M’s fault, since M cannot prove it
to S, M will take the responsibility. However, since this link breakage may
be caused by S who has selected a bad route, or caused by B who tries to
emulate link breakage to attack M, M should also record this link breakage.
In this case, M updates its records as follows:
Wto(S,M) = Wto(S, M) + nE, (6.21)
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LBwith(B, M) = LBwith(B, M) + nE, (6.22)
LBwith(S,M) = LBwith(S, M) + nE. (6.23)
In the ARCS system, each selfish node (e.g., M) will also set a threshold
LBthreshold(S, M) with any other node (e.g., S) to indicate the damage that
M can tolerate which is caused due to the link breakages happened between
M and S. In this case, if LBwith(B,M) exceeds LBthreshold(B, M), B will be
put into M’s blacklist. Similarly, if LBwith(S, M) exceeds LBthreshold(S,M),
S will be put into M’s blacklist.
• Case 4: M has dropped the packet due to the reason that the condition in
(6.6) is not satisfied or some nodes on R are in M’s blacklist. In this case M
does not need to update its records.
After finishing updating its records, M will also keep a copy of the submitted receipt
for possible future usage, such as resolving inconsistent records update problem,
as will be described in Section 6.2.6. From the above update procedure we can see
that a selfish node should always return a receipt to confirm a successful packet
reception, since refusing to return receipt is regarded as malicious behavior and
cannot provide any gain.
6.2.5 Secure Route Discovery
In the ARCS system, DSR [47] is used as the underlying routing protocol to per-
form route discovery, which is an on-demand source routing protocol. However,
without security consideration, the routing protocol can easily become an attack-
ing target. For example, malicious nodes can inject an overwhelming amount of
route request packets. In the ARCS system, besides necessary identity authenti-
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cation, the following security enhancements have also been incorporated into the
route discovery protocol:
1. When node S initiates a route discovery, it also appends its blacklist in the
request packet. After an intermediate node A has received the request packet,
it will update its own record Blacklist(S,A) using the received blacklist.
2. When an intermediate node A receives a route request packet which orig-
inates from S and A is not this request’s destination, A first checks the
following conditions: 1) A has never seen this request before; 2) A is not
in S’s blacklist; 3) B(S, A) < Bthreshold(S,A); 4) no nodes that have been
appended to the request packet are in A’s blacklist; 5) A has not forwarded
any request for S in the last Tinterval(S, A) interval, where Tinterval(S,A) is
the minimum interval specified by A to indicate that A will forward at most
one route request for S in each Tinterval(S, A) interval. A will broadcast the
request if and only if all of the above conditions can be satisfied, otherwise,
A will discard the request.
3. During a discovered route is being returned to the requester S, each in-
termediate node A on the route appends the following information to the
returned route: the subset of its blacklist that is not known by S, the value
of Bthreshold(S, A) if not known by S, the value of Debit(S,A), and node A’s
expected staying time at the current position. After S has received the
route, for each node A on the discovered route, it updates the corresponding
blacklist Blacklist(A, S), updates the value of Bthreshold(S, A), determines the
expiring time of this route which can be approximated as the expected mini-
mum staying time among all nodes on the route, and checks the consistency
between Debit(S,A) and Credit(A, S).
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6.2.6 Resolve Inconsistent Records Update
In some situations, after a node (e.g., A) has successfully forwarded a packet for
another node (e.g., S) and has sent a receipt back to S, the value of Credit(A, S)
may not be increased immediately by S due to some intermediate node dropping
the receipt returned by A. In this case, the value of Debit(S, A) will be larger
than the value of Credit(A, S), which we referred to as inconsistent records update.
As a consequence, S may refuse to forward packets for A even the actual value
of B(A, S) is still less than Bthreshold(A, S), or S may continue requesting A to
forward packets for it when the true value of B(S, A) has exceeded Bthreshold(S, A).
Next we describe how the inconsistent records update problem is resolved.
In the route discovery stage, after route R has been returned to S, S will check
whether there exists inconsistency. If S finds that a node A on route R has reported
a larger value of Debit(S, A) than the value of Credit(A, S), when calculating route
quality, S should use the value of Debit(S,A) to temporarily substitute the value
of Credit(A, S). In the packet delivery stage, when route R is picked by S to send
packets, for each intermediate node A on route R, the value of Credit(A, S) will
also be appended to the payload of the data packet.
When A receives an appended value of Credit(A, S) from S, and finds Credit(A, S) <
Debit(S, A), A will submit those receipts that target on S but have not been con-
firmed by S to claim corresponding credits, where we say a receipt received by A at
time t1 and targeting on S has been confirmed if there existed at least one moment
t2 > t1 before now at which A and S have agreed that Credit(A, S) = Debit(S, A).
Once S has received an unconfirmed receipt returned by A, S will check whether
there is a failed transaction record associated to this receipt. If no such record ex-
ists, either the receipt is faked, or the corresponding credit has been issued to A. If
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there exists such a record, let B be the node who has signed the receipt associated
to this transaction record, that is, all nodes between S and B have been credited
by S. Let C be the node who has signed the receipt submitted by A. If B is in front
of C on the route, S should use the new receipt singed by C to replace the previous
receipt signed by B, and for each intermediate node X between B and C on the
route, S should update Credit(X, S) using (6.13), also, if C is not the destination
of the associated packet, S should update Wby(C, S) using (6.16).
6.2.7 Parameter Selection
In the ARCS system, for each selfish node S, it needs to specify three types of
thresholds regarding to any other node A in the network: the cooperation degree
Bthreshold(A, S), the maximum tolerable damage due to link breakage LBthreshold(A, S)
and the minimum route request forwarding interval Tinterval(A, S), which are de-
termined in the following way.
For each known node A, S initially sets Tinterval(A, S) to be a moderate value,
such as a value equal to its own average pause time. During staying in the net-
work, S will keep estimating a good route discovery frequency for itself, and will
set Tinterval(A, S) to be the inverse of its own route discovery frequency. Similarly,
S initially sets all link breakage thresholds using a (relatively small) constant value
LBinit, and keeps estimating its own average link breakage ratio over time, assum-
ing PS,LB. For each node A, let Ntrans(A, S) be the total number of transactions
that simultaneously revolve S and A with A either being S’s next node or being
the initiator of the transactions, then S may set
LBthreshold(A, S) = LhopPS,LBNtrans(A, S)E + LBinit, (6.24)
where Lhop is the average number of hops per route.
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For Bthreshold(A, S), if favors can be granted simultaneously, a small value (for
example 1, as grudgers do in the ecological example) can work perfectly. However,
in many situations favors cannot be granted immediately. For example, after S
has helped A several times, S may not get similar amount of help from A due
to that S does not need help from A currently or A has moved. Many factors
can affect the selection of Bthreshold(A, S), among them some are unknown to S,
such as other nodes’ traffic patterns and behaviors, and some are unpredictable,
such as mobility, which make selecting an optimal value for Bthreshold(A, S) hard
or impossible. However, our simulation studies in Section 6.4 have shown that in
most situations a relatively small constant value can achieve good tradeoff between
energy efficiency and robustness to attacks.
6.3 Analysis of the ARCS System Under Attacks
In this section we analyze the performance of the ARCS system under the follow-
ing types of attacks: dropping packet, emulating link breakage, injecting traffic,
collusion and slander. Since the attacks of preventing good routes from being dis-
covered are mainly used to increase attackers’ chance of being on the discovered
routes, they can be regarded as part of dropping packets or emulating link break-
age attacks, and will not be analyzed separately. Similarly, modifying or delaying
packets attacks can also be regarded as specific types of dropping packets attacks,
and will not be analyzed separately. The results show that the damage that can
be caused by malicious nodes is bounded, and the system is collusion-resistant.
Dropping Packet Attacks: In the ARCS system, malicious nodes can waste
other nodes’ energy by dropping their packets, which can happen either in the
forwarding data packet stage or in the submitting receipts stage. We use Fig. 6.2
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Figure 6.2: Dropping Packets Attacks
as an example to study the possible dropping packet attacks that can be launched
by malicious node M. Based on in which stage M drops packets and whether M
will return receipts, there are four possible attacking scenarios:
• Scenario 1: M drops a packet in the forwarding data packet stage, but creates
a receipt to send back to A to confirm successful receiving from A. In this
scenario, after S gets the receipt, S will increase Wby(M, S) by nE, which
equals to the total amount of energy that has been wasted by M. That is, in
this scenario, the damage caused by M has been recorded by S and needs to
be compensated by M later if M still wants to get help from S.
• Scenario 2: M drops a packet in the forwarding data packet stage, and refuses
to return a receipt to A. In this scenario, although A will be mistakenly
charged by S which increases Wby(A, S) by (n − 1)E, A will mark M as
malicious and will stop working with M further. That is, M can never get
help from A and cause damage to A in the future.
• Scenario 3: M drops the receipt returned by B, but creates a receipt to
send back to A. In this scenario, M will be charged nE by S, but the nodes
after M who have successfully forwarded the packet will not be credited by
S immediately. That is, by taking some charge (here nE), M can cause
inconsistent records update. However, as described in Section 6.2.6, this
inconsistency can be easily resolved and will not cause further damage. That
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is, M can only cause temporary records inconsistency with the extra payment
of (n + 1)E.
• Scenario 4: M drops the receipt returned by B, and refuses to return a receipt
to A. This scenario is similar to scenario 3 with the only difference being that
in this scenario A will be mistakenly charged by S, but M will be marked as
malicious by A and cannot do any further damage to A in the future.
From the above analysis we can see that when a malicious node M launches
dropping packet attacks, either it will be marked as malicious by some nodes, or
the damage caused by it will be recorded by other nodes. Since for each node A, the
maximum possible damage that can be caused by M is bounded by Bthreshold(M, A),
the total damage that M can cause is also bounded.
Emulating Link Breakage Attacks: Malicious nodes can also launch emu-
lating link breakage attacks to waste other nodes’ energy. For example, in Fig. 6.2,
when node A has received a request from S to forward a packet to M, M can just
keep silent to let A believe that the link between A and M is broken. By emulating
link breakage, M can cause a transaction to fail and waste other nodes’ energy.
In the ARCS system, each selfish node handles the possible emulating link
breakage attacks as follows: For each known node M, S keeps a record LBwith(M, S)
to remember the damage that has been caused due to link breakage between M
and S, and if LBwith(M, S) exceeds the threshold LBthreshold(M, S), S will mark M
as malicious and will never work with M again. That is, the damage that can be
caused to S by malicious node M who launched emulating link breakage attacks is
bounded by LBthreshold(M,S).
Injecting Traffic Attacks: Besides dropping packets, attackers can also inject
an excessive amount of traffic to overload the network and to consume other nodes’
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valuable energy. Two types of packets can be injected: general data packets and
route request packets. In the ARCS system, according to the route discovery
protocol, the number of route request packets that can be injected by each node
is bounded by 1 in each time interval Tinterval. For general data packets, since
an intermediate node A will stop forwarding packets for node M if B(M, A) >
Bthreshold(M, A), the maximum damage that can be caused to node A by node M
launching injecting general data traffic attacks is bounded by Bthreshold(M, A). In
summary, by launching injecting traffic attacks, the maximum damage that can
be caused by a malicious node M to node A is bounded.
Collusion Attacks: In order to increase their attacking capability, malicious
nodes may choose to collude. Next we show that in the ARCS system colluding
among malicious nodes cannot cause more damage to the network than working
alone, that is, the ARCS system is collusion-resistant. First, it is easy to see
that two nodes collude to launch injecting extra traffic attacks cannot increase the
damage due to the existence of balance threshold (cooperation degree), and two
nodes colluding to launch emulating link breakage attacks makes no sense, since
each link breakage event has only two participants. Next we consider two malicious
nodes colluding to launch dropping packets attacks.
Given a packet delivery transaction, we first consider the case that the two
colluding nodes are neighbor of each other. For example, as in Fig. 6.2, assume
that M and B collude. When M drops the packet, M can still get (or generate
by itself, since M may know B’s private key) the receipt showing that M has suc-
cessfully forwarded the packet. However, this cannot increase their total attacking
capability, since B needs to take the charge for the damage caused by this packet
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Figure 6.3: Collusion Attacks
If two colluding nodes are not neighbor of each other, the only way that they can
collude is that one node drops the data packet in the forwarding data packet stage,
and the other node drops the receipt in the submitting receipt stage, as shown in
Fig. 6.3, where node C drops the data packet and node M drops the receipt. By
colluding in this way, if C has returned a receipt to its previous node, C will not be
charged by S temporarily, and all the nodes between M and C cannot get credits
from S immediately. For node M, if M will return a receipt to A, S will increase
Wby(M, S) by nE, and if M refuses to return a receipt to A, M will be marked as
malicious by A. That is, in this case, temporary inconsistent records update can
be caused, but the colluding nodes will be overcharged by nE. However, according
to Section 6.2.6, the inconsistency can be easily resolved.
Slander Attacks: In ARCS, each selfish node may propagate its blacklist to
the network, which may give attackers chances to slander others. Next we show
that instead of causing damage, such attacks can even benefit selfish nodes in
some situations. Suppose that a malicious node M propagates information to the
network to say that node X is malicious. For any selfish node S, this information
will only be used in the situation where S wants to calculate a certain route’s
successful packet delivery probability according to (6.7) and X lies on this route.
In this situation, the successful packet delivery probability of this route will always
be calculated as 0 according to (6.7), and this route will not be used by S, which
is just one goal of secure route discovery: preventing attackers from being on the
135
route. In all other situations, such information will not affect S’s decision.
In summary, given that in the ARCS system there are L selfish nodes {S1, . . . , SL}
and K malicious nodes {M1, . . . , MK}. Let Bthreshold(Mk, Sl), LBthreshold(Mk, Sl)
and Tinterval(Mk, Sl) be the cooperation degree, the link breakage threshold, and
the minimum route request forwarding interval that Slset for Mk, respectively. Let
TSl be node Sl’s staying time in the system, and let Erequest (which is far less than
E) be the consumed energy per route request forwarding. Based on the above
analysis, we can see that the total damage Damage that can be caused by all the











That is, the damage that can be caused by malicious nodes is bounded, which is
determined by the specified thresholds.
6.4 Simulation Studies
In our simulations 100 good nodes and various number of attackers are randomly
deployed inside a rectangular area of 1000m × 1000m. Each node moves randomly
according to the random waypoint model with vmax = 10m/s and the average Pause
time being 100 seconds. The physical layer assumes a fixed transmission range
model, where two nodes can directly communicate with each other successfully
only if they are in each other’s transmission range. The MAC layer protocol
simulates the IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) with a four-
way handshaking mechanism [44]. The maximum transmission Range for each
node is fixed to be 250m.
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In the simulations, each selfish node acts as a service provider which randomly
picks another selfish node as the receiver and packets are scheduled to be generated
according to a Poisson process. Similarly, each malicious node also randomly picks
another malicious node as the receiver to send packets. The total number of mali-
cious nodes varies from 0 to 50. Among those malicious nodes, 1/3 launch dropping
packets attacks which drop all packets passing through them whose sources are not
malicious, 1/3 launch emulating link breakage attacks which emulate link break-
age once receiving packet forwarding request from selfish nodes, and 1/3 launch
injecting traffic attacks. For each selfish or malicious node that does not launch
injecting traffic attacks, the average packet inter-arrival time is 2 seconds, while for
malicious nodes launching injecting traffic attacks, the average packet inter-arrival
time is 0.1 second. In the simulations, all data packets have the same size.
Based on selfish nodes’ forwarding decision, three types of systems have been
implemented in the simulations: the proposed ARCS system, which we called
“ARCS”; the ARCS system without balance constraint (i.e., cooperation degree
is set to be infinity for all selfish nodes), which we called “ARCS-NBC”; and a
fully-cooperative system, which we called “FULL-COOP”. In “ARCS”, all selfish
nodes behave in the way as described in Section 6.2. In “ARCS-NBC”, the same
strategies as in “ARCS” have been used to detect launching dropping packets
attacks and emulating link breakage attacks, but now (6.6) is not a necessary
condition to forward packets for other nodes, and a selfish node will unconditionally
forward packets for those nodes which have not been marked as malicious by it.
In “FULL-COOP”, all selfish nodes will unconditionally forward packets for other
nodes, and no malicious nodes detection and punishment mechanisms have been
used. In all three systems, the same route discovery procedure is used as described
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in Section 6.2.5.
We use {S1, . . . , SL} to denote the L selfish nodes and use {M1, . . . , MK} to
denote the K malicious nodes in the network. In this section the following perfor-
mance metrics are used:
• Energy efficiency of selfish nodes, which is the total profits gained by all
selfish nodes divided by the total energy spent by all selfish nodes until the
current moment.
• Average damage received per selfish node: which is the total damage received
by all selfish nodes until the current moment divided by the total number of















• Balance variation of selfish nodes, which is the standard deviation of selfish
nodes’ overall balance with the assumption that
∑L









l=1 B(Sl) = 0, this definition has incorporated the effects
caused by malicious nodes, which will make
∑L
l=1 B(Sl) deviate from 0. This
definition also reflects the fairness for selfish nodes, where Variation = 0 implies
absolute fairness, and the increase of Variation implies the increase of possible
unfairness for selfish nodes.
In our simulations, each configuration has been run 10 independent rounds
using different random seeds, and the result are averaged over all the rounds. In
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(a) Energy efficiency (b) Balance variation (c) Average damage
Figure 6.5: Performance comparison among the three systems
selfish node S, which is equal to the average pause time. The running time for each
round is 5000 seconds. For each selfish node, the link breakage ratio is estimated
through its own experience, which is the ratio between the total number of link
breakages it has experienced with itself being the transmitter and the total number
of transmissions it has tried. Fig. 6.4 shows the estimated values of link breakage
ratio by each node, which shows that all nodes have almost the same link breakage
ratio (here 2%).
Fig. 6.5 shows the performance comparison among the three systems: ARCS,
ARCS-NBC, and FULL-COOP, where in ARCS, Bthreshold is set to be 60E, and
the value of LBthreshold is set according to (6.24) with LBinit = 20E. The exper-
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Figure 6.6: Effects of injecting traffic attacks in the three systems
that 60E can achieve good tradeoff between performance and possible damage
(demonstrated in Fig. 6.7). From the selfish nodes’ energy efficiency comparisons
(Fig. 6.5(a)) we can see that ARCS has much higher efficiency than ARCS-NBC
and FULL-COOP when there exist malicious nodes. When only selfish nodes ex-
ist, ARCS-NBC and FULL-COOP have the same efficiency, since they work in the
same way, and both have slightly higher efficiency than ARCS with the payment
of higher balance variation of selfish nodes, which is shown in Fig. 6.5(b). The
balance variation comparison shows that ARCS has much lower balance variation
than the other two systems, and almost keeps unchanged with the increase of the
number of malicious nodes, while for the other two systems, the balance variation
increases linearly and dramatically with the increase of the number of malicious
nodes. This comparison also implies the lower unfairness for selfish nodes in the
ARCS system. The average damage comparison (Fig. 6.5(c)) shows that in ARCS
the damage that can be caused by malicious nodes is much lower than in other two
systems, and increases very slowly with the increase of malicious nodes number.
From the results shown in Fig. 6.5(a), Fig. 6.5(b), and Fig. 6.5(c) we can
also see that although ARCS-NBC has gained a lot of improvement over FULL-
COOP by introducing mechanisms to detect dropping packet and emulating link
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breakage attacks, its performance is still much worse than ARCS. The reason is that
ARCS-NBC cannot detect and punish those malicious nodes which launch injecting
traffic attacks, so a large portion of energy has been wasted to forward packets
for those nodes. Fig. 6.6 illustrates different effects of injecting traffic attacks
in the three systems, where the vertical axis shows the percentage of damage
caused by injecting traffic attacks to the network. From these results we can
see that in ARCS, only about 40% percentage of damage is caused by injecting
traffic attacks, in FULL-COOP this percentage increases to around 80%, while
in ARCS-NBC the percentage increases to more than 90%, although the overall
damage caused by all malicious nodes to the selfish nodes in ARCS-NBC is less
than that in FULL-COOP. In another words, in Fig. 6.5(c), the gap between
the results corresponding to “ARCS” and the results corresponding to “ARCS-
NBC” is caused by injecting traffic attacks, while the gap between the results
corresponding to “ARCS-NBC” and the results corresponding to “FULL-COOP”
is caused by dropping packets/emulating link breakage attacks. These results
explain why ARCS-NBC has much worse performance than ARCS, and clearly
show that how necessary it is to introduce mechanisms to defend against such
injecting traffic attacks.
Next we evaluate the ARCS system under different cooperation degree config-
urations, where all other parameters keep unchanged. Fig. 6.7 shows the perfor-
mance of the ARCS system by varying cooperation degree from 10E to 160E. From
Fig. 6.7(a) we can see that when the cooperation degree is 40E or more, the energy
efficiency becomes almost identical. However, Fig. 6.7(b) and Fig. 6.7(c) show that
with the increase of cooperation degree, both the balance variation of selfish nodes
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Figure 6.8: Effects of injecting traffic attacks under different cooperation degrees
in the ARCS system
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using Fig. 6.8, which shows that with the increase of cooperation degree, the per-
centage of damage that is caused by injecting traffic attacks also increases. That
is, the higher the cooperation degree, the more vulnerable to injecting traffic at-
tacks. These results suggest that a relative small cooperation degree (for example
40E) is enough to achieve good performance for selfish nodes, such as high energy
efficiency, low unfairness and small damage.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter we have investigated the issues of cooperation stimulation and
security in autonomous ad hoc networks, and proposed an Attack-Resistant Coop-
eration Stimulation (ARCS) system to stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes
and defend against various attacks launched by malicious nodes. In the ARCS
system, each node can adaptively adjust their own strategies according to the
changing environments. The analysis has shown that in the ARCS system, the
damage that can be caused by malicious nodes is bounded, and the cooperation
among selfish nodes is enforced through introducing a positive cooperation degree.
At the same time, the ARCS system maintains good fairness among selfish nodes.
The simulation results have also agreed with the analysis. Another key property
of the ARCS system is that it is fully distributive, completely self-organizing, and
does not require any tamper-proof hardware or central management points.
143
Chapter 7
Game Theoretic Analysis of
Secure Cooperation in
Autonomous Ad Hoc Networks
In Chapter 6 we have proposed an attack-resistant resistant cooperation stimula-
tion system for autonomous ad hoc networks. However, the proposed schemes are
still heuristics. In this chapter we will formally address the security and coopera-
tion in autonomous ad hoc networks under a game theoretic framework.
Although this work also falls into the category of reputation-based cooperation
stimulation for autonomous ad hoc networks in a game theoretic framework, there
are several major differences which distinguish our work from the existing work,
such as [6, 26, 31, 59, 78, 80]. First, since ad hoc networks are usually deployed in
hostile environments, in this work not only selfish behavior, but also malicious
behavior has been considered. Malicious behavior has been overlooked in existing
work, but can cause severe trouble without necessary countermeasures. Second,
in this work the issues of cooperation and security have been studied under more
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realistic scenarios, e.g., the communication medium is error-prone. The analysis
shows that almost all the existing cooperation schemes will break down under such
scenarios. Third, unlike some existing work which assumes that nodes will honestly
report their private information (e.g., [78]), in this work the possible cheating
behavior has been fully exploited, and cheat-proof strategies have been devised.
Fourth, instead of only using Nash equilibrium, in this work other optimality
criteria, such as cheat-proofing and fairness, have also been considered.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 focuses on a simple yet illumi-
nating two-player packet forwarding game and investigates the optimal cooperation
strategies. Section 7.2 identifies the underlying reasons why stimulating coopera-
tion under such scenarios is difficult and describes the secure routing and packet
forwarding game. In Section 7.3, a set of reputation-based attack-resistant coop-
eration stimulation strategies are devised. The analysis of the proposed strategies
are provided in Section 7.4 and Section 7.5. Extensive simulations have been
conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed strategies under various
scenarios, and the results are demonstrated in Section 7.6. Finally, Section 7.7
summarizes this chapter.
7.1 Two-node Packet Forwarding Game
We first study a simple yet illuminating two-node multi-stage packet forwarding
game, which is modeled as follows. There are two players (nodes) in this game,
denoted by N = {1, 2}. Each player needs its opponent to forward a certain
number of packets in each stage. To simplify the illustration, we assume that all
packets have the same size. For each player i, the cost to forward a packet is ci, and
the gain it can get for any packet that its opponent has forwarded for it is gi. Here
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the cost can be the consumed energy and the gain is usually application-specific.
Let Bi be the number of packets that player i will request its opponent to forward
at each stage. The values of Bi, ci, and gi will be reported by both players to
each other, either honestly or dishonestly, before the game is started. It is also
reasonable to assume that gi ≥ ci, and there exists a cmax with ci ≤ cmax.
Let Ai = {0, 1, . . . , B3−i} denote the set of actions that player i can take in
each stage, where ai ∈ Ai denotes that player i will forward ai packets for its
opponent in this stage. We refer to an action profile a = (a1, a2) as an outcome
and denote the set A1×A2 of outcomes by A. Then in each stage players’ payoffs
are calculated as follows provided the action profile a being taken:
u1(a) = a2 × g1 − a1 × c1, u2(a) = a1 × g2 − a2 × c2. (7.1)
That is, the payoff of a player is the difference between the total gain it obtained
with the help of its opponent and the total cost it spent to help its opponent. We
refer to u(a) = (u1(a), u2(a)) as the payoff profile associated with the action profile
a. According to the backward induction principle [64], if this game will only be
played for fixed finite times, the only Nash equilibrium (NE) is a∗ = (0, 0), no
matter whether the two players move simultaneously or not. That is, if the game
will only be played for one time, no node will help its opponent. The same result
also holds for the case when the stage game will be played for only finite times and
the game termination time is known by both players.
Next we show that cooperation can still be achieved if the game will be played
for infinite times, or for finite times but no player knows the exact game termination
time. Let G denote the repeated version of the above one-stage packet forwarding
game. Let si denote player i’s behavior strategy, and let s = (s1, s2) denote the
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Utility function (7.2) can be used when the game will be played for infinite times.
The discounted version (7.3) can be used when the game will be played for finite
times, but no one knows the exact termination time. Here the discount factor
δ (with 0 < δ < 1) characterizes each player’s expected playing time. Since in
general the results obtained based on (7.2) can also be applied to the scenarios
when (7.3) is used as long as δ approaches to 1, in this section we will mainly focus
on (7.2).
Now we analyze the possible NE for the game G with utility function (7.2).
According to the Folk theorem [64], for every feasible and enforceable payoff profile,
there exists at least one NE to achieve it, where the set of feasible payoff profiles
for the above game is
V0 = convex hull{v
∣∣ ∃a ∈ A with u(a) = v}. (7.4)
and the set of enforceable payoff profiles, denoted by V1, is
V1 = {v





Figure 7.1 depicts these sets for the game with B1 = 1 and B2 = 2, where the
vertical axis denotes player 1’s payoff and the horizontal axis denotes player 2’s
payoff. The payoff profiles inside the convex hull of {(0, 0), (g1,−c2), (g1−2c1, 2g2−
c2), (−2c1, 2g2)} (including the boundaries) are the set of feasible payoff profiles
V0, the set of payoff profiles inside the shading area (including the boundaries)










Figure 7.1: Feasible and enforceable payoff profiles
that as long as g1g2 > c1c2, there exist an infinite number of NE. To simplify
our illustration, in this chapter we will use x = (x1, x2) to denote the set of NE
strategies corresponding to the enforceable payoff profile (x2g1−x1c1, x1g2−x2c2).
7.1.1 Equilibrium Refinement
Based on the above analysis we can see that the infinitely repeated game G may
have an infinite number of NE. However, not all the obtained NE payoff profiles are
simultaneously acceptable to both players. For example, the payoff profile (0, 0)
will not be acceptable from both players’ point of view if they are rational. Further,
the existence of multiple NE payoff also requires nodes to make an agreement on
which NE strategy should be used, which also introduces extra trouble. Next
we show how to perform equilibrium refinement, that is, how to introduce new
optimality criteria to eliminate those NE solutions which are less rational, less
robust, or less likely.
When performing equilibrium refinement, the following optimality criteria will
be considered: Pareto optimality, subgame perfection, proportional fairness, and
absolute fairness. In the literature, Pareto optimality and fairness have been used
to refine the equilibrium in [78], and subgame perfection has been considered to
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remove empty threats in [80].
Subgame Perfection: Our first step towards refining the NE solutions is to
rule out those empty threats. This motivates the equilibrium refinement based on
more credible punishments known as subgame perfect equilibrium, which eliminates
those equilibria in which the players’ threats are empty. According to the perfect
Folk theorem [64], every strictly enforceable payoff profile v ∈ V2 is a subgame
perfect equilibrium payoff profile of the game G, where
V2 = {v





That is, after applying the criterion of subgame perfection, only a small set of NE
are removed.
Pareto Optimality: Our second step towards refining the set of NE solutions
is to apply the criterion of Pareto optimality1. It is easy to check that only those
payoff profiles lying on the boundary of the set V0 could be Pareto optimal. Let
V3 denote the subset of feasible payoff profiles which are also Pareto optimal.
For the case depicted in Figure 7.1, V3 is the set of payoff profiles which lie on
the segment between (g1,−c2) and (g1−2c1, 2g2− c2) and on the segment between
(g1−2c1, 2g2−c2) and (−2c1, 2g2). After applying the criterion of Pareto optimality,
although a large portion of NE have been removed from the feasible set, there still
exist an infinite number of NE. Let V4 = V3 ∩ V2.
Proportional Fairness: Next we try to further refine the solution set based
on the criterion of proportional fairness. Here a payoff profile is proportionally fair
if U1(s)U2(s) can be maximized, which can be achieved by maximizing u1(s)u2(s)
1Given a payoff profile v ∈ V0, v is said to be Pareto optimal if there is no v′ ∈ V0 for which
v′i > vi for all i ∈ N ; v is said to be strongly Pareto optimal if there is no v′ ∈ V0 for which
v′i ≥ vi for all i ∈ N and v′i > vi for some i ∈ N [64].
149






















































Absolute Fairness: In many situations, absolute fairness is also an important
criterion. We first consider absolute fairness in payoff, which refers to that the
payoff of these two players should be equal. By combining the criterion of Pareto























Another similar criterion is absolute fairness in cost, which refers to that the cost
spent by these two players for each other should be equal. By combining the























7.1.2 Cheat-proof Nash Equilibrium Strategies
It is worth noting that the above unique solutions (7.7), (7.8) and (7.9) require
players to reveal their private information to their opponents. While due to players’
selfishness, it’s unrealistic to expect them to honestly reveal their private informa-
tion. Further, to maximize their own payoffs, selfish players may tend to cheat
whenever they believe cheating can increase their payoffs. In this chapter, we refer
to a NE as cheat-proof if no player can further increase its payoff by revealing false







































(a) τ ′1 < τ2 (b) τ
′
1 > τ2
Figure 7.2: Player 1 falsely reports the value of π1
Now we study whether the obtained unique solutions are cheat-proof. We first
study the solution (7.7). Let πi = ci/gi denote player i’s cost-gain (CG) ratio. We
first analyze whether player i can increase its payoff by reporting a false CG ratio
given that player 2 will honestly report its CG value. That is, we fix the value of
π2, let π1 be player 1’s true value, and let π
′
1 be the value that player 1 will falsely





















easy to check that τ1 < τ
′
1 and τ2 < τ
′
2. Recall that Bi is the maximum number
of packets that player i will request its opponent to forward for it in each stage.
Let (x1, x2) denote the number of packets in average they will forward for each
other in each stage according to the solution (7.7) given that the true values of B1
and B2 are known by both players. The relationship between x2/x1 and B1/B2
under different situations is illustrated in Fig. 7.2(a) and Fig. 7.2(b). In these
two figures, the dashed curve corresponds to the relationship between x2/x1 and
B1/B2 given that player 1 honestly reports its CG value, which is π1; while the
solid curve corresponds to the relationship between x2/x1 and B1/B2 given that
player 1 falsely report its CG value, which is π′1.
From the results illustrated in Fig. 7.2 we can see that by falsely reporting a
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higher CG ratio, in most situations player 1 can increase the ratio of x2/x1. Next
we study the effect of falsely reporting a high CG ratio on player 1’s payoff. We
first consider the situation that τ ′1 ≤ τ2, which is illustrated in Fig. 7.2(a). In this
case the whole feasible space can be partitioned into 5 subareas along the feasible
range of B1/B2:














π′1 > π1, by falsely reporting a higher CG ratio player 1 can forward less
packets for player 2 than it should, consequently increasing its own payoff.
• For any value of B1/B2 inside range II, the solution corresponding to π1













B1, by falsely reporting a higher CG ratio player 1 can forward
less packets for player 2 than it should, consequently increasing its own payoff.
• For any value of B1/B2 inside range III, the solution corresponding to π1 is
(B2, B1), and the solution corresponding to π
′
1 is also (B2, B1). That is, in
this situation by changing the value of π1 to π
′
1, player 1’s payoff will not
change.






B2), and the solution corresponding to π
′






B2, by falsely reporting a higher CG ratio player 1 can request
player 2 to forward more packets for it than player 2 should, consequently
increasing its own payoff.























































B2, by falsely reporting a higher CG ratio player 1 can
request player 2 to forward more packets for it than player 2 should, and
consequently increases its own payoff.
Similar results can also be obtained for the case that τ ′1 > τ2, where now player 1
can increase its own payoff over all possible values of B1/B2 by falsely reporting a
higher π1 value given that π2 is fixed. In summary, by falsely reporting a higher
π1 value, in most situations player 1 can increase its payoff, and in no situations
player 1’s payoff will be decreased. Further, the higher player 1 reports the value
of CG ratio, the more benefit player 1 can get. Similarly, player 2 can also increase
its benefit by falsely reporting a higher CG ratio.
Next we consider the solution (7.8). Now let τ = g2+c1
g1+c2







1. Fig. 7.3(a) illustrates the relationship between x2/x1 and B1/B2 for the
two different reported cost values c1 and c
′
1, where g1, g2 and c2 are fixed. Similar
as in Fig. 7.2, the dashed curve corresponds to the case that player 1 reports a
true cost value, while the solid curve corresponds to the case that player 1 reports
a false cost value. From Fig. 7.3(a) we can see that by falsely reporting a higher
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cost value, in all situations player 1 can increase the ratio of x2/x1. Next we
study the effect of falsely reporting a higher cost on player 1’s payoff. As shown in
Fig. 7.3(a), the whole space can be partitioned into 3 subareas along the feasible
range of B1/B2:
• For any value of B1/B2 inside range I, the solution corresponding to c1 is
(B1/τ, B1), and the solution corresponding to c
′
1 is (B1/τ
′, B1). Since τ ′ > τ ,
by falsely reporting a higher cost player 1 can forward less packets for player
2 than it should, then increase its own payoff.
• For any value of B1/B2 inside range II, the solution corresponding to c1 is
(B2, τB2), and the solution corresponding to c
′
1 is (B1/τ
′, B1). Since B1/τ ′ <
B2 and B1 > τB2, by falsely reporting a higher cost, player 1 can forward
less packets for player 2 than it should and request player 2 to forward more
packets for it than player 2 should, then increase its own payoff.
• For any value of B1/B2 inside range III, the solution corresponding to c1 is
(B2, τB2), and the solution corresponding to c
′
1 is (B2, τ
′B2). Since τ ′ > τ , by
falsely reporting a higher cost, player 1 can always request player 2 to forward
more packets for it than player 2 should do, and consequently increase its
own payoff.
In summary, by falsely reporting a higher c1 value, in all situations player 1 can
increase its payoff given that c2 and g2 are fixed. Further, the higher player 1
reports the value of c1, the more benefit player 1 can get. Applying similar analysis
it is also easy to show that by falsely reporting a lower g1 value, in all situations
player 1 can increase its payoff given that c2 and g2 are fixed. Similarly, player 2
can also increase its benefit by falsely reporting a higher c2 or a lower g2 given that
154
g1 and c1 are fixed.
Now we consider the solution (7.9). Fig. 7.3(b) illustrates the relationship
between x2/x1 and B1/B2 for the two different reported cost values c1 and c
′
1 with
c′1 > c1 and c2 fixed. From Fig. 7.3(b) we can see that by falsely reporting a
higher c1 value, in all situations player 1 can increase the ratio of x2/x1. Applying
similar analysis as before, we can conclude that given c2 fixed, by falsely reporting
a higher c1 value, player 1 can always increase its payoff. Further, the higher player
1 reports the value of c1, the more benefit player 1 can get. Similarly, player 2 can
also increase its payoff by falsely reporting a higher c2 value given c1 fixed.
Based on the above analysis, it is surprising to see that none of them is cheat-
proof. Since all these unique solutions are strongly Pareto optimal, the increase of
its opponent’s payoff will lead to the decrease of its own payoff. Therefore players
have no incentive to honestly report their private information. On the contrary,
they will cheat whenever cheating can increase their payoff.
What is the consequence if both players will cheat? Let’s first examine the
solution (7.7). In this case, based on the above analysis, both players will report a
ci/gi value as high as possible. Since we have assumed gi ≥ ci and ci ≤ cmax, both
player will set gi = ci = cmax, and the solution (7.7) will become the following
form:
x∗ = (min(B1, B2), min(B1, B2)). (7.10)
After applying similar analysis for the solutions (7.8) and (7.9), it is surprising
to see, but easy to understand, that both will also converge to the form (7.10).
Accordingly, the corresponding payoff profile is
v∗ = ((g1 − c1) min{B1, B2}, (g2 − c2) min{B1, B2}) . (7.11)
Besides gi and ci, players can also report false Bi information. However, it is
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easy to check that a rational player should always report a true Bi value. Next we
use player 1 as an example to show this. If B1 ≤ B2, reporting a higher B1 can only
increase the number of packets it should forward for player 2, which introduces no
gain to it, while by reporting a lower B1, although it can decrease the number of
packets forwarded for player 2, the number of its own packets forwarded by player 2
will also be decreased and cannot introduce gain to it too due to g1 ≥ c1. Similarly,
if B1 > B2, reporting a higher B1 will not affect the solution, while reporting a
lower B1 may also reduce the number of packets that player 2 will forward for it,
which introduces no gain as long as g1 ≥ c1. Therefore, player 1 should not report
a false B1 value. The same analysis also applies to player 2.
In summary, when cheating behavior is considered, all the above unique solu-
tions converge to the same form as in (7.10) with payoff being (7.11), that is, in
the two-player packet forwarding game, in order to maximize its own payoff and be
resistant to possible cheating behavior, a player should not forward more packets
than its opponent does for it. A simple NE strategy to achieve the payoff profile
(7.11) is as follows:
Two-node cheat-proof packet forwarding strategy: For each player i ∈ N ,
in each stage it should forward min(B1, B2) packets for its opponent unless there
was a previous stage in which its opponent has forwarded less than min(B1, B2)
packets for it, in which case it will stop forwarding packets for its opponent for-
ever.
7.1.3 Remarks
The strategies proposed in [78, 80] may look similar to the one described above.
In [78] Srinivasan et al. studied the cooperation in ad hoc networks by focusing on
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the energy-efficient aspects of cooperation, where in their solution the nodes are
classified into different energy classes and the behavior of each node depends on
the energy classes of the participants of each connection. They have demonstrated
that if two nodes belong to the same class, they should apply the same packet
forwarding ratio. However, they require nodes to honestly report their classes, and
a node can easily cheat to increase its own performance, such as the approach
mentioned in [31] (section VIII). Meanwhile, using normalized throughput alone
as the performance metric may not be a good choice in general, as to be explained
in the section 7.5.3.
In [80], Urpi et al. claimed that it is not possible to force a node to forward
more packets than it sends on average (Lemma 6.2), and then concluded that
cooperation can be enforced in a mobile ad hoc network, provided that enough
members of the network agree on it, and if no node has to forward more traffic
that it generates (Theorem 6.3). However, the above analysis has shown that a
strategy profile can still be enforceable even this may require a node to forward
more packets than it sends on average, as illustrated in solutions (7.7), (7.8) and
(7.9). Second, in mobile ad hoc network, due to the multihop nature, in general
the number of packets a node forwards should be much more than the number of
packets it generates. Accordingly, their strategy cannot enforce cooperation at all
in most scenarios.
One major contribution of our analysis lies in that we have exploited all the
possible NE strategies, demonstrated why some strategies are not good, why they
cannot be acceptable by the players, and why the solution (7.10) is the only one
that should be adopted. In other words, we have provided more insight and physical
meaning for the solution (7.10).
157
The works presented in [7,100] are also related to ours in the sense that cheating
behavior has also been considered. They have proposed auction-based schemes to
stimulate packet forwarding participation, where by using VCG-based second price
auctioning these schemes force selfish nodes to honestly report their true private
information (such as cost) to maximize their profit. However, in their schemes, a
trusted third-party auctioneer is required per route selection and central banking
services are needed to handle billing information, which usually cannot be satisfied
in mobile ad hoc network. In our work, we focus on the scenario that neither trusted
third-party auctioneer nor central banking service is available.
7.2 Secure Routing and Packet Forwarding Game
Now we investigate how to stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes in au-
tonomous mobile ad hoc networks under realistic scenarios, by also taking into
consideration possible malicious behavior. We consider an autonomous mobile ad
hoc networks with a finite population of users, denoted by N . We do not assume
the availability of any tamper-proof hardware or central banking service, there-
fore the scheme should be completely reputation-based. We focus on the situation
that each user will stay in the network for a relatively long time, such as those
students in a campus. But we do not require them to keep connected all time,
and we allow users to leave and join the network if necessary. The goal is not to
enforce all the users to act in a fully cooperative fashion at all time, which has
been shown in [31, 100] to be not achievable in most situations. Instead, the goal
is to stimulate cooperation among nodes as much as possible through playing re-
ciprocal altruism, and at the same time take into consideration possible cheating
and malicious behavior as well as fairness concern.
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We assume that each user has a unique registered and verifiable identity (e.g.,
a public/private key pair), which is issued by some central authority and will
be used to perform necessary access control and authentication. Each node may
send information to the others or request information from the others. We focus
on the information-push model, where it is the source’s duty to guarantee the
successful delivery of packets to their destinations. But the obtained results can
be easily extended to the information-pull model. We assume that for each user
i ∈ N , forwarding a packet will incur cost ci, and letting a packet be successfully
delivered to its destination can bring it gain gi. Here the cost corresponds to
the efforts spent by i, such as energy, and the gain is usually user-specific and/or
application-specific.
Before devising cooperation stimulation strategies for autonomous mobile ad
hoc networks, we first pose some challenges that we may meet. First, most previ-
ous work addresses cooperation enforcement under a repeated game model, such
as [6, 31, 78, 80], which assume either random connection or fixed setup. However,
the repeated model rarely holds in autonomous mobile ad hoc networks due to
the topology change and variable request rate. In such networks, a source may
request different nodes to forward packets at differen time and may act as a relay
for different sources. Meanwhile, the request rates of each node to other nodes
are usually variable, which can be caused either by its inherent variable traffic
generation rate, or by mobility. A direct consequence of non-repeated model is
that favors cannot be simultaneous granted. In [28], Dawkins demonstrated that
reciprocal altruism is beneficial for every ecological system when favors are granted
simultaneously. However, when favors cannot be granted simultaneously, altruism
may not guarantee satisfactory future payback, especially when the future is un-
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predictable. This makes cooperation stimulation in autonomous mobile ad hoc
networks an extremely challenging task.
Second, in wireless networks, noise is inevitable and can cause severe trouble.
For two-player cheat-proof packet forwarding strategy, if some packets are dropped
due to noise, the game will be terminated immediately, and the performance will
be degraded dramatically. This will also happen in most existing cooperation
enforcement schemes, such as [31,78]. In these schemes, noise can easily lead to the
collapse of the whole network, where finally all nodes will act non-cooperatively.
Distinguishing the misbehavior caused by noise from those caused by malicious
intention is a challenging task.
Third, since nodes can only base on what they have observed to make their
decisions, imperfect monitoring can always be taken advantage of by greedy or
malicious nodes to increase their performance. For example, when the miss detect
ratio is high, a node can always drop other nodes’ packets but still claim that it has
forwarded. None of the existing approaches are designed with the consideration of
noise and imperfect monitoring, which greatly limits their potential applications
in realistic scenarios.
Fourth, since autonomous mobile ad hoc networks are usually deployed in ad-
versarial environments, some nodes may even be malicious. If there exist only
selfish nodes, stimulating cooperation will be much easier according to the follow-
ing logic as demonstrated in [31]: misbehavior can result in the decrease of service
quality experienced by some other nodes, which may consequently decrease the
quality of service provided by them; this quality degradation will then be propa-
gated back to the misbehaving nodes. Therefore selfish nodes have no incentive
to intentionally behave maliciously in order to enjoy high quality of service. How-
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ever, this is not true when some nodes are malicious. Since the attackers’ goal is to
decrease the network performance, such quality degradation is exactly what they
want to see. This makes cooperation stimulation in hostile environments extremely
challenging. Unfortunately, malicious behaviors have been heavily overlooked when
designing cooperation stimulation strategies.
In order to formally analyze cooperation and security in such networks, similar
as in Chapter 5, we also model the interactions among nodes as secure routing
and packet forwarding game:
• Players: A finite set of network users, denoted by N .
• Types: Each player i ∈ N has a type θi ∈ Θ where Θ = {selfish, malicious}.
Let Ns denote the set of selfish players and Nm = N−Ns the set of attackers.
Meanwhile, no play knows the others’ types a priori.
• Strategy space:
1. Route participation stage: For each player, after receiving a request
asking it to be on a certain route, it can either accept or refuse this
request.
2. Route selection stage: For each player who has a packet to send,
after discovering a valid route, it can either use or not use this route to
send the packet.
3. Packet forwarding stage: For each relay, once it has received a packet
requiring it to forward, its decision can be either forward or drop this
packet.
• Cost: For any player i, transmitting a packet, either for itself or for the
others, will incur cost ci.
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• Gain: For each selfish player i, it can get gain gi for any successfully delivered
packet originating from it.
• Utility: For each player i, let Ti(t) denote the number of packets that i
needs to send by time t, let Si(t) denote the number of packets that have
successfully reached their destinations by time t with i being the source, let
Fi(j, t) denote the number of packets that i has forwarded for j by time t,
and let Fi(t) =
∑
j∈N Fi(j, t). Let Wi(j, t) denote the total number of useless
packet transmissions that i has caused to j by time t due to i dropping those
packets transmitted by j. Let tf be the lifetime of this network. Then we
model the players’ utility as follows:
1. For any selfish player i, its objective is to maximize
U si (tf ) =
Si(tf )gi − Fi(tf )ci
Ti(tf )
. (7.12)
2. For any attacker j, its objective is to maximize





(Wj(i, tf ) + Fi(j, tf )) ci − αFj(tf )cj . (7.13)
Here α is introduced to determine the relative importance of attackers’ cost
comparing to other nodes’ cost. That is, it is worth spending cost c to cause
damage c′ to other nodes only if α < c
′
c
. If the game will be played for an infi-
nite duration, their utilities will become limtf→∞ U
s




On the right-hand side of (7.12), the numerator denotes the net profit (i.e.,
total gain minus total cost) that the selfish node i obtained, and the denominator
denotes the total number of packets that i needs to send. This utility represents
the average net profit that i can obtain per packet. We can see that maximizing
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(7.12) is equivalent to maximizing the total number of successfully delivered packets
subject to the total cost constraint. If ci = 0, this equals to maximizing the
throughput.
The summation in the right-hand side of (7.13) represents the net damage
caused to the other nodes by j. Since in general this value may increase monoton-
ically, we normalize it using the network lifetime tf . Now this utility represents
the average net damage that j caused to the other nodes per time unit. From
(7.13) we can see that in this game setting the attackers’ goal is to waste the other
nodes’ cost (or energy) as much as possible. Other possible alternatives, such as
minimizing the others’ payoff, will also be discussed later.
7.3 Attack-Resistant Cooperation Stimulation
Before devising attack-resistent cooperation stimulation strategies, we first study
how to handle possible malicious behavior. We focus on two classes of attacks:
drop packet attack and inject traffic attack. Next we show how to detect drop
packet attack under noise and imperfect monitoring.
Let Ri(j, t) denote the number of packets that j has agreed to forward for i by
time t, and let Hi(j, t) denote the times that i has observed j forwarding a packet
for it. If j has never intentionally drop i’s packets, given pe, pf and pm, for a large
Ri(j, t), we should have
poRi(j, t) ≤ Hi(j, t) ≤ (1− pe + pepm)Ri(j, t), (7.14)
with po = (1− pe)(1− pf ). Then a simple detection rule can be as follows: node i
will mark node j as intentionally dropping packets if the following holds
Hi(j, t) < Ri(j, t)po −∆(Ri(j, t), pe, pf , pm), (7.15)
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where ∆(n, pe, pf , pm) is a function of pe, pf , pm, and n. In general, there is a
tradeoff when selecting ∆(n, pe, pf , pm). A large ∆(n, pe, pf , pm) may incur high
miss detect ratio, while a small ∆(n, pe, pf , pm) may result in high false alarm
ratio.
Next we show how to choose a good ∆(n, pe, pf , pm). If the packet dropping
due to noise can be modeled as an i.i.d. random process with drop probability pe,
and the observation errors are also i.i.d. random processes, and all are independent



















Then we can let
∆(n, pe, pf , pm) = x
√
npo(1− po). (7.18)
In this case, the false alarm ratio will be no more than 1 − Φ(x) when Ri(j, t)
is large. Since in general Φ(x) can still approach 1 even for a small positive x,
∆(n, pe, pf , pm) will be a very small value comparing to npo for a large n. How-
ever, in general neither packet dropping nor observation error is i.i.d. Under such
circumstances, if the above detection rule is used, the false alarm ratio will usually
be larger than 1 − Φ(x). To handle non-i.i.d. scenario, one way is to increase
∆(n, pe, pf , pm), such as increasing x.
Let β denote i’s confidence on its detection decision, which lies in the range of
[0,1], with 0 indicating that i has not marked j as malicious and with 1 indicating
that i is sure that j is malicious. Then we can have β = Φ(x) for the i.i.d. scenarios
and β < Φ(x) for the non-i.i.d. scenarios. In the following of this chapter we will
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use ∆(n, pe, pf , pm, β) to denote the detection threshold with detection confidence
β.
Once node i has marked node j as intentionally dropping packets, one possible
rule is that it should not work with j again. However, such rule has a drawback
that if j has been mistakenly marked as malicious, it can never recover, since i
will not give it any chance. To overcome this drawback, we modify this decision
rule such that j will be given chance to recover, which will be described in the
following.
Next we present attack-resistant cooperation stimulation strategies. The strate-
gies for non-malicious players involve decision making in the following three stages:
route participation stage, route selection stage, and packet forwarding stage.
Route participation stage We first study what decision a selfish node i
should make when it receives a route participation request from node j. First, if
i has detected j as malicious with confidence β, with probability 1 − β it should
immediately refuse this request. Second, even if j has not been marked as malicious
by i, i should accept this request only if it believes that it can get help from j later.
However, whether i can get help from j depends on a lot of uncertain factors, such
as i’s and j’s future requests, the changing network topology, j’s strategy, and
so on. For example, if i will never need j’s help, or if i knows that this is the
last packet j will send, i will have no incentive to help j. However, due to the
unpredictability of future and favors not being granted simultaneously, stimulating
i to act cooperatively is difficult.
In this chapter we focus on the scenario that nodes will stay in the network for a
relatively long time. We consider the following strategy: a node may first forward
some packets for other nodes without getting instantaneous payback. However,
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in order to be robust to possible malicious behavior (e.g., inject traffic attack)
or greedy behavior (e.g., request more but return less), a node should not be
too generous. Before formalizing the above strategy, we first introduce a simple
procedure: let β be i’s confidence on whether j is malicious, i then randomly picks
a value r between 0 and 1, and will give j another chance if r < 1 − β. We
refer to this procedure as recovery check procedure. Let F̃j(i, t) be i’s estimate of
Fj(i, t). Then the above strategy can be translated as follows: i will accept j’s
route participation request only if j has passed recovery check and the following
holds:
Fi(j, t)− F̃j(i, t) < Dmaxi (j, t) (7.19)
We refer to Fi(j, t)− F̃j(i, t) as i’s estimated balance with j, and refer to Dmaxi (j, t)
as cooperation level. Here Dmaxi (j, t) is a threshold set by i for two purposes: 1)
stimulating cooperation between i and j, and 2) limiting the possible damage that
j can cause to i. Setting Dmaxi (j, t) to be ∞ means that i will always help j,
setting Dmaxi (j, t) to be −∞ means that i will never help j. By letting Dmaxi (j, t)
to be positive, i agrees to forward some extra packets for j without getting instant
payback. Meanwhile, unlike acting fully cooperatively, the extra number of packets
that i will forward for j will be no more than Dmaxi (j, t), which can limit that
possible damage when j plays non-cooperatively. This is analogous to a credit
card system where Dmaxi (j, t) can be regarded as the credit line that i sets for j at
time t. Like credit card company adjusts your credit line, Dmaxi (j, t) can also be
adjusted by i over time. In this sense, we can also refer to Dmaxi (j, t) as the credit
line that i sets for j.
It is easy to see that an optimal setting of credit lines is crucial to effective
cooperation stimulation in noisy and hostile environments. Next we use nodes i
166
and j as example to illustrate how to set good credit lines. If the request rates
between i and j are constant, then setting the credit line to be 1 will be optimal
in the sense that no request will be refused when two nodes have the same request
rate. However, due to mobility and nodes’ inherent variable traffic generation
rates, the request rates between i and j are usually not constant. In this case, if
the credit lines are set to be too small, some requests will be refused even when
the average request rates between them are equal. Let fi(j, t) denote the number
of times that i needs j to help forward packets by time t. If we set the credit lines
as follows:
Dmaxi (j) = max
t
{1, fi(j, t)− fj(i, t)}, Dmaxj (i) = max
t
{1, fj(i, t)− fi(j, t)}, (7.20)
then except the first several requests, no other requests will be refused when the
average request rates between them are equal. If the average request rates between
them are not equal, assuming that limt→∞
fi(j,t)
fj(i,t)
> 1, then no matter how large
Dmaxi (j) is, a certain portion of i’s requests will have to be refused. This makes
sense: to maintain ceratin fairness, j has no incentive to forward more packets for i.
This also suggests that arbitrarily increasing credit lines cannot always increase the
number of accepted requests. It is worth pointing out that (7.20) requires fi(j, t)
and fj(i, t) to be known by i and j. However, such prior knowledge is usually not
available since each node may not know a priori the others’ request rates as well
as its request rates to the others. Extensive simulations haven been conducted to
study the effect of cooperation level, and the results suggest that when all nodes
almost have equal request rates, a relatively small cooperation level can work well.
In order for the above strategy to work well, node i needs to have a good
estimate of Fj(i, t) for any other node j and needs to select a good cooperation
level. We first study how to get a good estimate of Fj(i, t). If i can have accurate
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knowledge of monitoring errors experienced by j, denoted by p̃f and p̃m, then we
should have
Fj(i, t)((1− pe)(1− p̃f ) + pep̃m) ' Hi(j, t). (7.21)
Then a good estimate of Fj(i, t) can be
F̃j(i, t) =
Hi(j, t)
(1− pe)(1− p̃f ) + pep̃m (7.22)
However, in general i cannot accurately estimate p̃f and p̃m. In such scenarios, a
more conservative estimate can be
F̃j(i, t) =
Hi(j, t)
(1− pe)(1− pf ) . (7.23)
Consequently, j can take advantage of such inaccuracy to forward less packets for
i, or ask i to forward more packets for it, which will be further investigated in later
sections.
It has been shown in [31] that topology will also play a critical role in enforcing
cooperation for fixed ad hoc networks, and in most situations cooperation cannot
be enforced. For example, a node in a bad location may never be able to get help
from other nodes due to that no one will need it to forward packets. In this work
we focus on mobile ad hoc networks. In such networks, a node in a bad location
at a certain time may move to a better location later, or vice versa. This suggests
that when a node receives a packet forwarding request from another node, it should
not refuse this request only simply because the requester cannot help it currently,
since the requester may be able to help later. That is, mobility can help alleviate
the effect of topology dependence.
Route selection stage: Next we study the strategy in the route selection stage.
Once a set of routes have been discovered by node i with all relays on these routes
having agreed to forward packets for it, the following strategy will be taken by i:
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first, i will not further consider this route if any relay cannot pass recovery check;
second, among all those routes with all nodes having passed recovery check, i will
pick the one with the minimum number of hops.
Packet forwarding stage: Now we consider the strategy in the packet forwarding
stage. For any selfish node, once it has agreed to forward a packet for a certain
node, it should not intentionally drop this packet unless the following can hold:
(1− pe)(1− p̃f ) + pep̃m ≤ p̃m. (7.24)
That is, p̃f + p̃m ≥ 1, where p̃f and p̃m are the actual false alarm ratio and miss
detect ratio experienced by the node. If (7.24) holds, this means that the chance
that it will be marked as malicious even after dropping all the packets will still
be no more than forwarding all packets due to the high monitoring inaccuracy.
However, if (7.24) cannot hold, intentionally dropping packets will not be a good
strategy if it still need others’ help, since such dropping may cause it to be detected
as malicious and consequently cannot get help from other nodes in the future.
Let β(i, j) denote i’s confidence on whether j is malicious. By combining
the attacker detection strategy and the routing and packet forwarding strategies
described above, we devise the following attack-resistant cooperation stimulation
strategy:
Attack-Resistant Cooperation Stimulation Strategy: For each single
routing and packet forwarding subgame, assuming that P1 is the initiator who wants
to send a packet to Pn at time t, and a route “P1 → P2 → · · · → Pn” has
been discovered by P1. After P1 has sent requests to all the relays on this route
asking them to participate, for each non-malicious player on this route the following
strategies should be taken:
1. In the route participation stage: For any relay Pi, it will accept this re-
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quest if and only if P1 can pass recovery check and FPi(P1, t) − F̃P1(Pi, t) <
DmaxPi (P1, t); otherwise, it should refuse.
2. In the route selection stage: P1 will use this route if and only if all relays
on this routes have passed recovery check and this route has the minimum
number of hops among all those routes with all relays having passed recovery
check; otherwise, P1 should not use this route.
3. In the packet forwarding stage: For any relay Pi, it will forward this packet
if and only if it has agreed to be on this route and (7.24) does not hold;
otherwise, it should drop.
4. Attacker detection: Let β be an acceptable false alarm ratio from P1’s point
of view. Then it will mark a relay Pj as malicious if (7.15) holds with i = P1,
j = Pi. Consequently, P1 updates β(P1, Pj) using β.
7.4 Strategy Analysis under Noise yet Perfect
Monitoring
We first analyze the optimality of the proposed strategies under noise but perfect
monitoring. We first consider an infinite lifetime situation with Ti(t) → ∞ as
t →∞. The finite lifetime situation will be discussed later. We assume that credit






and 2) for any pair of nodes i and j, when limt→∞
fi(j,t)
fj(i,t)
≤ 1, at most a finite
number of i’s requests will be refused by j.
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Lemma 7.4.1 For any selfish node i ∈ N in the secure routing and packet for-
warding game with no attackers, once i has received a route participation request
from any other node j ∈ N , if the attack-resistant cooperation strategy is used by
player j, then accepting the request is always an optimal decision from the point of
view of player i.
Proof From player i’s point of view, refusing the request may cause it to lack
enough balance to request player j to forward packets for it in the future (i.e.,
Dj(i, t) > D
max
j (i, t)), while agreeing to forward the packet will not introduce any
performance loss due to the assumption (7.25). Therefore, accepting the request
is an optimal decision.
Lemma 7.4.2 In the secure routing and packet forwarding game where some packet
forwarding decisions may not be perfectly executed, from the point of view of any
player j ∈ N , if the multi-node attack-resistant and cheat-proof cooperation strat-
egy is followed by all the other nodes, in the packet forwarding stage intentionally
dropping a packet that it has agreed to forward cannot bring it any gain.
Proof When a player j ∈ N intentionally drops a packet that it has agreed to
forward for any other player i ∈ N , it cannot get any gain except saving the cost
to transmit this packet. However, since player i follows the multi-node attack-




≥ 1, by dropping this packet, player j also loses a chance to
request player i to forward a packet for it. To get the chance back, player j has
to forward another packet for player i. Therefore, intentionally dropping a packet
cannot bring any gain to player j.
Theorem 7.4.3 In the secure routing and packet forwarding game with no attack-
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ers, the strategy profile that all players follow the multi-node attack-resistant and
cheat-proof cooperation strategy forms a subgame perfect equilibrium, is cheat-proof,
and achieves absolute fairness in cost if ci = c for all i ∈ N . If 0 < limt→∞ Ti(t)Tj(t) <
∞ for any i, j ∈ N , this strategy profile is also strongly Pareto optimal.
Proof We first prove that this strategy profile forms a subgame perfect equi-
librium. Since this multi-player game can be decomposed into many two-player
subgames, we only need to consider the two-player subgame played by player i
and player j. Suppose that player j does not follow the above strategy, that is,
either it will refuse to forward packets for player i when it should, or will inten-
tionally drop packets that it has agreed to forward for player i, or it will forward
more packets than it should for player i, or it will use non-minimum cost routes to
send packets. First, from Lemma 7.4.1 and Lemma 7.4.2 we know that refusing to
forward packets for other players when it should or intentionally dropping packets
that it has agreed to forward will not introduce any performance gain. Second,
forwarding much more packets (i.e., more than Dmaxi (j, t)) than player j has for-
warded for it will not increase its own payoff too according to the assumption of
credit line selections. Third, using a non-minimum cost route to send packet will
decrease its expected gain. Based on the above analysis we can conclude that the
above strategy profile (the multi-player attack-resistant and cheat-proof cooper-
ation strategy) forms a Nash equilibrium. To check that the profile is subgame
perfect, note that in every subgame off the equilibrium path the strategies are
either to play non-cooperatively forever if player j has dropped a certain number
of packets that it has agreed to forward for player i, which is a Nash equilibrium,
or still to play the multi-player cheat-proof packet forwarding strategy, which is
also a Nash equilibrium.
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Since no private information has been involved, based on the analysis presented
in section 7.1, we can conclude that the proposed cooperation stimulation strategy
is cheat-proof.









j∈N,j 6=i Fi(j, t)∑
j∈N,j 6=i Fj(i, t)
= 1. (7.26)
That is, this strategy can achieve absolute fairness in cost.
Now we show that the strategy profile is strongly Pareto optimal. From payoff
function (7.12) we can see that to increase its own payoff, a player i can either
try to increase Si(t) or decrease Fi(t). However, according to the above strategy,
minimum cost routes have been used, therefore Fi(t) cannot be further decreased
without affecting the others’ payoff. In order to increase its payoff, the only way
that player i can do is to increase limt→∞
Si(t)
Ti(t)
, which means that some other players
will have to forward more packets for player i. Since all Ti(t)’s are in the same
order, increasing player i’s payoff will definitely decrease other players’ payoff.
Therefore the above strategy profile is strongly Pareto optimal.
In the proof of Theorem 7.4.3 we have assumed that 1) Dmaxi (j, t) is large
enough such that forwarding Dmaxi (j, t) more packets than player j has forwarded




= 0. If Dmaxi (j, t) cannot satisfy the above two requirements,
the proposed strategy profile is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium. Finding a
Dmaxi (j, t) value to satisfy the first requirement is easy, while to satisfy both re-
quirements may be difficult or may even be impossible when nodes’ requests rates
and mobility patterns are not known a priori, which also explains why stimulating
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cooperation in real autonomous mobile ad hoc networks is extremely challenging.
However, our simulation results show that in many situations even an non-optimal
Dmaxi (j, t), such as a reasonably large constant, can still effectively stimulate co-
operation.
From the above analysis we can see that as long as gi is larger than certain
value, such as (1− pe)Lmaxgi > Lmaxci where Lmax is system parameter to indicate
the maximum possible number of hops that a route is allowed to have, then varying
gi will not change the strategy design.
Until now we have mainly focused on the situation that the game will be played
for an infinite duration. In most situations, a node will only stay in the network for
a finite duration. In this case, for each player i, if Dmaxi (j) is too large, due to its
finite staying time, it may have helped its opponents much more than its opponents
have helped it, while if Dmaxi (j) is too small, it may suffer the problems of lacking
enough nodes to forward packets for it. How to select a good Dmaxi (j) remains as
a challenge. section 7.6 has studied the tradeoff between the value of Dmaxi (j) and
the performance through simulations, which shows that under given simulation
scenarios a relatively small Dmaxi (j) value will be good enough to achieve near-
optimal performance (compared with setting Dmaxi (j) to be ∞) and good fairness
(compared with absolute fairness in cost). Here it is also worth pointing out that
the optimality of the proposed strategies cannot be guaranteed in finite duration
scenarios.
Now we analyze the multi-node attack-resistant and cheat-proof cooperation
strategies in the presence of attackers. The following two widely used attack models
are considered: dropping packet attack and injecting traffic attack. To simplify
our illustration, we assume that ci = c and gi = g for all i ∈ N .
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We first study dropping packet attack. By dropping other nodes’ packets,
attackers can decrease the network throughput and waste other nodes’ limited
resources, such as energy. Recall that an attacker detection mechanism has been
applied in the proposed cooperation strategy, from an attacker’s point of view,
dropping all the packets passing it may not be a good strategy since this can be
easily detected and a detected attacker cannot cause damage any more. Intuitively,
in order to maximize the damage, attackers should selectively drop some portion
of packets to avoid being detected. According to the multi-node attack-resistant
and cheat-proof cooperation strategy, the maximum number of packets that an
attacker can drop without being detected is upper-bounded by npe+x
√
npe(1− pe)
where n is the times that it has agreed to forward. That is, it has to forward at
least n(1− pe)− x
√
npe(1− pe) packets. However, among those dropped packets,
n(1−pe) packets are due to noise, which will be there even no attackers are present.
Thus, the extra damage is upper-bounded by x
√
npe(1− pe)c, while the extra cost
is n(1− pe)c− x
√






n(1− pe) = 0, (7.27)
selectively dropping packets can bring no gain to the attackers. In other words,
if the game will be played for an infinite duration, dropping packet attack cannot
cause damage to selfish nodes.
Now we study injecting traffic attack. By injecting an overwhelming amount
of packets to the network, attackers can consume other nodes’ resources (e.g.,
energy) once they help the attackers forward these packets. Since for each selfish
node i ∈ Ns, we have Di(j, t) ≤ Dmaxi (j, t), the maximum number of packets that
an attacker j can request i to forward without paying back is upper-bounded by
Dmaxi (j, t). Therefore, the damage that can be caused by injecting traffic attack is
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Dmaxi (j, t) is a large constant).
Based on the above analysis we can also see that when the multi-node attack-
resistant and cheat-proof strategy is used by all selfish nodes, attackers can only
caused limited damage to the network. Further, the relative damage will go to 0
when the game will be played for an infinite duration. Since Ri(j, t) and Fj(i, t)








Therefore, except some false positive, selfish players’ overall payoff will not be
affected under attacks. Although false positive may cause a node not to be able to
get help from those who have been mistakenly detected as malicious or from those
whom it has mistakenly detected as malicious, this will not become a big issue since
the false positive probability can be made approach to 0 by using a large constant
x without decreasing the overall payoff. From the above analysis we can also see
that no matter what objectives the attackers have and what attacking strategy they
use, as long as selfish nodes employ the multi-node attack-resistant and cheat-proof
cooperation strategy, the selfish nodes’ performance can be guaranteed.
Based on the above analysis we can conclude that for the infinite duration case








provided that all selfish nodes follow the multi-node attack-resistant and cheat-
proof cooperation strategy. This upper-bound can be achieved by the following
attacking strategy:
Optimal Attacking Strategy: In the secure routing and packet forwarding
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game, for any attacker j ∈ Nm, it should always refuse in the route participation
stage, should always pick the route including no attackers in the route selection
stage, and should not forward packets in the packet forwarding stage.
Following similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 7.4.3, we can also
show that in the infinite duration secure routing and packet forwarding game,
the strategy profile where all selfish players follow the multi-node attack-resistant
and cheat-proof cooperation strategy and all attackers follow the above optimal
attacking strategy forms a subgame perfect equilibrium, is cheat-proof and strongly
Pareto optimal, and achieves absolute fairness in cost under some mild conditions.
When the game will only be played for a finite duration, the above attack-
ing strategy is not optimal any more. Now the attackers can try to drop some
nodes’ packets without being detected, since the statistical dropping packet at-
tacker detection will not be initiated unless having collected enough interactions
to avoid high false positive probability. In this case, selfish nodes’ performance
will be degraded a little bit. However, as long as the game will be played for a
reasonably long time, which is the focus of this chapter, the relative damage is still
insignificant.
7.5 Strategy Analysis Under Noise and Imper-
fect Monitoring
This section analyzes the performance of the devised strategies, identifies the con-
ditions under which they can or cannot work well and why, and quantifies the
maximum possible damage that the attackers can cause.
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7.5.1 Performance Analysis under No Attacks
We first consider the decisions made by the relays in the packet forwarding stage.
As long as (7.24) does not hold and the source i can get an accurate estimate
of Fj(i, t), from any selfish node’s point of view, the only gain after intentionally
dropping a packet is saving cost cj, while the penalty includes the increase of
probability being marked as malicious by i and the decrease of the number of
packets that i will forward for j in the future. Therefore j has no incentive to
intentionally dropping packets in such scenarios.
What is the consequence of inaccurate estimate of Fj(i, t)? Let’s assume that
p̃f and p̃m are the actual false alarm and miss detect ratios experienced by j, and
i does not know it. In this case, i may use (7.22) to estimate Fj(i, t), and we have
Fj(i, t)
F̃j(i, t)
' (1− pe)(1− pf )
(1− pe)(1− p̃f ) + pep̃m . (7.30)








(1− pe)(1− pf )
(1− pe)(1− p̃f ) + pep̃m . (7.31)
In other words, node j can take advantage of imperfect monitoring to increase
its performance by forwarding less packets for node i. However, if the underlying
monitoring mechanism can guarantee pf and pm to be small enough, the damage
caused to node i will be very limited. Further, if node i also experiences lower
false alarm ratio, the damage will be further reduced, since the above analysis
is also applicable to i. We can also check that if the false alarm ratio and miss







Next we consider the source’s decision in the route selection stage. If no relays
on the selected route have been marked as malicious by the source, it is easy to
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see that this is an optimal selection. What is the consequence if some relays have
been marked as malicious? First, with very small probability those nodes can
pass recovery check, so even they are malicious, the long-term average damage
is still negligible. Second, since these nodes may have been mistakenly marked
as malicious, such chance can allow them to recover their reputation, and may
consequently increase the source’s future payoff, since it may have more resources
to select and use.
Finally we analyze the relay’s decision in the route participation stage. The
optimality of the proposed strategy in this stage depends on a lot of uncertain
factors, such as the nodes’ future request pattern, the changing topology, the nodes’
future staying time, the selection of good cooperation level, etc. Since most of these
factors cannot be known a priori, the optimality of the proposed strategies cannot
be guaranteed. It is usually impossible to find an optimal strategy without being
able to accurately predict the future. However, our simulation results (Section 7.6)
show that when nodes’ request rates do not vary a lot, a relatively small cooperation
level can work very well.
If the future is predictable, or at least partially predictable, such as the network
will keep alive for a long time, all nodes staying in the network will keep generating
and sending packets, and any pair of nodes will meet and request each other’s help
again and again, then each node can set its cooperation level to be a very large
positive constant without affecting its overall performance (any extra constant
cost will not affect the overall payoff as long as limt→∞ Ti(t) = ∞). Then the
proposed strategies can form a Nash equilibrium, and are Pareto optimal, are
subgame perfect, and achieve absolute fairness (in cost), provided that each node i
can accurately estimate Fj(i, t) for any other node j and D
max
i (j, t) is large enough
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to accommodate possible variable and bursty requests between them. The proof
is easy by following the above analysis, which is not put here due to space limit.
Unfortunately, such ideal scenarios may not exist in reality.
7.5.2 Attacking Strategy and Damage Analysis
Thus far we mainly focus on the scenarios that no nodes are malicious. Next we
analyze the possible damage that can be caused by the attackers. In an abstract
level, to damage the network, one can either drop other nodes’ packet, or inject
a lot of traffic to consume other nodes’ resources. We first consider drop packet
attack. According to the devised strategy, for attacker j, to avoid being marked
as malicious by node i, the highest packet drop ratio p′e that it can employ should
satisfy the following inequality to avoid being detected:
(1− pe)(1− pf ) ≤ (1− p′e)(1− p̃f ) + p′ep̃m, (7.32)
where p̃f and p̃m are the actual false alarm ratio and miss detect ratio experienced
by j. The best case from j’s point of view is that p̃f = 0 and p̃m = pm, then we
can have
p′e ≤
pe + (1− pe)pf
1− p̃m (7.33)
Accordingly, the extra percentage of i’s packets that can be dropped by j is upper-
bounded by
p′e − pe ≤
pep̃m + (1− pe)pf
1− p̃m (7.34)
From (7.34) we can see that as long as pe, pm, and pf are small, the extra damage
will be limited. Meanwhile, in order to continuously drop i’s packets, j also needs
to forward at least (1− p′e) percentage of packets for i, which may also incur a lot
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of cost to j. In other words, from an attacker’s point of view, as long as p′e − pe is
not large, dropping other nodes’ packets may not match its best interest by also
taking into consideration of its own cost.
However, if an attacker can successfully exploit the underlying monitoring to
avoid being detected, such as experiencing a high p̃m, then the extra number of
packets it can drop without being detected can increase dramatically. According
to (7.34), the extra damage will increase nonlinearly with the increase of p̃m. This
suggests that it is critical to have a robust monitoring scheme to ensure that the
monitoring error will not be too large. Actually, from (7.34) we can also see that
even for p̃m = 0.5, p
′
e − pe is still upper-bounded by pe + 2pf , which is still small
as long as pe and pf are small.
For inject traffic attack, since each selfish node i will maintain Fj(i, t) ∼ Fi(j, t),
for any node j, the extra number of packets that node j can request node i to
forward is always bounded. According to (7.31), the maximum possible ratio
between Fi(j, t) and Fj(i, t) is upper-bounded by
(1−pe)(1−p̃f )+pep̃m
(1−pe)(1−pf ) provided p̃f +
p̃m < 1. Meanwhile, if the underlying monitoring mechanism can ensure that pm
and pf are small, the ratio will be small. However, if j can successfully manage to
let p̃f + p̃m ≥ 1, such as making the miss detect ratio approach 1, it can always
request i to forward packet without returning any favor.
It is worth noting that under the proposed strategies, no matter what goal the
attackers may have, the selfish nodes’ payoff can always be guaranteed as long as
pe, pm and pf are small. Meanwhile, if α (defined in (7.13)) is small enough, from
an attacker’s point of view, maximizing (7.13) is almost equivalent to minimizing
the selfish nodes’ payoff. Otherwise, maximizing (7.13) may not cause as much
damage as minimizing the selfish nodes’ payoff, since in this case the attackers
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may not be willing to continuously drop packets without being detected due to the
reason that this also requires the attackers to forward a lot of packets for other
nodes and may not be their best interest.
7.5.3 Remarks
Compared with existing work, such as [6,26,31,59,78,80], we address cooperation
stimulation under very realistic scenarios: noisy environment, existence of (insider)
attackers, mobile nodes, variable traffic rate, etc. This makes the task extremely
challenging, and optimal solutions may not be always available. Meanwhile, our
goal is not to enforce all nodes to act fully cooperatively, but to stimulate cooper-
ation among nodes as much as possible.
One major difference between our scheme and the existing reputation-based
schemes is that in our scheme pairwise relationship have been maintained by nodes.
That is, each selfish node will keep track of the interactions with all other nodes
experienced by it. The drawback is that it requires per-node monitoring and results
in extra storage complexity. However, the advantage lies in that it can effectively
stimulate cooperation in noisy and hostile environments. Meanwhile, for each node
i, at any time it only needs to maintain the records Ri(j), isBadi(j), Fi(j), Fj(i)
for any other node j that i has interacted, so the maximum storage complexity is
upper-bounded by 4|N |. As long as |N | is not too large, for most mobile devices,
such as notebook and PDA, the storage requirement is insignificant.
In most existing work, such as in [6, 31, 78, 80], however, each node makes its
decision based solely on its own experienced quality of service, such as throughput.
Although the overhead is much lower than our scheme due to that only end-to-end
acknowledge is required and each node only needs to keep its own past state, they
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cannot effectively stimulate cooperation at all in noisy and hostile environments.
The logic to base only on its own experience quality of service is that they expect no
node will behave maliciously since misbehaviors will be propagated back later and
the quality of service experienced by the misbehaving nodes will also be decreased.
However, such logic cannot hold in noisy and hostile environments. First, attackers
will be willing to see such performance degradation, therefore they will try to
behave maliciously if possible. Second, even only noise can cause such misbehavior
propagation and performance degradation since noise can cause packet dropping.
Meanwhile, without per-node monitoring, attackers can always behave maliciously
and cause damage to the others without being detected.
In [31, 78], when a node makes its cooperation decision at each step, it only
bases on the normalized throughput that it has experienced. If only normalized
throughput is used, a greedy user can set a low forwarding ratio, but try to send a
lot of packets. Therefore, unless the others also try to send a lot of packets, from
the greedy node’s point of view, even after a large portion of its packets have been
dropped by other nodes, it can still enjoy a high throughput, although the normal-
ized throughput may be low. Meanwhile, as mentioned before, applying the same
forwarding ratio to all nodes is not fair to those who have acted cooperatively. To
resolve this problem, in our scheme, each node applies different packet forwarding
decision for different node based on its past interactions between them.
Besides reputation-based cooperation stimulation schemes, pricing-based schemes
have also been proposed in the literature, such as [7, 18, 19, 99, 100]. Comparing
to pricing-based schemes, the major drawback of reputation-based schemes is that
some nodes may not get enough help to send out all their packets. The most
underlying reasons are that favors cannot be returned immediately and future is
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not predictable. In other words, when a node is requested by another node to
forward packets, since it cannot get compensation immediately and it is not sure
whether the requester will return the favor later, it usually has no strong incentive
to accept the request. Pricing-based schemes do not suffer such problems since
a node can get immediate monetary payback after providing services. However,
pricing-based schemes require tamper-proof hardware or central banking service
to handle billing information, which is their major drawback. If such requirement
can be efficiently satisfied with low overhead, pricing-based schemes can be a bet-
ter choice than reputation-based schemes. Meanwhile, it is worth pointing out
that pricing-based schemes also suffer from noise and possible malicious behavior,
and the proposed statistical attacker detection mechanism is also applicable to
pricing-based scenarios.
In general, necessary monitoring is needed when stimulating cooperation among
nodes. For example, in [58], watchdog is proposed to detect whether some nodes
have dropped packets. In this chapter we assume that the underlying monitoring
mechanism can provide accurate per-node monitoring. Although this can be a
strong assumption in some scenarios, it can greatly simplify our analysis and at
the same time provide thoughtful insights. Meanwhile, this can be achieved by
some recently proposed monitoring mechanisms, such as those proposed in [91,93].
It is worth mentioning that in some situations perfect monitoring is either not
available or too expensive to afford. For example, the one proposed in [91] relies on
asymmetric cryptography, which may be too expensive to afford for some resource-
stringent mobile devices. The study of imperfect monitoring is beyond the scope
of this chapter, but will be investigated in our future work.
In our analysis we have assumed that the packet drop ratio pe is the same
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for all nodes at all time, which may not hold in general. If different nodes may
experience different pe, the nodes experiencing lower pe may experience high false
positive probabilities when performing the proposed attacker detection mechanism.
In this case, to decrease false positive probability, nodes need set the threshold to
be large enough, that is, using a larger x and pe in (7.15). Although this may
be taken advantage of by the attackers to cause more damage, as long as the gap
between the packet dropping ratios experienced by different nodes is not large,
which is usually the case, the extra damage is still limited.
It is also worth mentioning that the security of the proposed strategy also
relies on the existing secure protocols to achieve secure access control and secure
authentication, and to defend those attacks launched during route discovery, such
as those in [34–37,42,65,76,90,91,93,95,101]. In general, besides dropping packets
and injecting traffic, attackers can also have a variety of ways to attack the network,
such as jamming, slander, etc. In this chapter our focus is not to address all these
attacks, but to provide insight on stimulating cooperation in noisy and hostile
environments. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first one to formally
address this issue under such realistic scenarios.
7.6 Simulation Studies
In this section we conduct extensive simulations to evaluate the effectiveness of the
devised strategy and to identify when and why in some situations these strategies
cannot work well.
In our simulations, both static and mobile ad hoc networks have been studied,
with mobile ad hoc network being our focus. In these simulations, nodes are
randomly deployed inside a rectangular area of 1000m× 1000m, and each mobile
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node moves according to the random waypoint model, with vmin = 10m/s, vmax =
30m/s, and the average pause time 100s. The maximum transmission range is
250m.
In these simulations, each node randomly picks another node as the destination
to send packets. The total number of selfish nodes is 100. Both pm and pf are set
to be 5%, and β is set to be 0.1%. Each packet has a delay constraint, which is set
to be 10s. If a packet is dropped by some relay, no retransmission will be applied.
For each node i, we set gi = 1 and ci = 0.1. The nodes are indexed from 1 to N,
where N is the total number of nodes.
To conduct performance evaluation and comparison, the following are measured
for each selfish node in the simulations:
• Normalized throughput: this is the ratio between the total number of suc-
cessfully delivered packets and the total number of packets scheduled to be
sent.
• Probability of no route available: this is the percentage packets dropped due
to no valid route is available.
• Cost per successful packet delivery: this is the ratio between the total number
of forwarded packets (both for itself and for the others) and the total number
of successfully delivered packets originating from it.
• Balance this is the difference between the total number of packets that this
node forwarded for the others and the total number of packets that the others
forwarded for it.
According to (7.12) it is easy to see that a selfish node’s payoff can be easily















































Figure 7.4: Effects of mobility on cooperation stimulation
delivery.
7.6.1 Mobile Ad Hoc Networks vs. Static Ad Hoc Net-
works
We first study the effect of mobility on cooperation stimulation. In this set of
simulations, three types of networks are generated: mobile, partial mobile, and
static. In the partial mobile ad hoc network, the nodes with indices ranging from
1 to 50 are mobile, and the other half are static. All nodes employ the same traffic
pattern: the packet inter-arrival time follows exponential distribution with mean
being 2s. All nodes set their cooperation level to be 60. The simulation results are
illustrated in Fig. 7.4.
First, from the throughput comparison we can see that for the static case, ex-
cept several nodes, the majority of nodes (85%) experience extremely bad through-
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put. This is due to the reason that at most times they cannot find a route with
all relays willing to help it (shown in the second figure). For those several nodes
with high normalized throughput, the reason is that the destinations are in the
transmission range of the sources. These results suggest that the devised strate-
gies cannot be used in static ad hoc networks. Actually, in [31, 100] the authors
have demonstrated that in networks with fixed topology, cooperation enforcement
is impossible to achieve by relying solely on reputation. The most basic reason is
that the service that a node can provide is usually not needed by its neighbors,
therefore its neighbors have no incentive to help it.
From these results we can also see that when all nodes are mobile, the nor-
malized throughput can be fairly high. For example, except 4 nodes, all the other
nodes have normalized throughput being more than 80%. Even for those four
nodes, their normalized throughput is still more than 70%. We can also see that
for the majority of the nodes (96%), almost none of their packets are dropped due
to no available routes, that is, cooperation among nodes has been effectively stim-
ulated. Actually, the positive effect of mobility has also been noticed and studied
in many other works. For example, Luo et. al. have studied how mobility can
help improving lifetime in wireless networks and help improving the reliability of
wireless ad hoc networks [56], and Capkun et. al. have studied how mobility helps
security in ad hoc networks [24].
Now we study the partial mobile case. From the throughput comparison we
can see that for those mobile nodes, no one has normalized throughput less than
40%, and the majority (33 out of 50) have normalized throughput higher than
80%. However, for those static nodes, the situation is totally reversed: half of












































Figure 7.5: Effects of traffic pattern on cooperation stimulation
help stimulating cooperation. The underlying reason is that mobility can make the
service exchange more effectively. An analogy to this is the effect of businessman:
without them, we can only exchange service locally, the service we can get will
be very limited; while with the help of businessman, service can be exchanged
globally. From now on, we will mainly focus on mobile ad hoc networks with all
nodes being mobile.
7.6.2 Bursty Traffic Pattern vs. Non-bursty Traffic Pat-
tern
Next we investigate the effect of traffic pattern on cooperation stimulation. In
these simulations two traffic patterns are considered: bursty and non-bursty. In
bursty case, packets are generated in a bursty pattern with average bursty length























Dmax = 60 for all nodes
Dmax = -30 for the first ten nodes
Figure 7.6: Effect of negative cooperation level on cooperation stimulation
both cases the average packet arrival rate is 0.5 packet/s. The simulation results
are illustrated in Fig. 7.5.
It is surprising to see that bursty case has slightly better normalized through-
put than non-bursty case. This can be explained using the unsuccessful forward
ratio experienced by each node (shown in the second figure): in bursty case, the
unsuccessful forward ratio experienced by each other is 1% lower than the non-
bursty case. This is because in non-bursty case, when a packet needs to be sent,
with a high probability the existing route may have broken since this route may
be discovered a long time ago, while in bursty case, though link breakages also
happen frequently, as long as the current route is good, almost all the packets can
be delivered successfully. However, if nodes with bursty-pattern have much higher
rates, or the burst length is much longer, the performance of bursty-case may be
decreased, as to be shown later.
7.6.3 Effect of Negative Cooperation Level
In this set of simulations some nodes set their cooperation level to be negative.
Specifically, the first ten nodes set Dmax to be -30, and all the others set Dmax to










































Figure 7.7: Effect of cooperation level on cooperation stimulation
the majority of nodes (6 out of ten) who set Dmax to be negative have normalized
throughput less than 65%. Meanwhile, they also cause some other nodes to expe-
rience lower normalized throughput (6 out of 90 have normalized throughput no
more than 70%). These results suggest that as long as a node wants to stay in the
network for a long time and needs to send packets continuously, they should not
set their cooperation level to be negative.
7.6.4 Effect of Cooperation Level on Cooperation Stimu-
lation
In this set of simulations, each node sets its traffic rate to be 0.5 packet/s following
Poisson arrival. In each simulation different Dmax value is used ranging from 10
to 240. The results are illustrated in Fig. 7.7. From the first figure we can see
that once Dmax ≥ 80, both the average normalized throughput and the average
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payoff experienced by selfish nodes do not increase further, which suggests that in
this case setting Dmax = 80 can almost approach the optimal solution in term of
normalized throughput. However, from the second figure we can see that with the
increase of Dmax ≥ 80, the balance variation experienced by nodes also increase,
which leads to high unfairness. That explains why we have set Dmax = 60 in our
simulations: a good tradeoff between payoff and fairness.
7.6.5 Effect of Inhomogeneous Request Rates
In this set of simulations, each node’s traffic rate is determined as follows: let i
be a node’s index ranging from 1 to 100, then its traffic rate will be set as ((i
mod 20) + 1)/2 packet/s. Based on the configuration of Dmax and traffic pattern,
three cases are studied: in case 1 and 3, for each node its traffic follows Poisson
arrival, while in case 2 each node’s traffic follows a bursty arrival. Meanwhile, in
case 1 and 2, all nodes set Dmax to be 60, while in case 3, each node with index i
set Dmax to be 60 + (i mod 2). The results are shown in Fig.7.8.
We first study the throughput comparison. From these results we can see that
case 3 has the highest normalized throughput while case 2 has the lowest normal-
ized throughput. This suggests that bursty traffic may decrease the performance,
while if a node has too much traffic to send, increasing their cooperation level
can increase their performance. From these results we can also see that with the
increase of traffic rate, the throughput decreases too. Although increasing Dmax
can slightly increase the performance, it cannot completely solve the problem. The
reason is that the service provided by those nodes with high traffic rate are not


































































































Figure 7.8: Effect of inhomogeneous request rates on cooperation stimulation
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By checking the second figure (probability of no route available) in Fig.7.8, we
can see that in case 2 (bursty case), a lot of packets will be dropped due to no
available routes, especially when the node’s traffic rate is high, which explains why
they have lowest throughput. From the third figure (cost per successful delivery)
in Fig.7.8 we can see that with the increase of traffic rate, the hop number per
route may decrease slightly, which is a little bit surprising, but makes sense: when
a node with high traffic rate has used up the quota assigned by those nodes with
lower rate, they are forced to use short routes such as one-hop route. This is also
confirmed by the results in the fourth figure, which indicates that for the first 20
nodes, their overall balance almost reaches to the maximum.
Next we study an extremely asymmetric case, where in this set of simulations,
except the first ten nodes which have packet arrival rate 5 packet/s, all the other
nodes have packet arrival rate 0.5 packet/s. According to the first ten nodes’ Dmax
values, three cases are studied: in case 1 they let Dmax = 60, in case 2 they set
Dmax = 120, and in case 3 they set Dmax = 180. For the other nodes in all the
three cases, Dmax = 60. The results are illustrated in Fig. 7.9. From these results
we can see that by increasing Dmax from 60 to 120, a lot of gain can be obtained
(normalized throughput increases from 8% to 22%), while increasing Dmax from
120 to 180 introduces almost no gain, and the normalized throughput is still only
about 22%. This suggests that although increasing Dmax can provide some gain,
they cannot change the inherent problem.
7.6.6 Effects of Different Drop Packet Attacks
In this set of simulation, we study the effect of different drop packet attacks. Four





















































































































































































Figure 7.11: Performance comparison under different number of attackers
drop all packets passing through it, drop half of the packets passing through it,
and selectively drop packets passing through it and at the same time keep avoiding
being detected. Fig. 7.10 illustrates the evolution of the normalized throughput
and payoff averaged among all selfish nodes over time. From these results, first we
can see that dropping all packet can cause the maximum damage, the reason is
the we have set Bth to be a large value (200), so each attacker can drop up to 199
of any other node’s packets without being marked as malicious. However, we can
also see that with time increasing, the selfish nodes’ performance will also increase.
From these results we can also see that adaptive dropping can even increase the
selfish nodes’ performance. This is because the damage it can cause is very limited
in order to avoid being detected, while keeping forwarding packets for selfish nodes
can reduce the selfish nodes’ average hop number per selected route. Although
intuitively adaptive dropping may cause a lot of damage, in reality this may not
be the case.
7.6.7 Effect of Attacker Number
In this set of simulations we study the selfish nodes’ average performance in the
presence of different number of attackers, with the number of attackers ranging






















































Dmax = 20  
Dmax = 40  
Dmax = 60  
Dmax = 80  
Dmax = 100
Figure 7.12: Effect of cooperation level on damage
packet for selfish nodes. The results are illustrated in Fig. 7.11. From these results
we can see that with the increase of attacker number, the average normalized
throughput among all selfish nodes keeps almost unchanged, and the average payoff
only decreases very slightly. This can be explained using the second figure, where
here total damage is defined as the total number of packets that selfish nodes have
forwarded for each attacker. From this figure we can see that after some time, no
more damage can be caused to selfish nodes due to the reason that they have used
up all the quota assigned to them. This suggests that the proposed strategy is
robust to inject traffic attack.
7.6.8 Cooperation Level vs. Damage
In this final set of simulations, the effect of Dmax on selfish nodes’ performance
under inject traffic attack is studied, with the selfish nodes’ Dmax varying from
20 to 100. The results are illustrated in Fig. 7.12. From these results we can
see that after Dmax passes 60, the selfish nodes’ average performance (normalized
throughput and payoff) keep almost unchanged. Similar as the results illustrated in
Fig. 7.11, for each given Dmax, the damage caused by the attackers will not change
after some time due to using up all the assigned quota. Meanwhile, the damage will
increase linearly with the increase of Dmax. By also taking into consideration of
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fairness issue, these results also suggest Dmax = 60 can be a good choice. However,
we need to keep in mind that the selection of Dmax also depends on the underlying
traffic rate. It is easy to understand that with the increase of traffic rate, we should
also increase Dmax, especially when mobility is low and traffic may exhibits strong
bursty pattern and/or variable rates.
7.7 Summary
In this chapter we have investigated the issues of cooperation stimulation for self-
organized mobile ad hoc networks in a realistic context, where the communica-
tion channels are error-prone, the underlying monitoring is imperfect, and the
environment is hostile with possible malicious behavior. We have identified the
underlying reasons why stimulating cooperation among nodes under scenarios is
extremely challenging. Unlike most existing work whose goal is to enforce all
nodes to act fully cooperatively, our goal is to stimulate cooperation among selfish
nodes as much as possible through reciprocal altruism. We have devised a set
of reputation-based attack-resistant cooperation stimulation strategies, which are
completely self-organizing and fully distributed, and do not require any tamper-
proof hardware or central banking or billing service. Both theoretical analysis and
extensive simulation studies have demonstrated that the devised strategies can ef-
fectively stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes under various scenarios and
meanwhile is robust to attacks. Further, the conditions under which the devised
strategies cannot work well have also been studied and we conclude that the most




Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis we have studied how to secure cooperative ad hoc network against
insider attacks under noise and imperfect monitoring, and how to design attack-
resistant cooperation strategies for autonomous ad hoc networks that can work
well in noisy and hostile environments.
First, we have studied how to handle routing disruption attacks in mobile ad
hoc networks. Most existing secure ad hoc routing protocols require significant
overhead to implement extra security mechanisms, such as secure neighbor discov-
ery and link-level data forwarding monitoring. In this dissertation we present a set
of light-weight techniques, referred to as HADOF. We use a novel self-evaluation
mechanism that can significantly speed up malicious node detection. With self-
evaluation, a malicious node has to either admit dropping packets or provide re-
ports that are most likely conflicting with others. Based on self-evaluation, a dis-
tributed cheating record is maintained to track nodes’ long-term behavior. In ad-
dition, route diversity and adaptive route rediscovery mechanisms are employed to
enable quick recovery from route disruption due to malicious attacks, mobility and
traffic congestion. HADOF is capable of adaptively adjusting routing strategies
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according to network dynamics, and nodes’ past record and current performance.
It can distinguish routing disruptions caused by nodes’ temporary misbehavior and
those caused by malicious attacks. It can defeat black hole, gray hole, frame-up,
rushing attack, and wormhole attack. More importantly, HADOF introduces little
overhead to the existing routing protocols.
Second, we have investigated the possible injecting traffic attacks that can
be launched in mobile ad hoc networks, and proposed a set of mechanisms to
defend against such attacks. Both query flooding attacks and injecting general data
packets attacks have been investigated. Furthermore, for injecting general data
packets attacks, the situations that attackers may use some advanced transmission
techniques, such as directional antennas or beamforming, to avoid being detected
have also been studied. Two set of defense mechanisms have been proposed, one is
fully distributed, while the other is centralized with de-centralized implementation.
Both theoretical analysis and simulation studies have been conducted, which have
confirmed the effectiveness of the proposed defense mechanisms.
Third, we have formally investigated how to secure cooperative ad hoc networks
against insider attacks under realistic scenarios, where the environment is noisy
and the underlying monitoring is imperfect. We model the dynamic interactions
between good nodes and attackers in such networks as securing routing and packet
forwarding game. The optimal defense strategies have been devised, which are
optimal in the sense that no other strategies can further increase the good nodes’
payoff under attacks. The maximum possible damage that can be caused by the
attackers have also been analyzed. By focusing on the worst-case scenario from
the good nodes’ point of view, that is, the good nodes have no prior knowledge of
the other nodes’ types while the insider attackers can know who are good nodes,
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the devised strategies can work well under any scenarios. Extensive simulations
have also been conducted to justify the underlying assumptions and to evaluate
the proposed strategies.
Fourth, we have investigated the issues of cooperation stimulation and security
in autonomous ad hoc networks, and proposed an Attack-Resistant Cooperation
Stimulation (ARCS) system to stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes and
defend against various attacks launched by malicious nodes. In the ARCS system,
each node can adaptively adjust their own strategies according to the changing
environments. The analysis has shown that in the ARCS system, the damage
that can be caused by malicious nodes is bounded, and the cooperation among
selfish nodes is enforced through introducing a positive cooperation degree. At the
same time, the ARCS system maintains good fairness among selfish nodes. The
simulation results have also agreed with the analysis. Another key property of the
ARCS system is that it is fully distributive, completely self-organizing, and does
not require any tamper-proof hardware or central management points.
Finally, we have formally investigated secure cooperation stimulation in au-
tonomous mobile ad hoc networks under a game theoretic framework. Besides
selfish behavior, possible attacks have also been studied, and attack-resistant co-
operation stimulation have been devised which can work well under noisy and
hostile environments. First, a simple yet illuminating two-player packet forward-
ing game is studied. To find good cooperation strategies, equilibrium refinements
have been performed on obtained Nash equilibrium solutions under different op-
timality criteria, including subgame perfection, Pareto optimality, fairness, and
cheat-proofing, and a unique Nash equilibrium solution is finally derived, which
states that in the two-node packet forwarding game a node should not help its
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opponent more than its opponent has helped it. The results are then extended to
handle multi-node scenarios in noisy and hostile environments, where the dynamic
interactions between nodes are modelled as secure routing and packet forward-
ing games. By taking into consideration the difference between two-node case
and multi-node case, an attack-resistant and cheat-proof cooperation stimulation
strategy has been devised for autonomous mobile ad hoc networks. The analysis
has demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed strategy, and shown that it is
optimal under certain conditions. The analysis has also shown that the damage
that can be caused by attackers is bounded and limited when the proposed strate-
gies are used by selfish nodes. Simulation results have also illustrated that the
proposed strategies can effectively stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes in
noisy and hostile environments.
Although in this dissertation we have thoroughly addressed several critical is-
sues in securing ad hoc networks, there still exist many issues that need further
investigation. In the following of this chapter, we will list some of them that we
would like to address in future.
The first topic we would like to address is about trust modeling and reputa-
tion propagation in distributed networks. From previous chapters we have learned
that both attacker detection and cooperation stimulation involve the evaluation of
nodes’ trustworthiness. Meanwhile, when evaluating trustworthiness, direct obser-
vation alone may not be sufficient; indirect observation should also be considered,
which results in reputation propagation. Our focus will be on robust trust mod-
eling and reputation propagation. Besides building theoretic framework for trust-
worthiness evaluation in distributed networks, we would also like to investigate
the possible attacks associated to trust model and reputation propagation, since
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like all other schemes associated with security, trust management or reputation
systems can also become attackers’ targets. As a starting point in our exploration,
we have discovered several new attacks on reputation and trust systems, which
will lead to more exciting research challenges.
As mentioned before, effective monitoring is one of most crucial component
in securing wireless ad hoc and sensor networks, which is an indispensable com-
ponent in various aspects, such as intrusion detection, cooperation stimulation,
and trust evaluation. In the future, we will continually design effective and robust
monitoring mechanisms for ad hoc and sensor networks, and formally analyze their
performance under different scenarios. We plan to systematically investigate the
effect of imperfect monitoring on security and cooperation stimulation. Meanwhile
We plan to design low-cost and attack-resistant monitoring mechanisms by also
taking into consideration the tradeoff between monitoring accuracy and incurred
overhead. We also plan to investigate how to perform monitoring in a collaborative
way to simultaneously reduce the overhead and increase the accuracy.
The inherent characteristics and emergent properties of sensor networks make
a node’s location and time clock important parts of their state. Since sensor net-
works are usually deployed in hostile environments, security issues associated with
localization and time synchronization must also be studied. Recently, some suc-
cess has been achieved on securing localization and time synchronization services
in sensor networks. However, most existing schemes assume ideal scenarios, such
as ideal physical layer and perfect observation. Following similar methodologies
as used in this dissertational, in the future we plan to investigate how to perform
localization and time synchronization in noisy and hostile environments based only
on local and imperfect observation.
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